sed vereor an sensu tuo. "A voluntate pendentem" (Dei, intelligis, opinor,) recte, "præcipue," sed quid sibi vult`" virtualiter?" Nuga!

Hactenus fundamenta operose, in metaphysicæ nescio cujus arenâ, et scholarum quisquiliis jacta, mole quantum vis exigua ruunt sua. Qui possunt ergo quæ superstruuntur omnia non labi, non concidere? Tantum abest ut "his fundamentis positis error concidat," nisi qui istis inædificatur.

THESIS X.

Ex supra-positis hisce fundamentis concidit error in gradu triplici.-Primus. Decretum VELLEITATIS, quo determinationem ad conversionis actum, ad quem necessitate hominem non posse creditur, desiderare solum fingitur Deus.—Secundus. Desiderata illius determinationis PREVISIO per scientiam mediam, qua dependentis ab homine.-Tertius. Ex prævisâ determinatione, conditionati concursus INTENTIO concomitanter in effectum.

Et Primo: Velleitas illa decretum non est: hoc enim imperantis est ex suppositione potentiæ; illa vero purus voluntatis actus cum potentia defectu. Si enim quod possum volo, effectum impero si quod non possum, desidero; assequi

TRANSLATION.

will occur;" but, I fear, it is not true in your acceptation. When you say, "It is dependent on the will," I suppose you mean " on the will of God." This is right, if you add the word "principally." But what meaning has the word "virtually?" Mere trifling!

The foundations which have hitherto been laid with such great labour in the sand of 1-know-not what kind of Metaphysics, and in the rubbish of the Schools, now give way and fall down under their own weight, however light they are or trifling. How is it possible, therefore, for all the superstructure erected on these foundations to avoid falling down together and being completely subverted? So far is the fall of error from being a consequence of the laying of these foundations, that no error is overthrown except that which is built upon them.

THESIS X.

"From these foundations supra-posited [placed above], error falls down together in three degrees. FIRST. The Decree of Velleity, by which God is only supposed to desire a determination to the act of conversion, to which he is believed not to be able to necessitate man.-SECONDLY. The foresight or prescience of that desired determination by means of MIDDLE SCIENCE, + with regard to that determination being dependent upon man.-THIRDLY. Through the foreseen determination, the intention of a conditional concurrence accompanying the effect.

"And, First, That Velleity is not a decree: For the latter is the part of one who commands, on a supposition of power; but the former [velleity] is a pure act of the will, with a defect of power. For if I will that which I am able [to obtain], I command the effect: But if I will any thing which I am

↑ App. M.

erim non possum quod volo. Proinde etiam indignum Deo: Nam OMNIPOTENTI potentiæ defectum adfingit, et assequendi voti incertam spem FELICISSIMO. Quid enim felicitas aliud, nisi boni expetiti certa fruitio? Quid vero omnipotentia, nisi potentia omnium in omnibus? Denique, objecti etiam ratione impossibile. Primam enim potentiam transfert in hominem, qui creatura est et uxixos.

ANNOTATIONES.

"Ex supra-positis," inquis, "hisce fundamentis concidit error in gradu triplici." Quid video-" Fundamenta supraposita ?" Certe humi sternatur ædificium necesse est, mox fundamenta concidunt. Cave ne Jesus Christus inter " supraposita fundamenta" subvertatur.+

Sed ad rem: Neque nam in vocabulis moramur. “Ex supradictis," vis dicere, "fundamentis error triplex concidit: De velleitate, prævisione per scientiam mediam, ex prævisa determinatione conditionati concursus intentio concomitanter in effectum." Laconice satis! Sed quid, si nemo mortalium hos errores, aut eorum aliquem erraverit sic enunciatum? Velleitatem agnoscet non-nemo av@pwоτaеws Deo recte ascribi posse;

↑ 1 Cor. iii, 11. Vide Annot. ad Thes. 4.

TRANSLATION.

not able [to gain], I desire it,-for I cannot obtain that which I have willed. Therefore it [Velleity] is unworthy of God; because it betokens a defect in that power which is Omnipotent, and an uncertain hope in One that is MOST HAPPY of obtaining his wishes. For what is FELICITY, except the assured fruition of the good desired? And what is OMNIPOTENCE, but the power of all in all ?—Lastly. It is also impossible with regard to its object. For it [or He] transfers the first [or primary] power to man, who is a creature and sensual."

ANNOTATIONS.

