tributes; having no fuperior Law to direct or reftrain his Action; God is a Law to himself; that is, the Perfections of his own Nature, are a Rule to him of his Conduct; from which he can no more depart than he can oppose his own Action, or deny himself; for he never worketh, merely because he will work, or antecedently to any wife, good, or reafonable End of his working, but according to the Counsel of his Will; that is, after fuch a Manner, or for fuch Ends, as infinite Wisdom, Goodnefs, Mercy, or other moral Confiderations may direct. III. Tho' a fenfible Difference does therefore arife between the Duties of Man, as a dependent created Being, and the Conduct of the fupreme God; the Creator, Creator, and the Fountain of all Power; yet the general Reason of our imitating him, in those Perfections of his Nature, which are, in any Degree imitable by us, does still hold good; and obligeth us, as we are Creatures, to conduct ourselves in that Relation, as Reason and Order require we fhould do; and according to which the uncreated Being himself constantly regulates his own Actions; for he always does what in respect to his own State, or the Relation, wherein he ftands to his Creatures, does require, he fhould do. IV. By following Reafon and Order, we may be faid then, in a Senfe, to be Imitators of God, even while we are exercifing certain Virtues, of which his Soveraignty and the abfolute Perfec tion of his Nature render him incapable; and tho' an Obligation to them wholly arifeth from our prefent imperfect and dependent State. V. So that as to thofe moral Virtues of Sobriety, Chastity, and Humility, arifing from the prefent Union of the Soul to the Body, and from our Dependance on other Men, or our Commerce with them, which are properly human, or focial Duties, and cannot be afcribed to a Being of infinite Perfection; (for we cannot directly argue from the Idea of fuch a Being, that thofe Things are morally good, which are not included in his Idea:) The Anfwer is, tho' we cannot argue directly, in fuch a Way, yet to be fober, and chaste, and humble, is highly agreeable to our present State State and Condition; and, therefore, tho' We do not find in the Idea of an all-perfect Being, and for that very Reafon because he is all-perfect, any Attributes directly correfponding to these Duties; yet the general Reason for the Morality of them ftill holds good; we ought to render ourfelves as perfect, and, for that Reason, to approach as near to God as poffible: Thefe Duties are proper Means of perfecting our Nature, and of bringing us nearer to God; therefore they must be fupposed to have an intrinsick, which is what we understand by a moral Goodness in them. CHAP. Concerning the End of Man in refpect to his Happiness. III. A I. The Oppofition between human Happiness and Perfection. II. The Reafon of it. Question arifing from the Conflict between the Soul and the Body. IV, V. More easily anJwered, on Suppofition of a future State. VI. What Reafon directs upon that View. VII. The Error of the Stoicks concerning Pain. VIII. Of he roick Virtue. IX. The Error of the Epicureans concerning Pleafure. X. Tet the Argu ment, |