The air-force problem in this case is efficiently and conclusively to fulfill our team assignment. In order that we may carry out this team assignment we must accelerate the augmentation of our air force and at the same time provide for the attrition of combat operation. In other words, we now must have a continuous flow of aircraft and the necessary production, instead of a series of job-lot orders which has heretofore been adaptable and desirable in the process of building up to a given strength or state of defense. This program is submitted in order to provide for the building up of planes for our air force and for our Allies, and to provide for the combat attrition inevitable in air operation.

Continuous flow of production depends, first, upon continuously extended contracts and continuous production planning. Here we are proposing a base upon which the airplane plants may further extend their production plans.

Under present production schedules we will attain maximum production on existing orders for most types in August of 1942, and from thereon production will gradually decline due to lack of further orders. The program we are here presenting is necessary to maintain continuity of present planned capacity in that portion of the aircraft industry allocated to the Army, and to increase the production level of heavy bombers to per month. Since the production cycle of the heavy bombers is considerably longer than that of the training types, production plans for this type must be projected many months further ahead. Continuity of production is essential for maximum effort. In order to assure delivery of heavy bombers in 1943 and 1944 we must let contracts for them early in the calendar year 1942. However, contracts for trainers let now should result in delivered articles during August of 1942.

The production program has been carefully worked out and is of two parts. The first contemplates the maximum utility of present facilities under present planned production, and the second provides for increased facilities for additional capacity in the heavy bomber types. These types are of paramount importance in the present emergency, and their production must be assured even though present facilities should be destroyed. We cannot afford to take a chance on this production.

Facilities are provided to round out the production of present prime capacity as well as for the increased capacity. These facilities include those for the production of essential accessories, special raw materials and semifinished materials, and ammunition as well as prime facilities for aircraft and engine production.

The air force is attempting, and the aircraft industry is fully cooperating, to obtain maximum production of present facilities through working 24 hours a day 7 days a week. Such schedules will naturally considerably reduce the period with which the airplanes in this program will occupy the aircraft industry. Continual study is being made to determine possible production schedules with this maximum utilization of present and planned facilities.

It is considered essential that funds for this program be made available at the earliest possible date in order that the present facilities may prepare for futher production and that the new facilities may be expedited.

Briefly, the program, totaling $12,525,872,474, is made up as follows:

Air Corps estimates provide for airplanes and spare engines and spare parts in the usual percentages.

(General Arnold made a further statement off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. General Arnold, I wonder if there would be any objection to including in the record the total number of planes, without reference to types and classes, in view of the fact that the President, in his message, specified a number as the objective?

General ARNOLD. I see no objection to putting in the record the statement that this fund will cover the procurement of 23,000 combat types and 10,000 training types, giving us a total of about 33,000 airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you concluded your statement, General Arnold?

General ARNOLD. I have concluded; yes, sir.

(Further discussion off the record.)

COORDINATION OF AIRPLANE PRODUCTION PROGRAM WITH PILOT-TRAINING

PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. General Arnold, will you tell us how well coordinated our airplane production program is with our pilot-training program? As these airplanes are produced, will there be sufficient pilots to take care of them?

General ARNOLD. Every program that the War Department has adopted in connection with the expansion of the air forces has been based upon the number of pilots, the number of airplanes, the number of mechanics, and the bases for operating those airplanes all being available at the same time.

First we had a 24-group program; then a 54-group program. The 54-group program was supposed to be completed by the end of this fiscal year; but due to the fact that we entered the war early in December, we advanced that date materially, and at the same time, as a result of studies of what the actual requirements would be to meet the war effort, we adopted another program which we hope to meet by December 31, 1942, in which the number of pilots, mechanics, squadrons, groups, and bases are all figured out so that they will all be available at the right time in December 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. The production, the pilot training, the ground forces, and the airports are all being coordinated so that they will synchronize?

General ARNOLD. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the program was increased from a 24group program to a 54-group program. Subsequently that 54 was increased to 84?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any intention to exceed 84?
General ARNOLD. It is already further increased.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your base and airfield program, which will reach its peak in December, provides for additional fields or for expansion of present fields?

General ARNOLD. We are doing both. We are expanding some of our present fields, and we are also building new fields. When you are flying, and particularly when you are carrying out training, there comes a time when the air gets saturated with airplanes, beyond which you have the danger of collisions and a high accident rate. So rather than go through any such unfortunate situation as that, we prefer to build new schools where we will not have that overlapping in the air. For your information, however, we have given out instructions that hereafter all construction carried out in the United States will be of the cheapest kind that will last us through the war. We are not even going to go into what we used to call temporary construction. It is the wartime construction that we are going to go into from now on— just enough to carry us through the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you following the same policy with reference to air fields and the geographical location of these fields that you do with the plants-locating them inland?

General ARNOLD. In general, most of our fields will be located in the central part of the United States. However, we must have a certain number of our combat fields on the coasts for combat purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the saturation point been reached in the immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia?

General ARNOLD. No; I would not say that it had been, although along the Atlantic coast we are trying to have our bases so located that, in case of threat, we can concentrate the necessary number of combat planes in any locality, whether it will be the Boston locality, New York, Washington, Charleston, or wherever it may be.

