As for our staff functions, our Motion-Picture Bureau continues under Executive order as the central point of clearance and contact between Government agencies and the industry, and is responsible for the review and approval of pictures produced by other Government agencies for distribution to the public. As for the work of production of pictures in explanation and support of Government war programs, which this office used to perform, that has been taken over by the motion-picture industry itself, through its War Activities Committee; and I might add that the industry has also lent us one of its leading figures to serve as the chief of our Motion-Picture Bureau. Our Poster Division now merely approves the quality of, and clears for conformity with Government policy, the posters produced by other Government agencies; besides seeing that they are effectively distributed, with as little waste as possible. Our domestic Radio Bureau serves as the contact point and clearance mechanism for the requests of all Government agencies for radio time for their information programs requests which, when uncoordinated as they were in the early days of the war, caused endless confusion. And our Office of Program Coordination, working in close cooperation with the War Advertising Council and other groups, determines the emphasis and timing of the various home-front information campaigns in support of the war effort, to which private advertisers contribute either time on the air or space in newspapers and magazines.

These three parts of our Domestic Branch-the Radio Bureau, the Motion-Picture Bureau, and the Office of Program Coordination are responsible for the most effective use, in the interest of the war effort, of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of time on the air and the screen, and of advertising space in newspapers and magazines, contributed by private citizens and organizations to the national interest. It is the judgment of those with whom our staff men cooperate, both in the Government and private industry, that they are performing that function very effectively-and we are asking, for their continued operation, just about $1 for every thousand dollars' worth of time and space that they allocate.

I have reviewed these particular activities of the Domestic Branch, with which the committee is generally familiar from past years, to emphasize the fact that since the elimination of our publications and motion-picture production the Domestic Branch is principally a staff operation, responsible for the effective organization and coordination of other activities, both governmental and private, far more extensive than any we ever dreamed of conducting ourselves. There are certain further activities, conducted partly by the Domestic Branch and partly by the Director's office, which are perhaps our most important contributions on the home front. We give advice to other Government departments as to the most effective way to present their problems and policies in connection with the war, so as to secure the greatest possible degree of public understanding. An example is the policy on release of war news, recently worked out in full cooperation with the Army and Navy, which seems likely to ensure that the public will get the news of military operations just as fully and promptly as genuine considerations of military security permit. Another instance is the conferences which we undertook last winter with officials concerned with the problems of cut-backs in production and eventual reconver

sion of industry to civilian uses, whenever military needs shall have slackened. These conferences resulted in substantial agreement on the facts among officials concerned, and substantial unanimity in succeeding public statements, on a topic where confusion had previously threatened to prevail. We cannot and should not tell officials of other agencies what to do; but we can and do advise them how to explain what they are doing or going to do, so that the public will have as clear an idea as possible of what is asked of it, and why.

The foregoing may suggest that our Domestic Branch is a considerably more important piece of governmental machinery than might be inferred from the very modest sum asked for its operations for the coming year. Now for our Overseas Branch, which is asking for an increase over last year's appropriation of more than 75 percenta total of upward of $59,000,000, of which $10,000,000 is a contingency fund for action in support of military operations which cannot now be precisely foreseen.

This may seem a large figure; but a recent estimate by an authoritative magazine, the London Economist, suggests that the Germans are spending on foreign propaganda almost 10 times as much as we are asking from the Congress; and we must compete with an elaborate and vigorous Japanese propaganda too. We have a world-wide job to do, aside from those nations of the Western Hemisphere which fall in the field of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; in all the rest of the world, there is no nation which our propaganda or information programs do not reach.

As the committee knows, our operations outside the United States fall into two classes-those in friendly or neutral countries, where we operate under the general jurisdiction of the State Department, exercised through its embassies and legations; and those in theaters of war, where we are under the control of the military commanders. Both of these are war jobs. Enemy propaganda is constantly at work endeavoring to create division between us and our allies, to influence the feeling of neutral peoples against us, and make them less inclined to active sympathy with and assistance to our cause. It is the job of O. W. I. in these friendly and neutral countries to keep continually before the public eye the power and strength of the United States, to keep those peoples informed of our great and increasing contribution to the United Nations war effort on all fronts; and to assure them that the war aims of the United States, as laid down in authoritative statements of both the Executive and the Congress, are such as will conduce to the eventual good of the entire world. So long as the war goes on in any part of the world, O. W. I. will be required to explain the American point of view and set forth the American achievement to all peoples whose friendship and understanding may help us win the war.

