ABSURDITY. See Statutes-Construction and Operation.

ACCESSORIAL SERVICES. See Taxes-Transportation Tax.

ACTIVE DUTY PAY. See Military Pay.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION. See Statutes-Construction and
Operation.

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS. See Contracts.

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD. See Contracts.

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION. See Taxes-Income Tax.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

See Contracts.

AGENCY.

APPARENT AUTHORITY.

Retention of benefits by principal.

Where a corporation holds out its president as having authority to
act for it in connection with its contract with the United States and
the contract is executed for the corporation by its president who
also conducts all negotiations and executes all contract documents,
and where in addition the corporation thereafter accepts and re-
tains the consideration for a release signed on its behalf by its
president, the president is acting with apparent authority and,
under the circumstances, the corporation is estopped to deny the
validity and binding effect of his actions on its behalf. Rachelle
Enterprises, 701.

AIR CORPS ACT. See Patents.

ANNUAL LEAVE PAYMENT. See Civilian Pay.

ARMY PHYSICAL DISABILITY APPEAL BOARD. See Military Pay.
BANKRUPTCY ACT. See Taxes-Income Tax.

BURDEN OF PROOF. See Evidence.

CAREER COMPENSATION ACT. See Military Pay.

CARRIERS. See also Constitutional Law.

CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

Applicable tariff.

Determination of applicable tariff by Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.

Where the Interstate Commerce Commission determined that
Freight Tariff T-1-A relied on by defendant was not applicable to
the shipment in question, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
higher rates required by another tariff. Western Pacific Railroad
Co., 1.

Carriers 192

897

144 C. Cls.

CARRIERS—Continued

CARRIAGE OF GOODS-Continued

Evidence.

Burden of proof.

Where carrier sues to recover full amount of its bill, including
amounts which the Government had deducted as overcharges on
previous bills, the carrier has the burden of proving that the charges
for the earlier shipments were proper. Boston & Maine Railroad
Co., et al., 803.

United States 74 (10)

Interstate Commerce Commission.

Orders-construction and operation.

Service Order 68 of the Interstate Commerce Commission author-
izes and requires carriers to base their charges on the length of the
cars actually furnished regardless of the length of the cars ordered
by the shipper. In the light of opinions by the Commission involv-
ing this order, it appears that the order is applicable only where
the carriers are unable, because of unavailability of cars of the
length ordered, to comply with the shipper's orders. Alantic Coast
Line Railroad Company v. United States, 125 C. Cls. 235; 136 C.
Cls. 1. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., et al., 803.

The Court of Claims has jurisdiction of claims for compensation
for the carriage of mail. The Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525,
was never intended to apply to suits involving the carriage of
United States mails. United Fruit Co., 154.

Courts 449(1), 518

The fixing or making of rates is a function of the Postmaster Gen-
eral but a claim for compensation for the carriage of mail sacks is
not a request that the court fix rates but merely that it apply rates
already fixed by the Postmaster General to the carriage of the
mail sacks. United Fruit Co., 154.

Under article 169 of the Postal Union Convention of July 11, 1952,
the carriage of mail sacks and containers is recognized as being
as much a part of the carriage of mail as are letters. United Fruit
Co., 154.

Post Office 22

144 C. Cls.

CHANGED CONDITIONS. See Contracts.

CHANGES. See Contracts.

CIVILIAN PAY.

DISMISSAL.

Appeal to Civil Service Commission.

New evidence.

Civil Service regulations, Part 22(c), give to the Board of Appeals
and Review of the Civil Service Commission discretion to receive
and consider new evidence without remanding the case to the Re-
gion, and in the light of the record in this case the court held that
such discretion was not exercised arbitrarily where the new docu-
ments contained material already considered and their effect was
primarily cumulative. Atkinson, 585.

Specification invalidated-effect of.

Where, in upholding the agency action dismissing an employee, the
Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission
found that the matters contained in six of the seven specifications
had been established but that one specification was invalid for lack
of specificity, absolute certainty as to whether the employing agency
would have removed plaintiff in the absence of that seventh invalid
specification is not required to support the Board's decision. Aktin-
son, 585.

Where the cause of removal of a veteran preference eligible is the
striking of a supervisor, it cannot be said that the removal of the
employee for such an illegal act of violence was arbitrary or
would not tend to promote the efficiency of the Government service
within the meaning of section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act
of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, 390, as amended, 61 Stat. 723. Ruffin, 689.
Officers 68

Efficiency rating of satisfactory.

