residing here are not. The partnership as such ceases to exist. In such circumstances, the Alien Property Custodian had a right to seize only the interest of the enemy partners, i. e., such part as would remain after liquidation by the American partner or partners and the payment of their interests. (Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27; Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447.)

It would seem that those persons who became alien enemies because of Presidential Proclamation, should cease to bear that character when their names are taken off the designating list. But property of Germans and others residing in neutral countries is still held, even though the blacklist was long ago vacated.

In Re Garvan, Re Hermanos' Property, 270 Fed. 1002, the defendant claimed not to have been an alien enemy and objected to the seizure by the Alien Property Custodian on this ground. It appeared that the defendant was a neutral whose name had been placed upon a blacklist. The court referred to the duty of the Alien Property Custodian to remove the name from the list, if the original facts, which showed reasonable cause for belief that any person was an enemy, were cleared up.

The question involved here is an interesting one. Those in neutral countries who traded with Germany were put upon the blacklist. The blacklist was later abrogated. Under the Peace Treaty

the Alien Property Custodian has a right to hold German property until some suitable provision is made for American claims, but no provision concerns the property of neutrals.

In Sinjen v. Miller, 281 Fed. 889, where an American whose property was taken because of his residence in Germany returned to this country and made a demand for the return of his property the question of citizenship became important. It was found that the failure to register at the American Consular Office in Berlin did not necessarily mean the loss of American citizenship unless the court found that the residence abroad was with intent to renounce citizenship.

Section 2 also contains definitions of terms other than that of "enemy", such as "ally of an enemy", "person", "United States", "beginning of war", "end of war", "bank or banks" and the words, "to trade".

Section 3. "

Trading " with the Enemy Declared
Unlawful.

Section 3 of the Act makes "trading " unlawful. By Section 2, trade is defined to mean, among other things, to pay or satisfy a debt or obligation, to carry on, compiete or perform any contract, agreement or obligation.

Ordinarily, in time of war, commercial intercourse with the enemy is contrary to law. On its face,

such a statement is simple, but cases arise involving completion of contracts for enemies or the doing of acts which do not necessarily involve intercourse of any kind. Under the Civil War Act (See Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561) it was held that a lease between a citizen of Mississippi and a citizen of Massachusetts residing in Mississippi, made during the war and involving neither intercourse nor trading across the line of hostilities, was valid. In New York Life Insurance Company v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, 24 Law Ed., 453, another Civil War case, the question arose as to the right of an agent to receive insurance premiums, but the act under consideration there involved "commercial intercourse."

The courts have even gone so far as to disallow a claim for the expense of the children of an alien enemy who were supported by the claimant in the United States (Springer v. Garvan, 276 Fed. 595), on the ground that this was "trading with the enemy" under the Act. It may have been that the amendment to section 9 of June 5, 1920, sought to clarify this in providing that no debt should be allowed unless it was owing to or owed by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917. There are, however, claims that arose after that time which apparently have nothing to do with trading with the enemy. In Wilson v. Miller, 274 Fed. 808, an attorney was obliged to represent an enemy interested in a cause

that was in litigation before the war. The court intimated that if services were rendered to the property or to the alien enemy owner of the property, this would constitute a violation of the Act.

Section 4. Enemy, Insurance Companies Licensed to Continue Business.

Section 4 providing for the licensing of enemy insurance and reinsurance companies, was designed to make it possible for such companies to continue business under governmental supervision for a sufficiently long time to protect American policy holders and creditors. It was on the basis of the thirty-day provision in that section that a demurrer to an indictment was sustained in the United States v. Meinel & Wemple, Inc., 256 Fed. 396, since the communication which was there the basis of the indictment was sent within thirty days.

Section 5. Delegation of Power to Alien Property Custodian.

Section 5, besides providing for the appointment of the Alien Property Custodian, contained a provision permitting the President to delegate the powers vested in him to such officer or officers as he might select. It has been contended that the powers vested in the President by Congress could not be delegated to another.

The Act provided for a determination by the President in the first instance (section 7), as to whether or not property was enemy-owned. This power was delegated to the Alien Property Custodian under section 5 of the Act. In Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 65 Law. Ed. 604, 41 S. Ct. 293, the power of delegation was upheld. The court said:

"In short, a personal determination by the President is not required; but he may act through the Custodian, and a determination by the latter is in effect the act of the President. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554; The Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall. 92, 109."

Section 6. Appointment and Duties of Alien Property Custodian.

Section 6 authorizes the appointment and prescribes the duties of the Alien Property Custodian.

Section 7. Reports to Alien Property CustodianMethod of Seizure.

Section 7 requires the making of reports by corporations of stockholders or officers who might have an enemy character, as well as by persons holding property for enemies, whether the holding is beneficial or otherwise. Subdivision (c) of that section authorizes the President, after investigation, to determine whether a person is an enemy, and to require his property to be transferred to the Alien Property