correspondence course would have been subject to the jurisdiction of this code. While we do not feel that the armed forces desired such wide latitude, we were unanimous in the decision that the jurisdiction should be limited by statute and not left to regulations. Therefore, we substituted an entirely new subdivision which we feel is entirely proper. You will note that Reserve personnel do not become subject to this code when on inactive duty training unless such training is pursuant to written orders which are voluntarily accepted and which specifically state that the acceptance of such orders will subject that particular Reserve to the provisions of this code.

The original provisions of article 3 (a) provided for a continuing jurisdiction by the military over persons who had returned to an inactive-duty status but had committed an offense against military law while on an active-duty status. The Reserve components voiced strenuous objection to such proposals and it is admitted that those proposals went much further than existing law. As a matter of fact, the military authorities have been most reluctant to prosecute the average offender who succeeds in returning to a civilian status before the discovery of his crime. On the other hand, the military authorities have found themselves confronted with a lack of jurisdiction to try certain aggravated cases of this character. You will recall the Durant jewel case. That case involved the theft of the crown jewels of Hesse. At the time Mrs. Durant, one of the accused, was apprehended, she was in a terminal-leave status. The point was raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the Army had ceased to have jurisdiction over the accused since her active service was terminated and she was only completing the unexpired portion of her terminal leave. A writ of habeas corpus was granted in district court but ultimately reversed on the theory that the terminal-leave status is a service status and subjects one to the Articles of War. If charges and specifications had not been served on the accused until after the expiration of her terminal leave, neither the military nor our Federal courts would have had any jurisdiction over the case. You will also recall the more recent Hershberg case. Hershberg was a Navy enlisted man who allegedly abused other American military personnel who were under his supervision while they were all prisoners of war of the Japanese. Hershberg's term of enlistment expired and after 1 day he reenlisted. The Navy then attempted to prosecute him for the alleged abuse of American persons. A writ of habeas corpus was granted in that case, not because it would be unconstitutional to provide for a continuing jurisdiction in such cases, but because the present Navy statute confers no such continuing jurisdiction.

We felt that there was a solution to this problem and our proposed solution is offered in article 3 (a) which is a committee amendment to H. R. 2498. It provides for a continuing jurisdiction provided the offense against this code is punishable by confinement of 5 years or more and provided further that the offense is not triable in a State or Federal court of the United States. We feel that this will provide ample protection against any capricious action on the part of military authorities, will limit military jurisdiction to serious offenses that could not otherwise be tried by military or Federal courts and will likewise correct the absurd situation of permitting an honorable discharge to operate as a bar to a prosecution for murder or other serious offenses.

Article 15 replaces the present provisions of the Navy for Navy and Coast Guard mast punishment and the present provisions of the Army and Air Force for disciplinary punishment by commanding officers. We were of the opinion that a 50-percent pay forfeiture for 3 months was an excessive penalty for disciplinary infractions by officers. Therefore, we reduced the maximum forfeiture from 3 months to 1 month. We likewise disagreed with the original provisions of this article which permitted a forfeiture of one-half of an enlisted person's pay for 1 month. Enlisted persons are in a far different pay status than officers, and we do not feel that a pay forfeiture is appropriate as punishment for disciplinary infractions by enlisted persons.

This article also provided for confinement for not to exceed seven consecutive days and confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for a period not to exceed five consecutive days. The Army and the Air Force have never used confinement, with or without bread and water, as a disciplinary punishment. On the contrary, it is a provision of long standing in the Navy and Coast Guard. We are of the opinion that this type of disciplinary punishment should not be used ashore. However, we recognize that disciplinary matters aboard ship present an entirely different problem. Accordingly, we have authorized confinement for 7 days or confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not to exceed 5 days when imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel. In view of the fact that Army and Air Force personnel are stationed throughout the world and must necessarily spend a portion of their time aboard ship in reaching or returning from such stations, it is intended that the present provisions for confinement on bread and water shall not be restricted to Navy enlisted personnel but shall be equally applicable to all other enlisted personnel of the armed forces when attached to or embarked in a vessel. As a result of our amendments we have achieved uniformity in the types of disciplinary punishments which may be adjudged.

