Opinion of the Court. This view is illustrated by the case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 728, which arose under the act of May 5, 1892, c. 60, prohibiting the coming of Chinese persons into the United States. That act provided for the arrest and removal from the United States of any person of Chinese descent unlawfully within this country, unless such person shall establish, by affirmative proof, to the satisfaction justice, judge, or commissioner of the United States before whom he might be brought and tried, his lawful right to remain in the United States. It also authorized the arrest of such person by any customs official, collector of internal revenue, or United States marshal, and taken before a United States judge. This court said: "When, in the form prescribed by law, the executive officer, acting in behalf of the United States, brings the Chinese laborer before the judge, in order that he may be heard, and the facts upon which depends his right to remain in the country be decided, a case is duly submitted to the judicial power; for here are all the elements of a civil case-a complainant, defendant, and a judge actor, reus et judex. 3 Bl. Com. 25; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819. No formal complaint or pleadings are required, and the want of them does not affect the authority of the judge or the validity of the statute." Another suggestion thrown out in argument against the validity of the twelfth section of the Interstate Commerce Act, in the particular adverted to, is that the defendants are not accorded a right of trial by jury. If, as we have endeavored to show, this proceeding makes a case or controversy within the judicial power of the United States, the issue whether the defendants are under a duty to answer the questions propounded to them, and to produce the books, papers, documents, etc., called for, is manifestly not one for the determination of a jury. The issue presented is not one of fact, but of law exclusively. In such a case, the defendant is no more entitled to a jury than is a defendant in a proceeding by mandamus to compel him, as an officer, to perform a ministerial duty. Of course, the question of punishing the defendants for contempt could not arise before the Commis Opinion of the Court. sion; for, in a judicial sense, there is no such thing as contempt of a subordinate administrative body. No question of contempt could arise until the issue of law, in the Circuit Court, is determined adversely to the defendants and they refuse to obey, not the order of the commission, but the final order of the court. And, in matters of contempt, a jury is not required by "due process of law." of law." From the very nature of their institution, and that their lawful judgments may be respected and enforced, the courts of the United States possess the power to punish for contempt. And this inherent power is recognized and enforced by a statute expressly authorizing such courts to punish contempts of their authority when manifested by disobedience of their lawful writs, process, orders, rules, decrees, or commands. Rev. Stat. § 725; 1 Stat. 83; 4 Stat. 487; United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 302, 303; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230, 238. Surely it cannot be supposed that the question of contempt of the authority of a court of the United States, committed by a disobedience of its orders, is triable, of right, by a jury. We are of opinion that a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States determining the issues presented by the petition of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by the answers of the appellees, will be a legitimate exertion of judicial authority in a case or controversy to which, by the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends. A final order by that court dismissing the petition of the Commission, or requiring the appellees to answer the questions propounded to them, and to produce the books, papers, etc., called for, will be a determination of questions upon which a court of the United States is capable of acting and which may be enforced by judicial process. If there is any legal reason why appellees should not be required to answer the questions put to them, or to produce the books, papers, etc., demanded of them, their rights can be recognized and enforced by the court below when it enters upon the consideration of the merits of the questions presented by the petition. Opinion of the Court. In view of the conclusion reached upon the only question determined by the Circuit Court, what judgment shall be here entered? The case was heard below upon the petition of the Commission and the answers of the defendants. But no ruling was made in respect to the materiality of the evidence sought to be obtained from the defendants. Passing by every other question in the case, the Circuit Court, by its judgment, struck down so much of the twelfth section as authorized or required the courts to use their process in aid of inquiries before the Commission. Under the circumstances, we do not feel obliged to go further at this time than to adjudge, as we now do, that that section in the particular named is constitutional, and to remand the cause that the court below may proceed with it upon the merits of the questions presented by the petition and the answers of the defendants and make such determination thereof as may be consistent with law. Any other course would, it might be apprehended, involve the exercise of original jurisdiction, and might possibly work injustice to one or the other of the parties. For the reasons stated the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, MR. JUSTICE BREWER, and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissented.1 MR. JUSTICE FIELD was not present at the argument of this case, and took no part in the consideration and decision of it. 1 The dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Brewer, had not been filed when this volume went to press. It will appear in Vol. 155. Cases not Otherwise Reported. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1893, NOT OTHERWISE REPORTED, INCLUDING CASES DISMISSED IN VACATION PURSUANT TO RULE 28. No. 271. ABRAM v. WINSTON. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. March 9, 1894: Dismissed, with costs, pursuant to the 10th rule. Mr. William L. Royall for plaintiff in error. Mr. R. Taylor Scott for defendant in error. No. 428. ADAMS v. BUCK. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. May 14, 1894: Dismissed, with costs, per stipulation. Mr. J. H. Raymond for appellant. Mr. E. Smith and Mr. George H. Knight for appellees. No. 1018. Aн Ching v. UNITED STATES. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. December 18, 1893: Dismissed on motion of Mr. J. Hubley Ashton for appellant. Mr. J. Hubley Ashton, Mr. Joseph H. Choate, Mr. Harvey S. Brown, and Mr. Thomas D. Riordan for appellant. Mr. Attorney General for appellees. No. 1014. Ан SING v. UNITED STATES. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. December 18, 1893: Dismissed on motion of Mr. J. Hubley Ashton for appellant. Mr. J. Hubley Ashton, Mr. Joseph H. Choate, Mr. Harvey S. Brown, and Mr. Thomas D. Riordan for appellant. Mr. Attorney General for appellees. No. 1033. ALABAMA IRON AND RAILWAY COMPANY V. ANNISTON LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY. Petition for a writ of Cases not Otherwise Reported. certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. October 16, 1893. Petition denied. Mr. Henry B. Tompkins, for The Alabama Iron and Railway Company et al., in support of petition. Mr. John B. Knox, for The Anniston Loan and Trust Company, in opposition thereto. No. 540. ALBANY COUNTY BANK V. DROVERS' NATIONAL BANK. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. October 10, 1893: Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Mr. Alexander Porter Morse for plaintiff in error. Mr. Francis Kernan and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse for plaintiff in error. Mr. S. W. Rosendale for defendant in error. No. 151. AMERICAN RAPID TELEGRAPH COMPANY v. BOSTON SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut. December 5, 1893: Dismissed, with costs, pursuant to the 10th rule. Mr. R. G. Ingersoll for appellant. Mr. W. G. Wilson and Mr. Morris W. Seymour for appellee. No. 146. AMERICAN TUBE AND IRON COMPANY v. DAVIS. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio. December 4, 1893: Dismissed, with costs, pursuant to the 16th rule, on motion of Mr. A. J. Woolf for defendant in error. Mr. T. W. Sanderson and Mr. M. A. Norris for plaintiff in error. Mr. A. J. Woolf for defendant in error. No. 425. ANDERSON V. MINNESOTA IRON COMPANY. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. April 4, 1894: Dismissed, per stipulation. Mr. J. N. Castle for plaintiff in error. Mr. C. K. Davis, Mr. J. H. Chandler, and Mr. Frank B. Kellogg for defendant in error. |