Virtually all the increased funds we ask for, however, are for our work in support of present or projected military operations, and the expected consequences of those operations. The principal field in which, to date, we have been engaged in this sort of work is the Mediterranan theater, where O. W. I. has operated as part of the Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters. This organization included, besides many employees of O. W. I., a considerable number of American and British military personnel, representatives of the British Ministry of Information and Political Warfare Execu

tive, and a small number of men from the Office of Strategic Servicesan organization most of whose work in the area was of a different sort. The Psychological Warfare Branch was under military command but its executive officer was an O. W. I. man, C. D. Jackson, and I believe it can truly be said that our people were the strongest single influence on its activities. Of the valuable contributions of this organization to the victories in Tunisia and the early successes in Italy the committee was informed last fall. It is still in operation under the Mediterranean command, handling Allied propaganda in southern Europe and the Balkans; a similar organization has been established in London, to conduct psychological warfare activities in support of the invasion of northern Europe. These are both Allied operations. Elsewhere O. W. I. is operating independently, though in liaison with the propaganda organizations of our allies, under American military command-under General Stilwell in Burma and China, under General MacArthur in the southwest Pacific; and under Admiral Nimitz in propaganda conducted from the Hawaiian Islands against Japan. Of the details of these activities the committee will be informed by three men who have recently returned from various fronts Mr. Hamblet, head of our London office; Mr. Barrett, executive director of the Overseas Branch, who has lately been in the Mediterranean; and Mr. Lattimore, Deputy Director for the Pacific area, who has recently visited the headquarters of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur.

In all these theaters of operations we are in effect a specialized branch of the military forces, in a sense comparable to parachute troops or antitank battalions-a special branch which attacks the enemy's will to victory and confidence in victory, and counteracts his attacks on the mind and will of the populations of the occupied countries. To meet the requirements of the military commanders in Europe and Asia we have already recruited several hundred men for this work, and shall have to recruit more; servicing and supplying these men will entail also an increase in the staff of the home offices, and in our production of news, radio broadcasts, leaflets and other publications. Many of the details of what the military commanders have required of us must be given to the committee off the record, and some cannot be given at all. However, it may be said that the duties of the Psychological Warfare Branch which will support the invasion of Europe will be generally similar to those we are now performing in the Mediterranean, but on a much larger scale.

O. W. I. men will go across the Channel with the invading forces, conducting combat propaganda against the enemy and conveying information to the civilian populations too. During the next stage, when the invasion has gained a foothold but the countries now occupied are still the scene of military operations, it will be our duty, in collaboration with our allies, to operate newspapers and radio stations in the liberated areas-transmitting to the civilian populations the instructions of the military authorities, and encouraging their cooperation to the fullest possible degree with the armies of liberation.

This phase will end when the fighting has passed on to such an extent that civilian government can be restored in the liberated nations. But the function of O. W. I. will not end so long as the war continues, in other parts of Europe or in other parts of the world.

It will then be the duty of our men in the liberated nations to provide American information-by news, broadcasts, pictures, magazines, books, and any other means that may be found useful, to those Allied peoples who have been set free, just as do our outposts today in the nations of the British Commonwealth, in Russia, and China. And when Germany and its satellites have been conquered and occupied by our troops it will be our duty, under the supervision of the military authorities, to provide information for the enemy peoples which will gradually correct the false picture which has been given them by so many years of Nazi propaganda.

Accordingly, the military program under which we operate this year will require-assuming the success of the invasion-the establishment of some 35 new outposts of O. W. I. in Europe, in enemy countries or countries now occupied. This virtually doubles the number of our outposts; and this demand is responsible, directly or indirectly, for virtually all the increase requested in our regular appropriation. For this increase in our outposts will, of course, require a considerable increase in the output of our bureaus in Washington, New York, and San Francisco which provide the materials for our propaganda and information work. We cannot tell you precisely when each of these new outposts will be established, because that depends on the speed of our military advance; but the Army expects us to have the people ready to jump when the moment comes.

