freedom' which he first gave them; nor do his own will, but by taking away his own gifts. But herein is rather magnified the power of his providence, and the great wisdom of his power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his own heart, and that even rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his own glory; (the end," whether we will or no, of all our actions) and even when his will is most resisted, most powerful to fulfil it. For as sundry times God's revealed will is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it; so always his secret will is performed, even by the free and self-moving operations of those, who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any supreme destiny extrinsecally moving, or necessarily binding any inferiors to particular actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the concurrences of differing and casual causes, (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the intrinsecal operation of all inferior agents (which we call Nature) produce one main and supreme end, without straining or violating the proper motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt, in this case, to father their sins upon the motions of Satan, as if he brought the neces sity of sinning upon them; and, as St. Paul" said in faith, "Not 1, but sin in me;" so they in hypocrisy, "Not I, but evil motions cast into me." And because the devil is in a special manner called the Tempter, such men therefore think to persuade themselves, that their evil cometh not from any willingness in themselves, but from the violence of the enemy's power, malice, and policy. It is true indeed, that the devil hath a strong operation on the will of corrupt men.

First, because of the subtilty of his substance, whereby he can wind himself and his suggestions most inwardly into the affections and understanding.

Secondly, because of the height of his natural understanding and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himself into an angel of light, and so to method and contrive

m

Cyril. Alex. contra

n Rom. vii. 17.

• Matth.

1 Vid. Euseb. de Præparat. Evang. 1. 6. c. 6. Jul. 1. 4. Hinc etiam quod faciunt contra voluntatem Dei, non impletur nisi voluntas Dei. Aug. de Præd. Sanct. 1. 1. c. 16.

his devices, that they shall not miss of the best advantage to make them speed.

Thirdly, because of the vastness of his experience, whereby he is the better enabled to use such plots, as have formerly had the best success.

t

१

Fourthly, because of his manner of working, grounded on all these, which is violent and furious for the strength; and therefore he is called a 'Strong P Man,' a Roaring Lion,' a 'Red Dragon:' and deep for the subtilty of it; and therefore his working is called a Mystery of Iniquity,' and 'deceivableness of iniquity.' Which is seen, First, in his accommodating himself to our particular humours and natures, and so following the tide of our own affections. Secondly, by fitting his temptations according to our vocations and personal employments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing, or any other the like qualifying of his suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other circumstances. But yet we do not find, in any of these, any violation of man's will, nor restraint of his obedience, but rather the arts that are used to the inveigling of it. The workings then of evil angels, are all by imposture and deceit towards good men; and in respect of evil men, they are but as those of a prince over his subjects, or of a lord over his slaves and captives; which may well stand with the freedom of man's will. And therefore his temptations are, in some places, called the Methods,' in others the Devices,' in others the Snares' of Satan; all words of circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own wills. Though then Satan have, in a notable manner, the name of Tempter be longing unto him, yet we are told in another place, that “every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own concupiscence, and enticed.” So that the devil hath never an effectual temptation (such a one as carries and overcomes the will) but it is always joined with an inward temptation of our own, proceeding from the deceitfulness of our own lusts. So that in this case every man may say to himself, as

P Luke xi. 21.

X

Ephes. vi. 11.

Heb. iii. 13. Rom. vii. 11.

y 2 Tim. ii. 26.

2

⚫ 2 Thess. ii. 7.

* 2 Cor. ii. 11.

2 James i. 14. Vitii autor Diaboli decipientis calliditas,

et Hominis consentientis voluntas: Aug. de Peccat. Orat. 1. 2. c. 17.

Apollodorus, in Plutarch, dreamed of himself, when he thought he was boiled alive in a vessel, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to myself." Many more things might be here added touching this faculty, which I will but name. As first, for the manner of its operations; in some cases, it worketh naturally and necessarily, as in its inclination unto good, in the whole latitude and general apprehension thereof; for it cannot will any thing under the general and formal notion of evil. In others, voluntarily from itself, and with a distinct view and knowledge of an end whereunto it worketh. In others, freely, with a liberty to one thing or another, with a power to elicit, or to suspend and suppress, its own operation. In all, spontaneously, without violence and compulsion: for though, in some respects, the will be not free from necessity, yet it is in all free from coaction. And therefore, though ignorance and fear may take away the complete voluntariness of an action proceeding from the will, (because, without such fear or ignorance, it would not have been done; as when a man casteth his goods into the sea, to escape a shipwreck; and when Oedipus slew Laius his father, not knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the will to do that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of good there

unto.

