Presidential head, he has given, I am sure, his very honest view on the Presidency.

I, too, am interested in a restoration of a proper balance between the executive and the legislative branch. But the thing that troubles. me about the gentleman's bill is that I do not, cannot, somehow, believe that the net effect of his legislation will be to restore that proper balance.

You would restrain the President from holding down on spending. You would restrain him from setting up reserves or from impounding funds.

Mr. MAHON. If the gentleman will let me interrupt: No, it wouldn't restrain him at all in this bill, not at all. We would just have him report on his actions and then Congress might restrain him.

Mr. ANDERSON. You would provide a procedure that, in effect, says that within 60 days by concurrent resolution you could veto action taken by the President to hold up the spending of money.

Mr. MAHON. You could.

EXPENDITURE CEILINGS

Mr. ANDERSON. But what have you done, sir, in your resolution to hold up efforts by the Congress, then, to push up spending through the debt ceiling, and through the budgetary limits that the Congress has received? I want to support an amendment when this bill is marked up in committee, an amendment that I am sure will be offered, to tie to this legislation you are offering a contingency that this legislation cannot become effective until the Congress has, itself, adopted an enforceable spending ceiling.

Would I have your support in offering such an amendment?

Mr. MAHON. Here is the situation with respect to expenditure ceilings:

If Congress provides funds far in excess of the budget, for example, which we normally do not do-we did last year, but on the whole we have not

Mr. ANDERSON. The vocational rehabilitation bill, I guess, would be an exception to the rule the gentleman stated.

Mr. MAHON. There are exceptions in the overall gross total. Generally the Congress approves about the budget request for total spending. If we provide budget authority for certain programs and then we pass an expenditure ceiling that is much lower in total, then we mandate the executive to disregard the actions of the Congress. We say, in effect, "We couldn't make any decisions about this. We leave up to you to make reductions wherever you prefer to do so."

it

It is all right to have an expenditure ceiling. I will be happy to support an expenditure ceiling, but it must be a realistic ceiling, one that does not abdicate the responsibility of the Congress.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF BUDGET CONTROL

Mr. ANDERSON. This anti-impoundment legislation is being treated as a matter of great urgency. It is clear that an effort is going to be made to rush this through the House at the earliest possible moment. On the

other hand, we set up a joint committee on the study of the Federal budget; it was title III of the debt ceiling legislation last October. That joint committee was mandated to come back with a recommendation by the 15th of February of this year on mechanisms and methods whereby we could improve the present procedures that the Congress employs in handling the Federal budget.

Yet recently we extended until the end of 1973 the date by which that committee should give its recommendations to the Congress, well past the time when the new fiscal year will begin, well past the time when it will be possible for us to change our procedures in such a way as to have any visible impact on fiscal 1974.

I have introduced a resolution. House Concurrent Resolution 165, that would give the legislative authority to that joint committee that it does not have now to actually report out a bill-mandated, in fact, to report out a bill by June 1 of this year, not only to provide for an enforceable spending ceiling, which apparently the gentleman in the Chair desires, but also to report out legislation that would give us these new procedures and mechanisms whereby we in the Congress could act in a responsible and meaningful way to control the budget. I would suggest that if the gentleman will support me on the companion measure, if we are willing to serve on the same timetable to put our congressional house in order with respect to the way we handle the Federal budget, then I will be happy to join him in anti-impoundment legislation because I think the need for impoundments would be obviated and vitiated if we were willing to move with the same degree of speed here on Capitol Hill to do what we ought to do to get the fiscal situation in hand.

Having read the statements of the gentlemen on many occasions, having listened with great respect as I always do to his words of wisdom, I know that he, for one, believes that the fiscal situation is out of control, and that Congress has not truly lived up to its responsibility to handle the budget in the way that it should.

Will the gentleman now give me that assurance that he would support House Concurrent Resolution 165 so that we can mandate this committee to get on with the job of reforming the way we deal here on the Hill with the budget?