STATEMENTS IN TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT- -EFFICIENCY OF UNITED

STATES PLANES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I have before me the report of the investigating committee, known as the Truman committee, for the investigation of the national defense program. If this were merely the opinion of some columnist or newspaper writer, I would hesitate to bring it up, but this is a committee, supposed to be free of partisanship, appointed by the Senate for the investigation of the national defense program, and these conclusions are agreed to by the members of the committee unanimously. As such, they carry weight, and they have had the attention of the press generally throughout the country. The report is an important one, and it seems to have been met with general approval. I note from this report of the Truman committee that they say that only a limited amount of our present production is of combat types considered to be equal to or superior to the best types produced abroad, and the statement is made elsewhere that only 25 percent of our

airplane production is of the best types, equal or superior to the planes produced by the Axis Powers. What would you say in regard to that statement?

General ARNOLD. I cannot concur in it at all. I am quoted in the report of the committee, but the quotation is one sentence out of a speech, and that one sentence is used as a text. You can take one sentence out of the Declaration of Independence and make it awful. You can take one sentence or one phrase from a statement and prove anything. Here is what I actually said

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). On the other hand, without taking the report up in much detail, the report as a whole is a serious reflection on our aviation program. It is not based on the testimony of any one man, or any set of statistics, but it is general in its nature, and I think constitutes a rather serious indictment. Are you inclined to think that the indictment is overdrawn?

General ARNOLD. I would like to give you some facts in connection with our airplanes, and let us see what those airplanes have done. First, in connection with the P-40, which is the one that everybody is jumping on right now, here is what I actually said, referring to the P-40, and not to the P-40-A, B, C, D, E, or F. I said this with reference to the P-40.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the P-40?

General ARNOLD. The P-40 is a pursuit airplane. P-40's have been built and delivered to the pilots in our squadrons: I said that: "They have given an excellent account of themselves against the Luftwaffe in Egypt, and that they have been adopted as standard equipment in the Near East; although we no longer rate the P-40 as better than a good pursuit trainer, because of its limitations of speed, ceiling, and firing power."

Since the original P-40 we have come to the P-40-A, B, C, D, E, and F. As proof of the efficiency and effectiveness of these airplanes, let us see what they have actually done in the war. For instance, we have the British report, from which I quote:

From talking with pilots and squadrons that are equipped with P-40-D (Kitty Hawks), it has been found that this airplane is considered to be superior to the Messerschmitt 109-F. These pilots also consider this plane to be superior to all the other Royal Air Force planes in the Middle East.

Now, that report speaks for itself. In that connection, one squadron has been in combat with the enemy, and in two engagements 13 planes, including 2 Messerschmitt 109-F's, were destroyed with the loss of only 1 P-40-D plane. We lost only 1 plane, and they knocked down 13 hostile planes. It does not appear from that report that that plane is a bad one.

Mr. TABER. Of course, it would depend on the number of planes involved.

General ARNOLD. They. were up against a superior number.

Now, in Oahu and the Philippines, during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant Taylor and Lieutenant Welch, both flying airplanes similar to the British Tomahawk, attacked a formation of Japanese planes, and each shot down two planes. A short time later Lieutenant Welch engaged two Japanese planes, and shot both of them down. Other airplanes of the same type engaged in victorious battle with the Japanese on that day. Every time

67657-42--2

they went up in combat, they acquitted themselves in an excellent

manner.

Now, let us take the Chinese experience: Chinese sources are quoted to the effect that the American volunteer group of airmen defending the Burma Road and Rangoon, many of whom use airplanes of the P-40 series, have bagged from 90 to 100 Japanese planes. That has been since December 7, and it was done with the loss of only 3 planes and 3 men.

On the Russian front, early this month, four Tomahawks are reported in the news dispatches as having shot down eight Messerschmitts, which were there in support of the German drive on Leningrad.

In view of this, it looks to us as if the P-40 has more than paid for itself.

Mr. STARNES. Do you know who the military expert of the Truman committee was or is?

General ARNOLD. No, sir.

Mr. STARNES. I think it would be interesting to know who he was. General ARNOLD. Here is one other item along that line, showing where P-40 planes, or planes of the P-40 series, although outnumbered about 8 to 1 by enemy planes, destroyed as much as 60 percent of the enemy aircraft. This was against German air forces.

Mr. ENGEL. How many American planes were involved? General ARNOLD. It was a very small force. It was a matter of 8 to 1. The CHAIRMAN. Are they developing from day to day improved types of planes, or have you followed the development of improved types pretty closely?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir; we follow that as closely as we can. We have an exceedingly difficult task in getting information out of Germany. Before the war, with our attachés over there, we could not get the information that we would like to have.

The CHAIRMAN. What evidence along that line do you obtain from the planes that are shot down over England, in Africa, and in the Far East every day? Do those planes show any marked developments that have been made?

General ARNOLD. The planes I referred to were Messerschmitt 109-F, which means that it was the seventh model, the models running A, B, C, D, E, and F. In the same way, our P-40-F is the seventh model in the P-40 series.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of those planes that were destroyed, did they show any evidence in their construction that would indicate that their supplies of critical materials are short or substantially reduced?

General ARNOLD. The latest reports we have received on the types of construction indicate that they are still manufacturing airplanes from the best materials and with the best workmanship.

The CHAIRMAN. From that point of view, there is no evidence indicating that they are nearing the exhaustion of their critical materials?

General ARNOLD. We have had no indication along that line at all. The CHAIRMAN. Referring further to the report of the Truman committee of the Senate, the statement is made that when the Japanese aircraft attack was made down at Pearl Harbor on December 7,