CHAPTER THE SEVENTY-FIRST.

1779-1781.

Hostile preparations of Spain, before the declaration of hostilities Alliances calculated to diminish the influence of EnglandTreaty with Morocco-Junction of the bourbon fleets, their appearance in the channel, and return to their own coasts-Temporary misunderstanding between France and Spain-Blockade of Gibraltar-Expedition of Rodney for its relief-Loss of a spanish convoy-Defeat of the squadron under Don Juan de LangaraCapture of the british East and West India fleets-Expedition of admiral Solano to the West Indies-Reduction of West FloridaHostilities against the british settlements in the bay of Honduras.

IF any proof were yet wanting of the resolution CHAP. 71. taken by the spanish court to provoke hostilities, 1779-1781. and of their insincerity in the preceding negotiation, it might be found in the previous preparations and arrangements, both public and private, with every power, either at enmity with England, or likely to be turned against England, in the impending contest. With this view, Florida Blanca continued the negotiation which the preçeding minister, in conjunction with France, had opened with Hyder Ally, against the british power in the east. He formed also an intimate connection with the king of Prussia, who, since the peace of Paris, had fostered the bitterest

1779-1781.

CHAP. 71. enmity against England. He soothed the temporary resentment which the conduct of France, during the contest for the bavarian succession, had excited in the court of Vienna. He succeeded even in allaying the deep-rooted jealousy of Prussia and Austria; and, by their co-operation, turned the principal weight of the germanic body against the hereditary enemy of the House of Bourbon.

May 13,

1779.

The negotiations of the spanish minister extended even to St. Petersburgh. He obtained sufficient influence in the russian court and cabinet to weaken that partiality which was the effect of the long, intimate, and advantageous connection with England.* By the united representations of the bourbon courts, the empress was not only induced to lay aside her design of assisting England with her fleet, and uniting her arms with Prussia against Austria; but she was even persuaded to mediate the peace of Teschen, and thus to prevent the continuance of the war in Germany, which would have recalled a part of the french force from distant operations to their own frontier.+

He, at the same time, aided the machinations

*Florida Blanca, in his Statement, No. 5, avows these hostile designs against England; and acknowledges that the previous negotiation had enabled Spain to mature her preparations.-Appendix.

of France to foment the commercial jealousy of CHAP. 71. Holland, and lured the cupidity of this trading 1779-1781. people by the prospect of succeeding to the commercial privileges hitherto enjoyed by the english in Spain.

But his principal efforts were directed to the barbary states, whose friendship and assistance would essentially favour the attack meditated against Gibraltar, which was always the first hostile project of Spain in her disputes with England. As the failure of the unfortunate expedition against Algiers had sufficed to convince the minister that direct hostilities would only lead to disappointment and disgrace, he recurred to negotiation, and, for the first time, entered into a regular treaty with a people hitherto considered as irreconcilable enemies, both of the nation and of its religion.

By bribes, and the customary modes of solicitation, the emperor of Morocco was induced to send an embassador to Madrid, under the pretence of giving public satisfaction for the attack against Melilla. Through the agency of this minister, a treaty was concluded, which alienated the moorish prince from England, and attached him to Spain. He even deposited a part of his treasure in Spain, as a pledge of his sincerity, opened his ports to spanish ships, and favoured the projects of the court in all their subsequent

CHAP. 71. operations. Besides these direct advantages, the 1779-1781. friendship of the moors enabled the spaniards to

reduce their garrisons on the african coast, and even to diminish the artillery and magazines. Speaking of this treaty, its author, Florida Blanca, observes, Your majesty comprehends better than any other person, how great would have been our embarrassment, if, by omitting to form this connection in time, England had incited the moors to attack Ceuta or Melilla, or by piratical cruizes in the straits, to derange all our measures for the blockade of Gibraltar, and the transport of provisions to our camp.'

*

Among the measures directly connected with the views of Spain, may be placed the alliance with Portugal, which secured the tranquillity of the colonies in South America, and converted from an enemy into an ally, a power whose dominions alone could favour an attack against her own frontier.

By

As all the measures of external policy had been directed to increase the weight and influence of the crown, so at home every preparation was matured for prompt and vigorous hostility. the assistance of Portugal, considerable remittances were obtained from the new world; the usual expedients employed to accumulate a fund in the treasury; and the new taxes, projected in * Statement of Florida Blanca, No. 2.

1770 for the event of a war, were carried into CHAP. 71. effect. The army was more numerous, and in 1779-1781. a higher state of discipline and equipment, than at any period since the war of the succession; and the disposable part of the navy, exclusive of the ships destined for the service and protection of the colonies, exceeded forty sail of the line.

Thus secure at home and abroad, supported by powerful alliances, and provided with every requisite for defence or aggression, Spain proudly hoped that the time was arrived to obtain ample compensation for former losses and mortifications, and to crush a nation apparently sinking under the multiplied attacks of a host of enemies. As the british navy, the dread of Europe, appeared now scarcely equal to cope with the maritime force of France, it was triumphantly concluded, that an addition of 40 sail would secure the dominion of the seas, and lead to the degradation, if not the conquest, of a country, hitherto the principal barrier to the ambition of the House of Bourbon, and whose power and prosperity had been alternately the object of dread and envy.

To give effect to this superiority of force, and anticipate the efforts of England, the enterprising minister of Spain proposed to dispatch the fleet during the negotiation, a plan which must have led to the most decisive consequences. But his