Article 26 provides the authority for a law officer of a general courtmartial. Under existing law the Navy has no law officer. The Army and Air Force do have a law officer for general courts martial who, in addition to ruling upon points of evidence, retires, deliberates, and votes with the court on the findings and sentence. Officers of equal experience on this subject are sharply divided in their opinion as to whether or not the law officer should retire with the court and vote as a member. In view of the fact that the law officer is empowered to make final rulings on all interlocutory questions of law, except on a motion to dismiss and a motion relating to the accused's sanity, and in view of the fact that the law officer will now instruct the court upon the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and elements of the offense, we feel that he should not retire with the court with the voting privileges of a member of the court. Article 26, in our opinion, contains the appropriate provisions on this matter.

Article 67 contains the most revolutionary changes which have ever been incorporated in our military law. Under existing law all appellate review is conducted solely within the military departments. This has resulted in widespread criticism by the general public, who, with or without cause, look with suspicion upon all things military and particularly on matters involving military justice. Every Member of

Congress, both present and past, is well aware of the validity of this statement. The original bill provided for the establishment of a judicial council to be composed of at least three members. In view of the fact that this is to be a judicial tribunal and to be the court of last resort for court-martial cases, except for the constitutional right of habeas corpus, we concluded that it should be designated by a more appropriate name. We likewise questioned the number of members to be provided. As a consequence we have substituted a new subdivision (a) which establishes the Court of Military Appeals, consisting of three members who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Such appointees must be members of a State or Federal bar, shall hold office during good behavior and receive the same compensation, allowances, and retirement benefits as judges of the United States courts of appeals. We must frankly admit that it is impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy the case load which this tribunal must consider. You will note under subdivision (b) that it shall review the records of (1) cases affecting a general or flag rank or including the death sentence, (2) cases which the Judge Advocate General may forward on his own motion and (3) all cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown, the court has granted a review. Rather than provide for a greater number of members than three for the Court of Military Appeals, we have concluded that it would be sounder to limit the number to three until such time as the facts may warrant an increase in number. The article as presently written embodies those conclusions.

Perhaps the most troublesome question which we have considered is the question of command control. Under existing law commanding officers refer the charges in general, special, and summary courts martial and convene the courts; they appoint the members of the court, law officer for general courts and counsel for trial; and retain full power to set aside findings of guilty and modify or change the sentence, but are not permitted to interfere with verdicts of not guilty nor to increase the severity of any sentence imposed. We have preserved these elements of command in this bill. On the other hand, we have included numerous restrictions on command. The bill provides that the convening authority may not refer charges for trial until they are examined for legal sufficiency by the staff judge advocate or legal officer; authorizes the staff judge advocate or legal officer to communicate directly with the Judge Advocate General; requires all counsel at a general court-martial trial to be lawyers or law graduates and, in addition, to be certified as qualified by the Judge Advocate General: provides a law officer who must be a lawyer whose ruling on interlocutory questions of law will be final and binding on the court and who must instruct the court on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and the elements of the offense charged; provides that the staff judge advocate of the convening authority must examine the record of trial for sufficiency before the convening authority can act on a finding or sentence; provides legally qualified appellate counsel for an accused before a board of review and the Court of Military Appeals; establishes a civilian court of military appeals, completely removed from all military influence or persuasion; and makes it a

court-martial offense for any person subject to this code to unlawfully influence the action of a court martial.

Able and sincere witnesses urged our committee to remove the authority to convene courts martial from "command" and place that authority in judge advocates or legal officers, or at least in a superior command. We fully agreed that such a provision might be desirable if it were practicable, but we are of the opinion that it is not practicable. We cannot escape the fact that the law which we are now writing will be as applicable and must be as workable in time of war as in time of peace, and, regardless of any desires which may stem from an idealistic conception of justice, we must avoid the enactment of provisions which will unduly restrict those who are responsible for the conduct of our military operations. Our conclusions in this respect are contrary to the recommendations of numerous capable and respected witnesses who testified before our committee, but the responsibility for the choice was a matter which had to be resolved according to the dictates of our own conscience and judgment.

