The march of Ney and his threatening object were fully understood by the commander in chief, Count Wittgenstein: to counteract it, Barclay de Tolly and General Von York were detached from the right towards Hoyerswerda. On the 19th, Barclay de Tolly met the head of one of Ney's columns at Konigswartha, under General Perin, whom less serious affairs with the French || in conjunction with the new levies advance, which we omit for the sake in the Margravate of Brandenburg, of brevity. As soon as Bonaparte against Victor's approach. had ascertained that the allied army had entered its strongly fortified position between Bautzen and Hochkirch, with the evident determination to oppose his further progress, he directed the bulk of his army to that point: Ney, with Lauriston and the several divisions under him, instead of pursuing the original plan of relieving Wittenberg, was ordered to march eastward to Hoy-he completely defeated, with the erswerda, on the right flank of the allies, with a view to come into the rear of their entrenched camp; and Victor, with his own corps, the Saxons, and the division which, under Sebastiani, had arrived from the Lower Elbe, marched against Berlin. These dispositions completed, Bonaparte left Dresden on the 18th, and joined his army before Bautzen the next day. In the mean time, the allies had not been remiss in availing themselves of every resource in their immediate reach, to augment their means of resistance. Besides some thousands of Russian convalescents arrived from Poland, a numerous corps (stated at 30,000 men), under the orders of General Barclay de Tolly, approached by forced marches, and arrived about the 17th; several thousands of fresh troops joined the Prussians; their king, to prepare for the worst, issued an order for calling out the "Landsturm" (levy en masse) in the provinces nearest to the scene of action; and the divisions of Borstel and Bulow, under the command of the latter, which had hitherto remained about Dessau, were recalled, in order to cover Berlin, loss of 1500 prisoners and 11 cannon. Nearly at the same time, Von York came into contact with the rest of Ney's corps at Weissig. Here the action was severe, and the German accounts maintain, that Von York kept his ground at night; but as both himself and Barclay de Tolly turned about, and re-entered the position of Bautzen the next day, with Ney and Lauriston at their heels, we are inclined to think, that the important object Count Wittgenstein had in view by this operation, was not completely attained. Ney, it is true, was diverted from falling in the rear of the position, but he came into its right flank; and his arrival led to unfortunate consequences. How far comparative strength might have rendered a different result practicable, we are not sufficiently informed to decide. When Bonaparte arrived before Bautzen, a day's reconnoissance enabled him to ascertain, that his enemy was formidably posted in a double position; that of Bautzen itself, which served merely as an entrenched advance to another range of fortified eminences, about a mile in the rear, extending from the the pivot of the position. Upon this, the allies determined to dispute the field no longer against such fearful odds pressing upon them from every quarter: the troops and every cannon were withdrawn from the position in the evening, with such order and regularity, that the march of the army, according to the official account of General Sir Charles Stewart (then on the spot), resembled a movement on a field-day. Unmolested in their retreat, they took at night a position at Weissenberg. mountains of Bohemia on the left, by Hochkirch to the hills of Kreckwitz on the right. He attacked the advance-position on the following day (20th), with determined impetuosity. It was bravely defended by the corps of Miloradovitch and Kleist; the former of whom repulsed every effort of the enemy; till, finding that Kleist had been obliged to retire into the position in the rear, he himself withdrew thither in the evening. This combat, although sanguinary, was but the prelude to the murderous con-flict of the day following. On the Bonaparte states his loss on the 21st, the general attack on the al- 20th and 21st at 11 or 12,000 men, lied position of Würtschen, com- that of the allies at 28,000 and 19 menced at three o'clock in the pieces of cannon (?) The allied acmorning. To give a military de-counts quote no numbers, but it is scription of this obstinate battle, reasonable to believe, that, in forcwould lead to great detail, and in-ing the strong lines of their oppoterest few of our readers. Suffice it, therefore, to say, that, in spite of the most artful manœuvres, of false attacks, and of the most lavish sacrifice of lives, Bonaparte was unable to make any serious impression on any part of the lines of his antagonists, till about noon, when Ney and