Mr. MAHON. I appreciate my friend's very generous references, and very much I appreciate them. I have not read this particular resolution. I do support the efforts of this joint committee of 32 which was set up by legislation last October. A preliminary report has been made in which discussion is given as to some of the things which are being confronted by this committee: Limited overall budget considerations, splintering of appropriation processes, effect of uncontrollable expenditures, the lack of coordination between tax and expenditure policy, and so on. I have great hope-I have more hope than I originally had for this joint committee-and I want it to move rapidly forward. It is working assiduously. It has a good staff, and I think it is doing a good job. I have great hope for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisk.

Mr. SISK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to pursue just very briefly with the distinguished Chairman of the Appropriations Committee the question raised by our

colleague from New York regarding the so-called enforcement powers within this bill.

As I followed section 2, which the gentleman from Texas read, what you have actually done is to write in as strong language as possible by the use of the word "shall", so that if action is taken in line with the procedures set forth and the President still continues to impound, he will, in fact, be in direct violation of a law of this land. Is that not correct?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. SISK. Of course, there are other procedures then that come into play. That would depend, I suppose, on the matter of events, the pressure of public opinion, a variety of things. But, in fact, the President would be in direct violation of a law which now he maintains he is not in violation of under existing procedures.

Mr. MAHON. So this bill would be helpful to the Congress and it would clarify the position of the executive. It ought to be mutually beneficial.

Mr. SISK. I appreciate very much the statement of the gentleman from Texas because it seems to me he has placed this in proper perspective. He is not here seeking to increase spending, necessarily, or to decrease spending, but to set up a procedure whereby we can restore to the Congress the policymaking powers which I believe the Constitution gave to the Congress. That, in fact, is what the gentleman as I understand it, seeks to do. Is that correct?

Mr. MAHON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. SISK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clawson.

Mr. CLAWSON. If permissible, I would like to ask my former chairman a question or two.

Mr. Chairman, it is a real pleasure to have you as a witness here after having served with you for a little over 2 years on the Appropriations Committee, and listening to your very sage and cogent advice about fiscal responsibility, all of the things that the Congress ought to be doing.

I am a little concerned with your role today. It seems to me out of character. But, nevertheless, perhaps you could respond to one or two questions.

Mr. Anderson raised the question of whether or not this legislation would place any discipline or restraint upon the Congress. I see none whatsoever because all it does is provide for a veto, in effect, of the Congress over the impoundment of funds by the President. It says he shall cease, but there is no discipline upon the Congress, itself. Do you believe that we should use some other vehicle rather than this legislation in order to be sure that the Congress exercises this fiscal restraint that you are so fond of, and so frequently emphasizing to us in committees and on the floor of the House?

Mr. MAHON. I appreciate my friend's comments.

Yes, we must exercise a greater degree of fiscal restraint in this Government, in the legislative branch and in the executive branch, This bill does not treat with the issue of fiscal restraint by the Congress. It is a procedural bill, as pointed out. We have to pursue other

ways to compel ourselves, and I hope the executive, to grapple more realistically with the problems of overspending. We are overspending in tremendous sums. The national debt is going up this year $34 billion. It is going up next year, according to the budget, with all the cutbacks, $30 billion. This is an unacceptable situation, I would say to my friend from California, and we have to find a way to grapple with that. But this bill does not grapple with that situation. It deals with the power of the Congress. I believe that we take pride in the Congress of the United States, and that we feel that Congress should exercise its authority under the Constitution. Whether we exercise it poorly or well is not the issue. The question is we should exercise that authority.

Mr. CLAWSON. Mr. Chairman, I share that with you, and I feel that sometimes we have allowed our authority and our prerogative as a Congress to deteriorate, and to go off into other branches of the Government. However, this bill does not, in my opinion, even protect that. I think it is a strawman that you are setting up here, this one-man rule, one-man government. We could exercise our prerogatives at any time we wanted to. Even you indicate in some of your speeches, if I might quote from one, "The debt continues to skyrocket, and Congress could have changed that. The heavy expenditures and deficits continue. We could have changed that. Mr. Speaker, this is where we find ourselves at this particular time-", and you go along to say, "I think we must applaud the President for facing up to some of the major aspects of the fiscal crisis which continues to confront the country. He is to be applauded for the goal of trying to reduce spending."

