towards its Center, or proper Place, in a direct, than in an oblique or crooked Line. And if there be fo much Beauty and Reason in observing a certain Order in the Formation and Direction of Things inanimate; the Neceffity of Order will appear much greater, in Proportion, as the Things wherein it is fought or required, is of a fuperior and more excellent Nature.

IV. We shall no less easily dif cover that, as the most perfect Being acts according to a certain Order; fo his Action is always conducted to very wife and good Ends. And if Wisdom and Goodness are not Perfections, there is no arguing, in any Cafe, from the moft clear, the most universal, and incontested Notions, that Men can have of Things. D 3

CHAP.

CHA P. V.

Whence an Obligation of conforming to this Rule arifeth.

1. The Rule of Action to Man immutable. II. Confirmed by the Authority of Cicero and Ariftotle. III. More particularly of Ariftotle. IV. The Rule of Action to Man compared with that of other Creatures. V. A Difficulty which may arife. VI. Obviated. VII. Efpecially from a Profpect of future Rewards and Punishments. VIII. A future State of Rewards and Punishments demonftrated. IX. After a Manner

Manner that cannot be difputed by those, who believe the moral Perfections of the divine Nature. X. Another Objection propofed and, XI. anfwered. XII. The great Advantages to Men in following this Rule.

I.THE Rule, concerning which I am now speaking, is the

Rule of Order. A Rule that directs us to compare Things together, to obferve their feveral Relations, Powers and Properties; and from the Judgment we make of them, to employ the most proper Means towards attaining our End. So that the Law of Order, is only another Appellation for the Law of Reafon; for fuppofing a reasonable Being to act, if we intend any thing by: D 4 Rea

Reafon, or if Reafon is of any Ufe to fuch a Being, the proper Office of it will confift in advifing him to chuse the nearest and beft way to his End. It is impoffible, indeed, to conceive of what good use Reason can be to a Man, except by enabling him to judge when he lays Things together, and examines their different Qualities, whether he ought to prefer or reject them; whether they are really beneficial or injurious to him; otherwife his Understanding instead of being attended with thofePrivileges,with which the Author of Nature defigned he should be diftinguished, might rather prove the Occafion of his greater Error or Prejudice; as tending, in frequent Inftances, to mislead and carry him ftill farther from his proper End.

II. And

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II. And therefore Cicero defines the moral Law, or the Law of Nature, to be "right Reason, agree"able to the natural Conftitution " of Man, diffused as a common Principle, through all human "Race, uniform, and of perpetual "Force." Vera Ratio,naturæ Congruens, diffufa in omnes, Conftans, perpetua. De Republ. Confonant to which Definition is that of Ariftotle, who calls the Law of Nature immutable, and of the fame Operation and Effect every where; like that of Fire, faith he, fpeaking of his native Country, which burns here, and in Perfia. Τὸ μ φύσει ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχε τὴν ἐν ὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥστες τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ἐν bade, yev tegoaís, naier. Chrift. Ethe.

III. In the Judgment of this Philofopher, as inanimate Beings move and act in vertue of cer