The final point involves the question of whether or not we shall establish separate Judge Advocate Generals Corps for the Navy and the Air Force, as has already been done in the Army, in Public Law 759 of the Eightieth Congress. Practically every witness who testified before our committee, except departmental witnesses, urged that such corps be adopted. Even though there were no provisions on this matter in the bill, our committee gave a great deal of consideration to the proposal. The Navy and the Air Force strenuously opposed the establishment of Judge Advocate Corps in their services. We came to the conclusion that since we now have a Judge Advocate Corps in the Army and since the Court of Military Appeals will have an opportunity to review the comparative results of the Army with its corps as against the Navy and the Air Force without such a corps, that we should permit the services to operate under their present different plans until such time as we may be able to factually determine the best method of operation. In spite of this decision we have reached the conclusion that the Navy and the Air Force are not giving adequate recognition to their law specialists and judge advocate officers, respectively.

It may not be generally known, but there is no requirement under present law that the Judge Advocate General of any of the services be a qualified lawyer. We think that that is a deficiency which should be corrected. In view of these conclusions we have added a new section to the bill which appears as section 13. You will note that it requires that the Judge Advocates General must be members of a Federal or State bar, must be judge advocates or law specialists, and must have at least 8 years accumulative experience in a Judge Advocates Corps, department, or office, the last 3 years of which, prior to appointment, must be consecutive. Now, in order that there may be no misunderstanding by either the Navy or the Air Force, we point out that we are fully aware that the Navy has a number of unrestricted line officers who have law degrees and may qualify as law specialists as well as officers of the line. We do not intend that such officers shall be precluded from becoming Judge Advocates General as a result of this section. We do, however, insist that all Judge Advocates General be legally qualified, with a prescribed amount of experience, and that a substantial portion of that experience be obtained immediately prior

to appointment to the office of the Judge Advocate General. If the Navy or the Air Force have officers who are not law specialists or judge advocates but are otherwise qualified under this section, they are not precluded from designating such officers as judge advocates or law specialists immediately prior to appointment. It is to be hoped, however, that neither the Navy nor the Air Force will continue to relegate their legal personnel to positions of lesser importance and dignity than their counterparts in the line. We think it entirely sound and proper that the Judge Advocates General be chosen from those who have sacrificed the prerogatives of the line officer in order to follow a legal career in the services. We hope to see some revised thinking on this subject and will view future developments with interest.

In addition to the committee amendments to H. R. 2498 which appear as original provisions in H. R. 4080, two substantive amendments to H. R. 4080 which are worthy of comment have been adopted by the committee. The first amendment relates to the selection of judges for the Court of Military Appeals as provided in article 67. The committee is of the opinion that it is desirable to remove every possible criticism from the proposed code and that a limitation on the number of judges who may be appointed from the same political party is not only appropriate but highly desirable. The committee has adopted such an amendment to article 67. The second amendment pertains to article 2, page 5, subdivision 11, beginning on line 18, and subdivision 12, beginning on line 24. You will note that subdivision 11 confers jurisdiction over all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States and certain territories. Subdivision 12 confers jurisdiction over all persons within an area leased by the United States which is under the control of the Secretary of the Department and which is without the United States and certain Territories. It has been discovered that the United States armed forces occupy certain territory in the Philippines, which territory was originally acquired for the use of the United States by virtue of the 1898 Treaty with Spain, which territory continues to be used by our armed forces by virtue of the military base agreement of 1947 between the United States and the Philippines. We find that under the provisions of subdivision 12, we will have no jurisdiction over persons not otherwise subject to this code who enter this property and commit offenses while on the property. It is considered desirable to have such jurisdiction. On the other hand we fully recognize the fact that certain limitations have been placed upon the jurisdiction of the United States by virtue of certain treaties and agreements and that this jurisdiction may be further curtailed by future agreements. Certainly, we do not desire to arouse the suspicion of any foreign governments by the use of any language in this code which would appear to give the armed forces jurisdiction in excess of obligations which we have already or may in the future assume by treaty or agreement. In order that our intent be made perfectly clear, the following amendment was adopted: On page 5, line 18, at the beginning of subdivision (11) insert "Subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law," and substitute a small a for the capital A in "All".

On page 5, line 24, insert the same amendment as in subdivision (11) and, in addition, on line 24, after "by" insert "or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of".