of an infinitely wife and good God, to believe, he has created all other Things in Number, Weight, and Measure, and yet left Man, the nobleft and moft excellent of his vifible Works, to act without any regard to Order or Proportion; and in particular to the Rule, I have now mentioned? A Rule, according to which all other Beings are not only obferved to act; but whereby even the most perfect Being himfelf does inviolably conduct his own Action. XV. Now I defire no more fhould be granted towards demonftrating the real Diftinction of moral Virtue, than that Man, fuppofed a reasonable Agent, is obliged antecedently to any poftive Inftitution, human or divine, to conduct himself by this Rule, that that is, by pursuing what he proposes to attain as good or convenient for him, by the most easy, fimple, and practicable Means. Upon this Conceffion, which no reasonable Perfon will fcruple to make, it will unavoidably follow, that in the natural and neceffary Reafon of Things, the Distinction of moral Good may be established, and confequently of moral Evil, after the fame Manner, whereby we discover a Line to be crooked, by comparing it with a streight Line. XVI. I have then nothing more to do, in profecuting this Argument, but to inquire, whether there are not certain Actions, which have a direct Tendency to promote the Good and Happiness of Man; and by means of which he will much fooner, and more eafily attain his End, than he would do by a contrary or different Practice? In order to a Refolution of which Inquiry, it may be proper to confider, in the firft Place, what the proper End of Man really is? for that being once discovered, we may better find the true and direct Way that leads to it. CHA P. II. What the proper End of I, II. The End of Man confider- it. V, VI. A Difficulty propofed, and answered from the violent Impreffions made upon us by Means of fenfible Objects. VII. The Wisdom and Holinefs of God vindicated, notwithStanding what was objected. VIII. The Objection farther confidered, and refuted. IX. The particular Reafon of confidering it in respect to the Author's Method. THE I. HE End of Man may be confidered as having respect either to his Perfection, or to his Happiness. II. I fhall begin with the former Distinction; for these two Things, on Account of the prefent State of Mankind, admit of a very different Confideration. Tho' in a feperate State of the Soul Soul from the Body, we cannot cafily conceive any Grounds for fuch a Diftinction; for certainly a pure Intelligence will be more happy in Proportion as it is perfect; and more perfect, in Proportion as it is happy. Whereas, in the present Union of Soul and Body, we often seek and find Happiness, such as it is, in Things, not which tend to the Perfection of human Nature, but to vitiate and debase it. Pleafure and Happiness are infeperable; whatever therefore has a Power of pleafing us, has, in the fame Degree, a Power of making us happy: Now it being neceffary to the Prefervation of the fenfible Life, that we fhould be affected with Pleafure, in the Ufe or Enjoyment of fenfible Objects, we are often ex cited |