dinance of God, and it is neceffary, to the Ends of it, that Men fhould expose themselves to Sufferings of this Kind, in Discharge of their Duty to it, this is a folid, and clear Answer to all Objections which may arife, whether in refpect to Prudence, or Juftice. As God has a Right to command our Obedience, in the moft difficult Inftances of it; fo he can, and will make up all Inconveniences, in Pursuance of his own Institution; and if they are not supplied in this Life, it is a convincing, and clear Argument, that there is another Life, wherein they shall be supplied.

XV. I have had no Defign, in thefe tranfient Remarks, on feveral of the moft eminent Philofophers, but to fhew, how, with all their Excellencies, they

had

had their Defects and Errors; and that without detracting from the Praises, which in all Ages, fince they flourished, have been thought due to them, we ought so to confult them, as to make use of our own Reason, or any additional Lghts, which the Improvements made by fucceeding Ages, may have afforded to us.

XVI. But how then, in this our Enquiry, concerning the Authority of Philosophers, in reference to the Subject of moral Virtue, fhall we come to any determinate Refolution? Seeing none of them was free from Error, and many of them were fubject to grofs Errors. If we fay, fuch wife Men did not always reafon justly, it may be asked, how we come to be more enlightened, or how we, certainly know, that

we

we are more enlightened. In order to prove that any Perfon did not reafon juftly, there must be fome certain Teft, or Standard of reasoning justly, with which if his Arguments do not agree, what he faith can be of no Authority.

XVII. But does not, then, a greater Difficulty, here occur; and which entangles us in a Circle? The Authority of Philofophers, faith the Reader, is propofed to me as a Guide; and now I am to judge, whether my Guide conduct me in the right Way: Is not this to change Hands, and to invert the natural Order of Things? I am no longer to follow; my Office at present is, to inform, and correct my Guide. There is no Remedy, but in the following Distinction, between

an

an abfolute, and a conditional O bedience to my Guide. Out of the Confidence I have in his Skill, or Honefty, I will follow where I do not know, or cannot fee my Way; but where I have some imperfect Knowledge of it, or have Caufe violently to fufpect, that he is going to mislead me; I will rather endeavour to find out the Way my felf, than to follow him into a Quagmire; or, perhaps, down a steep and dangerous Precipice, with my Eyes open.

XVIII. The Application is obvious, we ought not to judge of what is reasonable by Authority, but to examine Authority by Reafon. Yet, where our own Reason does not afford fufficient Light; in that Cafe, but in that Cafe only, Prudence may, fometimes,

1

direct us, to be determined by Authority; and, especially, if we are under Circumftances, as we, fometimes, are, that oblige us immediately to act.

The CONCLUSION. That no juft Inference can be drawn, against the Expediency of a divine Revelation, from any Thing that hath been faid, concerning the Light of natural Reafon.

HERE is one Objection,

ΤΗ

which I have had continually in View, throughout this Treatife, the Force whereof, it may be here, in the Conclufion of it, very proper for me to confider. It is questioned, if the Principles Ff

of