We haven't done that. You didn't applaud the Congress but you did applaud the President for trying to do this in your speech.

That was on January 29 of this year, when you made that speech. Mr. MAHON. The Congress has undertaken to exercise some restraint. The Congress has not gone completely wild. For example, in appropriation bills over the last 20 years we have been below the budget every year, not just in the aggregate, but every year. Sometimes I think we have exercised more restraint than we give ourselves credit for exercising. But we haven't exercised sufficient restraint and neither has the executive branch. The executive branch is plugging for an increase of $64 billion the national debt during this year, and the next year. So we are all in this boat together. The sooner we recognize that we are in the boat together, and the sooner we cooperate toward finding a solution, and the sonner we recognize that money is not the answer to all our ills, the better off we will be.

I think this so-called confrontation. this legislation, I think may bring us nearer to reality in all branches of Government and be a hopeful sign for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I want to say at the outset that I commend my distinguished colleague and friend from Texas in bringing this legislation before the committee. I think it is long overdue by possibly 100 years or more.

These are procedures, as the distinguished gentleman has said, that are important to be established.

I do want to say that I do not agree with much of what was said in the opening statements, both by my own chairman and by the ranking

minority member of this committee. I think the President has a responsibility. I think we must recognize that he has a responsibility to act in the national interest, and I think that Congress has a responsibility. As I see this problem it resolves itself into the basic question of establishing priorities. I think the bill presented by the distinguished gentleman from Texas would go a long way in doing that, and would do a great deal to bring about a better order between the Executive and his decisions and the Congress.

As I understand the bill, after we go through all the procedures of vetoes and overriding vetoes, and the President then decides he is still not going to spend funds, under the gentleman's bill the matter would be returned to the Congress with a statement of what funds are to be impounded and why. That would be done within 10 days. Then the matter would be referred to the Appropriations Committee, and I think appropriately so. No. 1, because it is an appropriation matter. No. 2, because the Congress would express a great deal of responsibility in turning this over to the Appropriations Committee because the record will show that the Appropriations Committee of the House has been most responsible in fiscal matters. If my recollection serves me correctly in the 17 years that I have served here, I think without fail the Appropriations Committee has always come in with appropriations below the recommended budget of the President. I am talking about Democratic and Republican Presidents.

What I see in this would be a referral to the Appropriations Committee of the President's action, with his reasons, and then the Appropriations Committee would responsibly analyze and review what the Chief Executive has done, and would make certain recommendations to the Congress. Congress then would pass the recommendations. I think a great deal would be accomplished because it would be a responsible act. It just wouldn't be a matter of saying "we did this, now you go ahead and spend this money regardless of what you think, Mr. President. Your responsibilities are to this Nation."

It would be after the Appropriations Committee had analyzed, had chosen to act on some of the issues, had chosen not to concur with him on some of them.

A lot of people. I think. feel like this impoundment is on some kind of funds that they are not interested in, and think nobody else should be, either. As has been brought out here, these impoundments are across the board. For instance, I happen to serve on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I am disturbed that the President has cut out all of the funds or drastically curtailed the funds for nuclear medicine.

Functions that cannot be performed by private medicine at all, or by private industry. Yet involved in it is the solution of this great cancer problem, of heart attack, and many other things too numerous to mention.

What I want to say is that I think your bill would provide a responsible way for Congress to act, not just leave it in limbo after the President has decided to impound funds. After that is done, then, of course, there are many ways of enforcement. You have the courts, you have other legislation that the President is interested in. You have public opinion. There are many ways that this can be done. I presume that when the recommendations are reported back by the committee, the