Secondly, for the motives of the will; they are first natural and internal. Amongst which, the understanding is the principal, which doth pass judgement upon the goodness and convenience of the object of the will, and according to the greater and lesser excellency thereof, represents it to the will, with either a mandatory, or a monitory, or a permissive sentence. The will likewise doth move itself. For by an antecedent willing of the end, she setteth herself on work to will the means, requisite unto the obtaining of that end.

And the sensitive appetite doth indirectly move it too, by suppressing, or bewitching and enticing, the judgement to put some colour and appearance of good upon sensual things. And then, as the sun seemeth red through a red glass; so such as a man's own affection is, such will the end seem unto him to be; as the philosopher speaks."

Next supernaturally, God moveth the wills of men, not only in regard of the matter of the motion, for 'In him we live, and move, and have our being;' but in regard of the rectitude and goodness of it in actions supernatural, both by the manifestation of heavenly light, ('They shall be all taught of God') and by the infusion and impression of spiritual grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to will and to do of his own pleasure.

Lastly, for the acts of the will; they are such as respect either the end, or the means for attaining of it. The acts respecting the end, are these three. 1. A loving and desiring of it, in regard of its beauty and goodness. 2. A serious intention and purpose to prosecute it, in regard of its distance from us. 3. A fruition or enjoying of it, which standeth in two things; in assecution or possession, whereby we are actually joined unto it; and in delectation or rest, whereby we take special pleasure in it.

The acts of the will respecting the means, are these: 1. An act of using or employing the practical judgement, an application and exercising of it to consult and debate the proper means conducible unto the end. Which consultation having passed, and, by the practical judgement, a representation being made of the means discovered,-there next fol loweth an embracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double act; the one an act of consent, whereby we approve the means dictated as proper and possible; the other an act of election, whereby, according to the different weight of reasons, we adhere unto one medium more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more feasible. Thirdly, because the means do not bring us unto the end by being chosen, but by being executed. Hereupon followeth another act of mandate to all the faculties, interested in the execution of those means, to apply and put forth their forces with vigour and constancy, till the end be, at the last, by due execution of those means, attained and enjoyed.

C

Now whereas the philosopher doth often distribute the things belonging unto the soul into affections, faculties, and habits; (for the faculties are moved by the passions, and the passions are regulated and managed by the habits; the

Eth. 1. 2. c. 6. Idem, 1. 2. c. 2.

habits procured for facility and constancy of action, and the actions directed to the obtaining of an end) this method of the philosopher would now lead us to speak further:

First, of the habits of the reasonable soul; and they are either rational only, and in the mind, as the habits of wisdom, of principles, of conclusions, of art and prudence; or besides that virtuous and vicious, conversant about good or evil moral. Which are, first, the habits of practical principles, called Synteresis; and next, the habits of particular virtues, whereby the will is inclined and facilitated unto well-doing. Unto the felicity of all which, are required these four conditions.

1. Justice and rectitude, disposing the will to render unto God, unto ourselves, and unto all others, that which is theirs, and which, of right, we owe unto them.

2. Prudence, discovering that, which is in this manner right, judging of it, and directing unto it.

3. Fortitude, enabling the will firmly to persist in her virtuous purposes, according to the instructions of practical prudence; notwithstanding the labour it must undergo, the delays it must sustain before it can obtain the end, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements, it shall meet withal.

4. Temperance, suppressing and subduing those sensual appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant resolutions.

Next, because all habits, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of actions, we should be thereby led on to the consideration of human actions, fortuitous, violent, natural, voluntary, involuntary, mixed; as also to the grounds of the goodness or illness of actions, taken, First, from the rule of them, unto which they are to conform. Secondly, from the principles of them, from whence they are to proceed; to wit, knowledge and faith to see, will to purpose, love to do, subjection to obey, strength to finish and fulfil, what virtue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed; by which considerations we should be led to take a view of the right end and ultimate felicity, unto which all these actions should lead