Where the stock seized exceeded fifteen per cent. of the total, the Alien Property Custodian placed his representatives on the Board of Directors. Where it was over fifty per cent., the Alien Property Custodian's appointees controlled the corporation and sometimes liquidated the business, regardless of the interests of the minority American stockholders. Thus, while section 9 was held to be the necessary due process of law, yet the administration of the Act which gave power to control, manage and sell, and limited the rights of claimants to the proceeds derived from sale, worked an injustice in many cases. (d) Where Stock Certificates Were Abroad. Section 7 further provides that corporations should report those stockholders whom they had reasonable cause to believe to be alien enemies. In many cases, the stock certificates were abroad. It was held that the corporations must issue new shares to the Alien Property Custodian, canceling the former shares on their books. (Columbia Brewing Co. v. Miller, 281 Fed. 289; Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 281 Fed. 804; Garvan v. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co., 275 Fed. 486; Garvan v. Certain Shares of International A. Corporation, 276 Fed. 206.) The question arose as to the rights of third parties to whom the shares might have been transferred. Such parties, however, would have to take proceedings under section 9 in order to recover their property. In Miller v. Abramson (unreported), the question involved the collection of notes due by the defendant to alien enemies. The defendant pointed out that if the notes were in the hands of a third party, he might have a defense through the statute of limitations. The court, however, ordered the money paid over by the American, giving him the right to reopen the case if it should afterwards appear that the notes were transferred. (e) Determining Date of Seizure-Effect of Demand -Right of Suit Today Where Property was not Seized. In spite of the very comprehensive measures taken by the Alien Property Custodian to seize German property, there are instances where money claimed by Germans never reached the Government; for example where the American debtors claimed they had a defense against the Germans, or the rate of exchange was disputed; or where purchasing contracts were concerned. The question has arisen as to whether the Germans can today bring suit against their American debtors where, if a debt had existed, it should have been seized by the Alien Property Custodian. It was claimed, for instance, after the Armistice and again after the Treaties of Peace were made abroad, that the Alien Property Custodian could no longer seize property, but it was held that the determining date was July 2, 1921, when the war officially came to an end. In Miller v. Rouse, 276 Fed. 715, a demand was served on July 5, 1921. Although the peace treaty gave this government the right to hold any property which had been seized, yet no property would vest on a demand that was served subsequent to such date. This case would seem to make it clear that Germans can claim property or debts which were not seized prior to July 2, 1921 by the Alien Property Custodian. The question of the time of vesting of title in the Alien Property Custodian was raised in Kohn v. Jacob & Josef Kohn, 264 Fed. 253. There the Alien Property Custodian had made a demand from a debtor of the plaintiff, a Czecho-Slovakian. A part of the claim of the Czecho-Slovakian had been paid to the Alien Property Custodian, and in this case it was sought by injunction to prevent payment of the balance. The court held, however, that on the service of a demand, title vested in the Alien Property Custodian, and that whatever change might have occurred subsequent to that time could not affect the right to continue to collect. Of course, the Czecho-Slovakian under the amendments of the Act would subsequently have a right to proceed under section 9. The case is important, however, as indicating the line of demarkation where Ger mans have claims for property not turned over to the Alien Property Custodian. Where a demand covering such property has been served, whether or not the Alien Property Custodian seized the debt or the property actually came into his possession, nevertheless title would vest in him; where, however, the res has not been the subject of a demand, title in still in the German and in view of Miller v. Rouse, supra, he would have a right to sue today. Section 8. Contracts With Enemies CanceledLiens on Property. Section 8 provides for the retention of liens upon property in the possession of non-enemies. A further section provides that contracts with enemies may be canceled upon thirty days' notice, where such contracts involve delivery of articles manufactured, produced or mined in the United States. The courts have been asked to hold that trustees who hold property of insurance companies for the benefit of American policy holders and creditors have a lien under this section. It was contended that such property, held as security, was not of alien character. Such contention was overruled, the cases holding that section 8 has to do only with direct liens. (Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, supra). It was on the basis of this section that in Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229, and Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447, the plaintiff partner was held entitled to liquidate the partnership, the Alien Property Custodian having no right in the partnership property, but merely to the enemy interest in the surplus, if any, after an accounting. Section 9. Procedure In Prosecution of Claims Against Enemy Property. Section 9 provides for claims against alien property by non-enemies and prescribes the method for pursuing such claims. The forms provided by the Alien Property Custodian's office consist of an application, demand, consent and power of attorney. The Act as originally passed provided that no property could be returned by the President without the consent of the alien, but the amendment of July 11, 1919, did away with this necessity. Were the assent required, it would be difficult to see how Americans, during the war, could ever have secured the allowance of claims as communication with the enemy was forbidden. The section provided further that if the President failed to act within sixty days or if the claim was disallowed, the claimant might bring a suit in equity, such suit to be brought within six months after the end of the war. This time, however, was extended to eighteen months and later to thirty months.* This time limitation has given rise to considerable mis *Limitation provision canceled by Winslow Bill. pendix, p. 329, post. See Ap |