Mr. MAHON. When Congress provides funds and enacts a law, the Constitution says it is the responsibility of the President to faithfully execute the laws. Whether he gives a reason or does not give a reason, he is certainly constrained to operate within the Antideficiency Act which gives him certain rights of impoundment, but not complete and total control of the whole purse strings of the Nation. The CHAIRMAN. A quorum call is on. We will reconvene at 2 p.m. [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.] AFTER RECESS [The committee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Ray J. Madden, chairman of the committee, presiding.] STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MAHON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS-Resumed The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. When we recessed for lunch, Congressman Latta had completed his questioning. Congressman Murphy may proceed. Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to applaud the statement today of the able gentleman from Texas, Mr. Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee. EXPENDITURE CEILING Mr. Mahon, I know you responded to Mr. Anderson's question regarding an amendment to our bill which would include in some way a limitation placed by Congress on its own spending, however, would you elaborate a little more on Congress limiting this spending? Mr. MAHON. I think an expenditure ceiling would not fit the purpose of this bill. This bill has one purpose and one purpose alone, and that is to deal with impoundment actions of appropriations of public funds. I don't believe this would be a vehicle for an expenditure ceiling. We do have a committee of 32, 16 House Members and 16 Senate Members, created as a result of action taken by Congress last October, which is making a study of ways and means for Congress to get better control of fiscal matters. That is where I think we would want to consider an expenditure ceiling. Congress will have an opportunity to work its will on an expenditure ceiling. As I pointed out this morning, in 1967 and 1968, Congress did establish something of a ceiling and required the President to make reductions himself totaling billions of dollars in funds which had been made available. This was a blanket concession to the President to himself select the places where the cuts would be made. That is one way we can do it if we wish to do it. I say again as I said this morning, I think we ought to be more specific. Instead of giving the Executive blanket authority, we ought to be specific and select where the reductions should be made. Otherwise, we accord to the President an item veto which no one, I believe, thinks is accorded the President in the Constitution. It would be nonsense, it seems to me, and make us look a bit ridiculous, for us to appropriate far beyond planned spending and then come in and say, Well, we have had our fun now. We have appropriated all these funds for all these purposes. We have made everybody back home happy. Now we are going to come way down and we are going to approve an expenditure ceiling far below what we have authorized. If you do that, you are in effect saying, "Mr. President, we surrender to you the authority to control the purse of the country because we failed to do it ourselves. In specifics we went far above what maybe we should have spent and far beyond revenues at hand. "But in our expenditure ceiling we are coming way down and it is up to you now to find places to make cuts." That is not a very statesmanlike way to confront the problem. I admit it is less painful than selecting the specific reductions to be made. Mr. MURPHY. What you are saying, then, Mr. Chairman, is that you would not favor an amendment to your bill for an expenditure ceiling but that you would favor it in another context. Mr. MAHON. Yes, some kind of suitable restriction I think would be good. But, of course, we all recognize, and I think our friends at home recognize, that the long-range control of fiscal affairs, the long-range control of spending, is accomplished by holding the line on authorizations and holding the line on backdoor spending and direct appropriations to a level that is reasonable. That is the way you do it. If you properly hold the line in the authorization legislation and in all the bills that appropriate money, you don't really need to worry about an expenditure ceiling. An expenditure ceiling at that point would be cosmetic. I am perfectly willing to embrace an expenditure ceiling that is reasonable and sensible-not one that abdicates the responsibility of the legislative branch. Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mahon, I, too, would like to congratulate you for the excellent and I think well-defined presentation you made of this problem. It appears to me, as I think you stated, that the Anti-Deficiency Act set forth specific cases in which the Congress has authorized the President to deter spending any funds, and that other than that the reliance upon a Jeffersonian precedent really raises sericus questions as to whether or not there is any. You know, you can find a Jefferson precedent in the fact that he bought Louisiana without any authorization at all. You can logically assume that if the President says he has the right-could you not-determine that he is not going to spend moneys and, in fact, do away with a complete program. I think that this points up the abuse of it that many are concerned with. It is not the fact that good fiscal management requires it and not the fact that we in the past have been understanding of his problems in that regard. But it is the very fact of the abuse of the authority of the Anti-Deficiency Act that has me concerned. I have never been one who felt that just because of the fact that something had been allowed to continue for a particular period of time that that justified it. All it does is make us perhaps critical of ourselves for not taking action sooner. What it does to me, Mr. Chairman, is that it makes it more mandatory that we take action now and not let it continue any further. If you add that to the invoking of the executive privilege and the arbitrariness of doing away with complete programs, I am inclined to agree with you, that it is not a question of what has gone on in the past, but it is a question of where we are now and where we go from here. Mr. MAHON. I appreciate your statement, Mr. Long. Mr. MCSPADDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to amplify what has been said this morning, sir, and to commend you on the high level in which you have conducted yourself. This morning charges were made from the other side of the aisle that this is a purely partisan deal, the Republicans on one side and the Democrats on the other. As I understand the existing law, we can repass an impounded measure, which we have done. Let's assume that next week the House and the Senate override the "Vocational rehabilitation" appropriation. Then nothing is to keep the President from reimpounding those funds, is that correct? Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct. The President could, if he exercises the authority he claims. He says that if spending funds would increase prices or result in increased taxes, then he has the absolute right to impound the funds. Under that principle, any major or small spending program could be claimed to have a relationship to prices and to taxes. This doctrine would confer almost blanket control of the purse to the President. I don't really believe the President meant to go that far in that statement, but it stands unchanged. It gives us reason to be disturbed. Mr. MCSPADDEN. My point, Mr. Chairman, is this: Let's assume that the Congress overrides the veto next week. This could be, as Mr. Delaney pointed out a few moments ago, an exercise in futility because under the guise of one word, "inflation," which everyone is afraid of today, as this makes sense to the people and thus the President can impound the funds. This is putting us through the process of attempting to override a veto, which we may do. Your bill, as I understand it, acknowledges the fact that this President, as other Presidents, has the right to impound certain funds, and when he does so he sends the message back to the initiating committees or the appropriation committee. By a concurrent resolution, which does not take a two-thirds vote but a majority vote, a portion or all of the funds are to be reinstated. This, in essence, is what you are saying, is that right, sir? Mr. MAHON. I believe the gentleman is correct. Mr. MCSPADDEN. It has been discussed this morning about the partisanship and about the Presidents who through the years have impounded funds. Don't you think, Mr. Chairman, it is almost like the old story of somebody being a little bit pregnant. It seems that there 94-228 0-73-pt. 1- -3 are certain people who believe the present administration impoundments might be 8-months pregnant while others believe it would take almost an immaculate conception to be judged that way. This is kind of what it is. Mr. MAHON. I would like to point out that this vocational rehabilitation bill is not an appropriation bill. It is an authorization bill. It does not mandate spending, generally. It provides the basis for spending. A PROCEDURE FOR THE LONG TERM Mr. MCSPADDEN. One final question, Mr. Chairman, if I may. The charge has been made that this is purely an antipresent administration measure. Should this become the law of the land, this would. I assume, apply to the President, whomever he might be, in 1976. This might be Mr. Connally, it might be Mr. Agnew, it might be Senator Jackson, it might be Senator Kennedy, it might be Mr. Anderson. Who knows? Relative to the philosophy you are espousing here, my question is this: Regardless of who is President in 1976, should this become law, would you not be just as strong for this type of legislation to stay on the books as you are to get it passed today? Mr. MAHON. I certainly would be. After all, this is permanent legislation. It is not just for today, but for the long-range future. For example, the first antideficiency bill was passed along in 1905. and in 1906 another bill amplifying it a bit, and in 1950, another one. It has been the law all the time. I can't see why Democrats and Republicans and citizens generally wouldn't feel that Congress was asserting a responsible, well-reasoned position in the passage of this legislation. I think I would be in the position to defy anyone to argue to the contrary, who would be willing to read the bill and discuss it dispassionately. Mr. MCSPADDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Matsunaga, you were a little late. But please proceed. Mr. MATSUNAGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. My father always used to tell me don't make excuses. When I used to try to make excuses he would say, "Your friends don't need it and your enemies won't believe it." I think I am among friends so I won't make any excuses. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO IMPOUND Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether the question has already been raised here, but I note in your statement that you do not in any way raise the question of whether or not the President has the constitutional right to impound. This, as you know, is one of the major issues being fought over between the Congress and the Executive. As a matter of fact there are bills before this committee, in addition to yours, which take a different approach; the Pickle and Macdonald bills, for example. Many of the Members of the House have voiced opposition to your bill for the reason that you do not raise the question of the President's constitutional authority to impound. Do you see any serious opposition to your bill because it fails to tackle head-on this question which now faces the Congress and the country, in fact? Mr. MAHON. Speaking of the Constitution, let me begin by saying I do not claim to be the leading constitutional lawyer in the country, especially since I made a grade of 64 on the final examination at the University of Texas in constitutional law. I would say this bill is not so ambitious as to try to settle the constitutional issue, which might have to be settled by a constitutional amendment or by other procedures. THE PICKLE BILL This bill seems to be reasonable. You speak about other bills, and about 137, I believe, have been introduced, and you refer to the Pickle bill. Some of those bills including the Pickle bill would just outlaw all impoundments and would tend to place the sign upon Congress as being against any savings that might come about by better management. That is not the image that Congress should covet. We want to get away from that. I don't see any reason why we should repeal the AntiDeficiency bill, which does supply some flexibility for management in managing this $250 billion gargantuan Federal Government. I think you have to have some flexibility. But the Pickle bill is just a bill that says, "You can't do it." That, I think, places the wrong image on Congress and overlooks the need for flexibility in the management of our Government. The Pickle bill also fails to provide a review by the Congress. You vote all impoundments up or down when they are submitted to the Congress. I think the impoundment message ought to be reviewed by a committee of Congress. Impoundment messages should be gone into thoroughly in order to check the validity of the President's reasons for making these impoundments. This would give us a better opportunity upon which to act. Another feature of H.R. 5193 is the flexibility it provides. You can say, "Well, the fiscal year is nearly over, and the Executive has impounded these funds. We would not want to mandate an attempt to spend the entire amount in the last month of the fiscal year." So this bill provides the flexibility for Congress to nullify an impoundment in whole or in part. You have an approach there that gives you the opportunity to mandate the spending of whatever portion of the impounded money you want. Mr. MATSUNAGA. So you are saying that while the Pickle bill challenges the President's constitutional authority to impound, your bill would not, that you are proceeding on the basis of the Anti-Deficiency Act and setting up a procedure whereby the authority granted to the President under the Anti-Deficiency Act could be reviewed by the Congress. That is one question. Secondly |