Lauriston, by great superiority of numbers, succeeded in outflanking Barclay de Tolly, on the extreme right, and thereby compelling him to fall back upon Würtschen. The danger being imminent on that side, Blucher's, and afterwards Von York's and Kleist's corps, were sent from the center to oppose the successful efforts of the French. They arrested his progress; but the center being thus weakened, Bonaparte availed himself of the opportunity, and, by unceasing and furious attacks, gained the entrenchments on the heights of Kreckwitz, and thereby nents, in a contest of sixteen or eighteen hours with fluctuating success, the French can at least have lost no less than the Russians and Prussians, particularly when we revert to the animated testimony which Sir C. Stewart pays to their valour. The skill displayed by Count Wittgenstein in the command on those days, likewise claims our admiration, and causes the greater regret at finding him superseded in that command by Barclay de Tolly, although an able general likewise. Nothing but a numerical superiority of two to one led to Napoleon's success. Sir Charles Stewart states, that the force of the allies did not exceed SIXTY - FIVE THOUSAND MEN, while he estimates that of the French at 120,000 at least. This unexpected intelligence, from a military man on the spot, we own, affected us more than the loss of the battle; even now it staggers our belief.--What! such a handful of men was deemed sufficient to oppose the great talents of Bonaparte, at the head of double the number of soldiers! No wonder, that, with such odds, his newly raised army has been successful. The whole disposable force of the Russian empire dwindled into some thirty thousand men!!! What are we to hope, after such an incredible tale? But to the thread of our narrative. rissow, who had been dispatched by Count Woronzow from before Magdeburg with 500 cavalry to scour the country, fell in with a French regiment of cavalry, led by General Poinsat towards the grand army. A short attack was sufficient to capture the general, 1 colonel, 25 officers, and 300 men; and to kill and disperse the remainder. Besides this brilliant affair, an angry bulletin informs us, that a French convoy, on its way from Bayreuth to Dresden, was fallen upon (by what party of the allies we are at a loss to guess) between Chemnitz and Zwickau; that this surprise caused a loss of 200 men, of 360 horses taken, and of 7 or 8 pieces of cannon, as well as some carriages either captured or destroyed. And the last arrivals from the Continent bring intelligence of an action near Halberstadt (Lower Saxony), in which the French were completely defeated, with the loss of 14 cannon, and after which the allies penetrated as far as Brunswick, which city they actually entered. To supply his losses, Bonaparte recalled Victor and Sebastiani from their progress against Berlin; and, with his usual energy, he followed the retreat of the allies into Silesia, by the road to Breslaw. Excepting some rear-guard encounters, especially at Reichenbach on the 23d May, where Miloradovitch's corps greatly distinguished itself, no action of moment occurred in the track of the main armies. But no sooner was Victor withdrawn from his march on Berlin, than the instant advance of the corps of Generals Bulow and Borstel into the heart of Lusatia, threatened Bo-naparte's communications, and obliged him to detach again a corps under Oudinot, who proceeded as far as Hoyerswerda before he fell in .with the Prussians. There he was attacked by Bulow on the 28th with great energy and skill, and altho' the French official accounts (the only ones we yet possess of this battle) claim the victory, the as-nitz; a dangerous movement, insertion is rendered questionable by that account itself. Still further in his rear, and even on the left bank of the Elbe, Bonaparte's communications were bro-ken in upon by detached corps of the allies. Near Halle, Colonel Bo However annoying these insults on his rear and flauk must have proved to Bonaparte, he boldly continued his route in pursuit of the allies; who, on entering Silesia, instead of directing their retreat on Breslaw and the Oder direct, dropped to the right, in the direction of Jauer and Schweid asmuch as Bonaparte, by marching direct upon Breslaw (which he did), might succeed in cutting off their communication, not only with all the Prussian states, but even with Poland and Russia; and, in a manner, coop up the allies between LOWER ELBE. his own army and the Austrian frontiers of Bohemia, In this si- Here, too, it is our painful task tuation of things, proposals for an to record the progress of the enearmistice were made on the 29th || my, effected in a manner as sudden May, as Bonaparte states, by the as it was singular and unexpected. allies: negociations were imme--In the night of 8-9th May, the diately set on foot at the village