You say, "From these foundations which have been placed above, error falls down in a three fold degree." What is this which I see? "Foundations placed above!" The edifice must undoubtedly dispread the ground, as soon as the foundations fall down together. Beware lest Jesus Christ be subverted among "those foundations which have been placed above.” †

But, not to be detained by mere verbiage, we proceed to the matter. Instead of foundations placed above" aud" an error in three degrees," you wish to say, "From the foundations above-named, a three-fold error falls down: (1.) That concerning Velleity; (2.) that concerning foresight, "by means of middle knowledge; and (3) that concerning the intention, "through the foreseen determination, of a conditional concurrence accom"panying it into an effect." All this is said Laconically enough. But of what use is it, if no mortal man ever yet fell into such errors, or into any one of them as it is here described! Speaking according to the feelings and affections of men, any one will acknowledge that Velleity may be correctly attributed to God: Yet he who will not attempt to deny, that God can ne

I Cor. iii, 2. See the Annotations to the Fourth Thesis.

qui tamen "eum ad conversionis actum necessitare potuisse" (absque esset decreto suo in contrarium) inficias non iverit; "velle autem Deum, ordine decretorum stante," ægre concesserit. SCIENTIAM MEDIAM ex permultis sacræ scripturæ periodis astruent nonnulli, qui tamen "determinationem" (nota bene) qua ab homine (solo, aut principaliter "dependentem") rotunde negaverint. Denique vix, aut ne vix quenquam reperias, qui errorem tertium, prout hic expressum, intelligat, nedum teneat. "Conditionatum quendam concursum quidem concomitanter in effectum" recte explicatum, viz. ut "post Dei gratiam pulsantem, prævenientem, operantem, cum co-operante," si quis asserat errare eum ostendendum erat, non præstruendum, ex fundamentis (quid dico labilibus ?) corrutis et collapsis.

Quid si "decretum velleitas non sit?" Non est ergo (ut hominum more et ad captum mortalium loquamur) velleitas? Est quidem voluntatis actus, non autem (uti affirmas) "in Deo cum potentiæ defectu." Voluntas Divina a me supponitur potentiam Omnipotentis quandam habere comitem, et executricem quoties et quatenus voluntati ejusdem libet eam ex consilio suo exercere. Non autem semper per potentiam OMNIPOTENTIÆ ubique voluntatem suam exequitur Deus: Præsertim ubi decretum est (ut formulis tuis utar) "imperantis" (scilicet obedientiam) aut "prærequisitum quid" (agnosce phrases tuas!) homini, sub præmii et pænæ spe metuque. Pergis. "Si enim," inquis, "quod possum volo, effectum impero: Si quod non posTRANSLATION.

cessitate to the act of conversion, (unless it be contrary to his own decree,) will scarcely be induced to grant, that God can will [such necessity] as long as the order of his decrees remains unchanged. Some persons will establish middle knowledge from many passages of scripture, who will yet roundly deny the determination with respect to its being "solely or principally dependent on man." Indeed, you can scarcely find any one who will be able to understand the third error as it is here expressed; much less can you discover a solitary individual who holds such an error. If any one asserts, that "a certain conditional concurrence, which is accompanied into an effect, is rightly explained when it is stated to operate, after the propelling and preventing grace of God, with him who is a co-worker,"-it must be shewn, that such a person is in an error, before any further erections be placed on foundations-shall I call them liable to give way," or " already fallen down and collapsed together?"

If Felleity be not a decree," what is the consequence? That we may speak after the manner of men and in accommodation to the capacities of mortals, is it therefore any less Velleity? It is truly "an act of the will;" but it is not, as you assert," an act of the will in God with a defect of power." The Divine Will is supposed by me to have a certain power of an Omnipotent Being accompanying it, and executing [or actiug] as often and as far as it pleases this Divine Will to exercise it [the power] according to its own counsel. But God does not always and in every place execute his will by a power of Omnipotence; especially in those instances in which, to employ your own expressions, "the decree is of one who commands" obedience, or as "some pre-requisite to man," (you will recollect your own phraseology,) under a hope of reward and a fear of punishment.-You then proceed: For if I will that which I am able [to obtain], I command the effect: But if I will any thing which I am not able [to gain], I desire it;

sum, desidero; assequi enim non possum quod volo." Quid mihi et tibi, bone vir, quid velis aut possis? De DEO loquimur, qui quod vult facit, et quod velle potest, facere vel effectum dare potest. Quod vult facit, quatenus et quousque facere vult. Quid autem si non semper velit, qucusque tu eum velle facere opinaris? Noli Deum avresov et Omnipotentem tuo modulo metiri. Et tu tamen, nunquamne experiris voluntatem tuam potentiæ tuæ non imperare ut ad extremum virium ubique et semper agat?

Si a te causâ solitariâ res in arbitrio tuo penitus sita agenda fuerit, effectum dabis: Secus opinor, eveniet, si cum causis sociis, aut instrumentalibus (quæ ab officio cessare, vel te destituere possint, præsertim si hoc ex tuo ipsius instituto sit ut possint) imperatum sit perducendum in actum. Sed quid tibi vult "effectum impero?" Ambigua locutio, et Anglicismum sapiens, si etiam intelligatur ut significet (uti hic videtur) "finem seu effectum intentum assequor." Præterea, "si volo," inquis, quod non possum, desidero:" Rursus ambigua dictio. sidero," si careo significet, recte: si cupio, male: Quippe doles, desperas, irasceris; sic homines solent, quando quod non possunt volunt. At "indignum est Deo," et "proinde :" Quare proinde? An quia, quod tu vis et non potes, "desideras?" At Deus quodcunque vult, quatenus vult, potest, et facit. At "indig

TRANSLATION.