It will be observed that this work in Europe, assuming that all goes as expected, will eventually pass out of the jurisdiction of the military commanders, as civil government is restored in one liberated_nation after another. This has already occurred in north Africa. Till the end of last May Africa was the scene of military operations, and thereafter it was the base for the invasion of Italy. All of O. W. I.'s work in Africa was at that time part of the Psychological Warfare Branch of Army headquarters; and because of the shortage of personnel, our offices in Africa had to be pretty completely stripped to make up the forces that went into Italy with the Army. It was presently found, however, that the reduction of American information work in Africa had had a distinctly detrimental effect on American interests; most of the information to the population, whether French or native, was coming from sources which had no particular interest in giving news of the United States or promoting the interest of the United States. Accordingly, at the urgency of the State Department, we are now creating an O. W. I. branch in north Africa distinct from the psychological warfare operation, and responsible to State Department authorities. The same sort of thing is likely to occur in Europe; but whether we operate under military or diplomatic control, it is certain that the national interest will require the continuance of active American information work in Europe at least so long as fighting continues in Asia.

These coming demands on us in Europe-assuming the success of the invasion can be in large part foreseen; in response to the specific demands of military leaders we have planned that work in great detail. We cannot see that far ahead in Asia; but we can foresee the high probability that as the war in Asia intensifies, and as our military forces advance, O. W. I. will have to increase its psychological warfare operations under military command and will probably have to set up, in the course of the coming year, a number of new outposts in countries

now under Japanese occupation. It was largely with this in view that we have asked for the $10,000,000 contingency fund; but this is not solely for contingencies in Asia and the Pacific. Some of our future. responsibilities in Europe cannot yet be predicted with certainty. We know what is expected of us by the military commanders in the north European and Mediterranean theaters; but certain areas of Europe lie outside their present theater of operations and it may be necessary for us to open outposts there, too. Also, the cost of our forthcoming work in the countries to be liberated, and in the enemy countries that will be occupied, has been estimated on the supposition that much of the material we shall have to work with-newspaper printing presses, and so forth-will be left intact or at least capable of fairly simple and inexpensive repair. This happened at some places in Italy; at others it did not. Conceivably, we may have to supply much more equipment for news distribution and broadcasting in Europe that we can now foresee; and we must be ready for swift and flexible change and expansion as the shifting and rapidly changing military situation may dictate in ways which we cannot now foresee. Accordingly, we have again asked for a $10,000,000 contingency fundto be released, as was the $10,000,000 of contingent money allotted to us last year, only a piece at a time as the need arises. If certain things don't happen, we don't spend the money.

I assume that after the explanations made in our previous appearances before this committee, it is no longer necessary for us to set forth the importance of propaganda in contributing to the success of military operations. Propaganda cannot do it all, but it can increase the impetus of victory and do a good deal to cushion the shock of set-backs to our foreign audiences.

It is quite as apparent, however, that continuance of propaganda and information work abroad will powerfully serve the national interest so long as the war continues in any part of the world. Presumably, the shooting will stop in Europe some time before it stops in Asia; the reorganization and restoration of Europe will have begun while a great part of the resources and energy of the United States is still devoted to the Pacific war. If the United States is to play an active part in international cooperation after the war-and Congress, in the Connally and Fulbright resolutions, has declared that national intention then the people of Europe have to be kept informed of what the United States is doing, of the effectiveness of our military activity in regions far removed from Europe, and of the tendency of American policy to promote a stable and lasting peace. If we are going to continue our association with the rest of the world at all— and few Americans now believe that we can safely withdraw from itwe want to win friends and influence people. We cannot leave it to other nations, however friendly, to do that job for us; and the nations of the world are more likely to make a serious endeavor to cooperate in building the future peace of they can believe that America will try to build it too.

That is a very general outline of the job that O. W. I. is expected to do during the coming year; now some observations as to how we are doing it. By the end of this fiscal year the Office of War Information will be 2 years old; some of its activities were carried on before that by the other agencies which were combined into O. W. I., and many of our people have now been engaged in the job of foreign propaganda and information for 21⁄2 years or more.

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