of Pleiwitz, near Striegau; during which, the corps of Lauriston entered Breslaw (1st June), and that of Victor relieved Glogau. The conferences terminated on the 4th of June, with the signature of a regular armistice for all (?) the belligerent powers, to last till the 20th July, with six days notice for the resumption of hostilities. The line of demarcation for the allies, extends from the Bohemian frontier to the Oder, near Althoff; for the French, from the same frontier to the confluence of the Katzbach with the Oder: the ground between these two parallel lines, including Breslaw, is to remain neutral. The whole of Prussia, excepting that part of Silesia within the French line of demarcation, remains to the allies; and the whole of Saxony, together with all the countries on the left bank of the Elbe, where that river leaves. Saxony, to its mouth, is left to the French army; with that addition, that, in regard to Hamburg and the Hanseatic departments (the fate of which was not known then), the line of demarcation should be decided by the line of the advanced posts of the two hostile armies on the lower Elbe, on June the 8th at midnight; and the French garrisons in the fortresses of Dantzig, Zamosc, Modlin, Stettin, and Custrin, are to be victualled every five days by the allies, against payment to be made every month. corps of Vandamme surprised the Hanseatic detachment in the Elbe Islands of Wilhelmsburg and Ochsenwerder, situated close to Hamburg, and, in fact, forming the stepping-stones to that city. Reinforced, however, by a battalion of Mecklenburgers and some Hanoverians from England, the Hanseatics succeeded in recovering the islands, and driving the French to their boats, although with a loss of 15 officers and 150 men. On the day following a division of Danish troops, with artillery, marched from Altona into Hamburg, proclaiming their intention to assist in its defence; and the fears of those who doubted the sincerity of the Danes, were completely dispelled three days afterwards (12th), when the French commenced a more serious attack than the former on Wilhelmsburg. The Danes, ou this occasion, fought bravely in defence of their Hanseatic neighbours, and lost from 40 to 50 in killed and wounded. But, in spite of the most determined resistance, the French finally retained possession of Wilhelmsburg.-During the fortnight succeeding, excepting occasional harmless bombardments from the islands, no new attempt was made on Hamburg; the city was considered free from immediate danger; the more so, as the Swedish troops continued to arrive numerously in the German ports in the Baltic, and as the entry into Hamburg of two Swedish battalions (at whose approach the Danes returned to Altona), was deemed an earnest of the Crown Prince's protection. the French, in execution of Napoleon's threats against the city; but we do not trust the relentless tyrant. By the armistice, he remains in full possession of Hamburg, and if he spare the lives of the ci But, alas! all these hopes of the brave, the patriotic, the noble Hamburgers proved delusory. The re-tizens, their purses will have to pay turn of Count Bernstorff with an unsatisfactory answer from London, at once determined the court of Copenhagen to act in open hosti-imposed. Why this serious mis dearly for the indulgence. An enor mous contribution of 84 millions of livres has, it is said, already been lity to England, and to join the fortune, for Hamburg as well as the Thus, by the assistance of the Danes, and not by the French arms, has the unfortunate city of Hamburg again fallen under Bonaparte's iron yoke. At first rashly compromised by a handful of Cossacks, she generously raised the standard of German liberty, armed and fought bravely; but was left unprotected, nay, deserted, by all the belligerents. It is probably owing to the interposition of Denmark, that we have hitherto Heard of no outrages committed by What we mentioned in our last; respecting the cession of Norway to Sweden, has been recently confirmed by official papers laid before parliament. Russia, to purchase the alliance and co-operation of Sweden, instead of restoring to her Finland (which would have been as just as politic), a province Alexander despoiled her of at the instigation of Bonaparte, and solely because Gustavus would not, like Alexander at that time, bend to the arbitrary dictates of Bonaparte; Russia, we say, by a treaty dated 24th March, 1812, made over tỏ Sweden the kingdom of Norway, an integral part of the dominions of the King of Denmark, who, as an indemnity for the loss of this province, was to have received some territory near his German dominions. This compact was ac ceded to on the part of Great Britain, by a treaty dated 3d Mar. last; and, as a further boon to insure the co-operation of Sweden, besides a subsidy of one million for this campaign, the French island |