"De

for I cannot obtain that which I have willed." Good man! what have you and I to do with what you will to be done or what you are capable of doing? We are speaking about GOD, who does whatever he wills; and who is able to do, and to give effect to, whatever he is capable of willing. He does whatever he wills, so far and so long as it is his pleasure to do it. What harm is there, if HE does not always will to act so far or so long, as you think it is his pleasure to do? Allow not yourself to measure God, the Independent and Omnipotent Being, by your own small and slender propor tions. And yet, on reflection, do you never experience, that your own will does not command your power to act in every case and on all occasions according to the extreme stretch of its capabilities?

If a thing, placed entirely in your own will and power, is to be performed by yourself as a solitary cause, you will produce the effect: But this will not be the case, I think, if it be commanded to be brought into performance by associated or instrumental causes, that can cease from fulfilling their duty or can abandon you,-especially if their being capable of cessation or abaz donment be in accordance with your design. But what do you intend by the words, "I command the effect?" It is an ambiguous expression that savours of an Anglicism,—even if it be understood to signify, what it seems to do in this place, "I obtain the end or effect intended."-You next say: "If I will that which I am not able [to gain], I desire it." This is another ambiguous expressiou. If desidero signify to want" or "to be without any thing," your phrase is correct. But if it be intended to convey the meaning of "I long for it," or "I covet it," the phrase is improper; because, in such circumstances, you indulge in grief, despair, and anger, as men usually do when they will what they are not able to obtain].-You then say: "It is therefore unworthy of God." But why is this word "therefore" used? Is it because you desire that which you will, and which you are not able [to obtain]? But God is able to do and actually performs whatever he wills, and as far as he wills. But, I ask, "Why is it unworthy of

num est Deo:" Quare?, inquam. "Quia Omnipotenti potentiæ," inquis, "defectum adfingit." "defectum adfingit." Minime, inquam, nec OMNIPOTENTIS potentiæ cujuscunque modi, nedum omnipotenti potentiæ cui resisti nequit. Si quem defectum adfingeret, hic esset voluntati adfingendus non imperanti, minime autem potentiæ, voluntatis (ut ita dicam) imperata semper facienti, sed secundum voluntatis intentionem et imperium, et eorundem mensuram. At "adfingit etiam," inquis, "assequendi voti incertam spem FELICISSIMO." Noli timere, bone vir, salva res est. Falli aut incertus esse nequit Deus: Hoc certo certiùs scio, etiamsi nec tu, qui metaphysicâ totâ imbutus es, modum explicare potis fueris. "Nescire velle quæ Magister Optimus docere non vult, erudita est inscitia." Quod de Felicitate et Omnipotentia philosopharis, prætereo, ne actum agam.

"Denique," inquis, "objecti ratione est impossibile." Quid est hoc impossibile? Quid objecti ratione? Scilicet, opinor, vis, "velleitatem (more humano loquor) quandam esse in Deo, impossibile esse." Quare?, inquam. "Primam," inquis, " potentiam transfert in hominem, qui creatura est et XIKOS." Quis "transfert primam," &c.? Deus? Quid primam &c. transfert? Hic de velleitate error, opinor. Minime autem inquam ego: sed "HOMINEM," non negabit, "quoad sensum gratiæ pulsantis et prævenientis esse omnino PASSIVUM, quamvis in consensu" (dicam et assensu interdum ?) "esse plerumque, a gratia actum,

TRANSLATION.

God?" You reply, "Because it imputes a defect to that Power which is Omnipotent." It ascribes no such deficiency to any species of Omnipotent Power, much less to an Omnipotent Power that cannot be resisted. If it betokened any defect at all, that defect would be imputable to a Will which did not issue its commands; and on no account to a Power which always performs (if I may so term it,) the commands promulgated by the will, but which executes them according to the intention and mandate of the will, and according to the measure of the commands themselves.-You also declare, that "it attributes, to ONE who is MOST HAPPY, an uncertain hope of obtaining his wishes." Good man! never fear; that matter is in perfect safety: For God can neither be deceived nor be uncertain. Of this truth I am persuaded with the assurance of complete certainty,-although you, who are entirely imbued with Metaphysical lore, may not be capable of explaining the manner. "An unwillingness to become acquainted with those matters which the Best Master is unwilling to teach, is [a good trait in] learned and skilful ignorance." That I may not appear to discuss those points upon which I have already treated, I pass by all that you are pleased to philosophize about Felicity and Omnipotence.

You tell us, Lastly, It is impossible with respect to its object." What is intended by "impossible," and what by "relation to its object?" I think you wish to state, that it is impossible for such a thing as Velleity to be in God,"-speaking after the manner of men. Again I put the question, "Why?" You reply, "For it [or He] transfers the first [or primary] power to man, who is a creature and sensual." 1s it God that is the transferrer? And what is this primary power which he transfers ? 1 think this must be erroneous-to talk of primary power when treating about Velleity. But I say, this transferring to man is not true, and he will not deny, that man is altogether passive with regard to his sense or perception of propelling and preventing grace; although, when acted upon by