Effect of-on dismissal for unsatisfactory performance of duties.
The holder of a satisfactory efficiency rating is not immune to
removal for cause. Cf. Misuraca v. United States, 135 C. Cls. 387;
DeBusk v. United States, 132 C. Cls. 790. Atkinson, 585.

Following the holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Thomas v. Ward, 225 F. 2d 953, an employee
may be removed under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act
of 1944 for unsatisfactory performance of duties during a period for

144 C. Cls.

CIVILIAN PAY-Continued

DISMISSAL-Continued

which he has received a satisfactory performance rating under the
Performance Rating Act of 1950. Atkinson, 585.

Officers 68

Laches.

Where the procedural defect relied on by plaintiff (section 14 of
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944) was not called to the attention of
the Civil Service Commission and more than four years elapsed be-
tween final adverse action by the Commission and the date of the
filing of the petition herein, and where the employing agency had,
in the meantime, employed another person in plaintiff's job, the
plaintiff has been guilty of laches. United States ex rel Arant v.
Lane, Secretary, 249 U.S. 367. Bailey, 720.

NIGHT DIFFERENTIAL PAY.

Wage Board employees entitled to overtime pay.

Employees of the Panama Canal who have been held by this court
to be covered by section 203 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of
1945, 59 Stat. 297, and entitled to the overtime pay provided for
in section 201 of that Act, are not entitled to the night differential
pay provided for in section 301. Abbott, 712.

Sleeping and eating time-when compensable.

Whether or not sleeping and eating time is compensable overtime
for firefighters under the provisions of the Federal Employees Pay
Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 295, as "hours of employment" in excess of
40 hours, depends on the facts of the particular case; and where
it appears that the employees were rarely interrupted in their
normal and private pursuits of sleeping and eating for periods in
excess of 8 hours, such time does not amount to "hours of employ-
ment" for overtime purposes. Farley v. United States, 131 C. Cls.
776, and England v. United States, 133 C. Cls. 768, distinguished.
Merlin M. Armstrong, 659.

Sleeping and eating time of firefighters during which time no sub-
stantial duties were performed are not "hours of employment" in
excess of 40 hours for which they would be entitled to overtime
pay under the Federal Employees Pay Act, Merlin M. Armstrong,
et al v. United States, this day decided, ante, p. 659. Wright, Jr.,

United States 39(4)

144 C. Cls.

CIVILIAN PAY-Continued

OVERTIME PAY-Continued

Standby time-when compensable.

Standby time not set aside for eating and sleeping is compensable
under a reasonable interpretation of the Federal Employees Pay
Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 295, despite the fact that the employees may
do some eating and sleeping during that time, such interpretation
requiring that employees on duty for 24 hours be compensated for
two-thirds of such time; accordingly, defendant is not entitled to
recover on its counterclaim asserted on the theory that more than
8 hours were set apart for eating and sleeping for which time
plaintiffs have been paid. Wright, Jr., 810.

PANAMA CANAL ZONE POLICE PAY.

District of Columbia police pay-comparability.

After the court decided in Barker, et al. v. United States, 117 C.
Cls. 221, that Panama Canal Zone policemen were covered by the
Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 295, as amended, 60
Stat. 218, strict comparison of the pay of these policemen with the
pay of District of Columbia policemen could no longer be made and
the Canal Zone policemen are not entitled to all the increases au-
thorized for District of Columbia policemen in sections 101(a) and
102(a) of the Act of June 20, 1953, 67 Stat. 72, and the Act of
August 5, 1955, 69 Stat. 530. Amason, 761.

Measure of recovery.

Limitations on recovery-when applicable.

The limitations on the amount of back pay due a reinstated Civil
Service employee contained in statutes not violated in connection
with plaintiff's removal are not applicable in determining the
amount of plaintiff's recovery; and in the absence of any congres-
sional intention to limit the back pay of Government employees
reinstated under the Act of August 13, 1946, 60 Stat. 1010, 22 U.S.C.
§ 928, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all of the back pay he would
have earned had he been reinstated in accordance with that Act.
Prosterman, 692.

Where the statute violated in connection with plaintiff's removal
contains no limitations on the amount of back pay which he may
receive upon reinstatement, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
ingrade and statutory increases in pay which he would have earned
(Crocker v. United States, 130 C. Cls. 567), and an amount repre-
senting all annual leave he would have earned (Hynning v. United
States, 141 C. Cls. 486.) Prosterman, 692.

United States 39(8)