And although, at law, her right to damages is lost by the death of the heir, she is entitled in equity to an account of rents and profits, notwithstanding the death of the heir pending the suit. Curtis v. Curtis, 2 Bro. 620.

The account will not be limited to the time of filing the bill, or by analogy to the statute of limitations. Oliver v. Richardson, 9 Ves. 222.

Interest will not be allowed on arrears of dower. Lindsay v. Gibbon, cited 3 Bro. 495. Wakefield v. Childs, 1 Fonbl. 23. (5) Costs.

For costs on bills for dower. See Beames on Costs, 35.

At law there are no costs on a mere writ of right or assignment of dower. See Lucas v. Calcraft, 1 V. & B. 21. note. S. C. 1 Bro. 134. 2 Dick. 594. But in case of deforcement the statute of Merton gives damages, and the statute of Gloucester costs. See William v. Gwyn,

2 Saund. by Williams, 45. note.

For the form of the judgment in a writ of dower. See Ib. and Dennis v. Dennis, Ib. 331. Coke's Entries, 171, 172. 175, 176. 181.

No. VI.

COMMISSION TO ASSIGN AND SET OUT DOWER. George, &c. To greeting: Know ye, that we, in confidence of your prudence and fidelity, have appointed you, and by these presents do give unto you, any three or two of you, full power and authority, in pursuance of an order of our Court of Chancery, made in a certain cause there depending, wherein A. B. is complainant, and C. D. defendant, bearing date the day of last, to assign and set out dower for the aforesaid complainant, out of all and singular the lands and tenements, being lately the estate of the said order mentioned, called

deceased, in And therefore we

command you, any three or two of you, that you meet at a certain time and place to be appointed by you for that purpose, in order to come unto, inspect, and view the aforesaid estate, lands, and premises, wheresoever they shall be found to be situate, lying, or being; and according to the best of your skill and judgment, to assign and set out (1) dower for the said complainant, out of the aforesaid farm, lands, and

premises; and doing in all and singular the premises, according to the true intent and meaning of these presents and the aforesaid order. And when you shall have thus done, that you transmit unto us, in our said Court of Chancery, wheresoever it shall be, your certificate concerning the said complainant's dower, ingrossed on parchment, together with your proceedings in the premises as is usual, with this writ. Witness &c. Harr. Pract. vol. ii. p. 21. ed. 1767.

For commission of partition. See Decrees for Partition, &c. No. IV. ante.

NOTE.

(1) Metes and Bounds.

It seems that the endowment should be by metes and bounds. See D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 391. Co. Litt. 32 b. Vin. Abr. tit. Dower, (X). And see Decrees for Partition &c. No. IV. ante.

No. VII.

DECREE TO CONFIRM JOINTURE.

[Inter alia] And the plaintiff Sir Willoughby Aston now offering to confirm the jointure of the defendant Dame Catherine Aston, in the several estates settled upon her in jointure by the deeds, dated &c. or either of them, his Lordship doth order and decree that the plaintiff Sir Willoughby Aston do confirm the jointure of the said defendant Dame Catherine Aston in all the said estates, as Mr. S. one &c. shall direct; and the said Master is to settle the deeds or assurances for the confirmation of such jointure, in case the parties differ about the same. And after such jointure shall be confirmed in manner aforesaid, it is further ordered, that the defendant Dame Catherine Aston do produce before the said Master upon oath, all deeds and writings in her custody or power relating to the several estates comprised in the settlements, dated &c. or any of them, or any part thereof. And it is further ordered, that the defendant Dame Catherine Aston do also produce before the said Master, upon oath, all deeds and writings in her custody or power relating to the lands, manors, and premises comprised in the settlement made by Elizabeth Grey, dated &c. or any part thereof; and any of the parties are to be at liberty to inspect the said

deeds and writings, or any of them, and to take copies thereof, or of such parts thereof as they shall think fit, at their own expense. And his Lordship doth reserve the consideration of costs, and all further directions, until after the said deeds and writings shall have been produced. And any of the parties are to be at liberty to apply &c. [See Usual Directions, No. XIX. ante.] Aston y. Aston, L. C. 4th December, 1747. Reg. Lib. A. 1747. fol. 152. See S. C. 3 Atk. 302.

For like decree. See Equity Draftsman, 657.

For decree for jointure. See Equity Draftsman, 658.

NOTE.

Confirming Jointure.

A jointress will not be compelled to produce deeds in her possession, unless her jointure is confirmed. Aston v. Aston, supra. Towers v. Davys, 1 Vern. 479.

But it seems that she must produce her jointure deed. Aston v. Aston, supra. But see Petre v. Petre, 3 Atk. 511.

So where she pleads her jointure deed in bar of discovery of deeds in her possession, the plea must state the date of the deed, and the particular lands comprised in it. Chamberlain v. Knapp, 1 Atk. 52. And it seems that the deed must be produced. Aston v. Aston, supra. Senhouse v. Earl, 2 Ves. 450.

An offer by the bill is not sufficient, the jointure must be confirmed by the decree. Leech v. Trollop, 2 Ves. 662. But see Lord Portsmouth v. Lord Effingham, 1 Ves. 430. in which it appears that the deeds were directed to be produced at the trial; but the jointure was not confirmed till the decree on further directions. See S. C. Belt's Supplement, 28.

If the bill does not contain such an offer she may demur to it. Lord Redesdale, 162. But it is more usual to plead, Ib. and 225. On confirming her jointure she will be ordered to deliver up deeds in her possession. See Ford v. Perring, 1 Ves. jun. 76.

v. Pyncent, 3 Atk. 571. Petre v. Petre, supra.

Pyncent

That a jointress cannot have any discovery against the heir, if he submits to confirm the jointure. See Gilb. For. Rom. 182.

That detinue of charters may be pleaded in bar of dower. See Vin. Abr. title Dower. (L.) (M.) (N.)

DECREES RESPECTING INFANTS.

No. I.

DIRECTION FOR DAY TO SHEW CAUSE (1)
AGAINST DECREE.

And this decree is to be binding unto the said defendant Robert Spore the infant, unless he, being served with a subpœna (2) to shew cause against the same, shall within six months (3) after he shall attain his age of twenty-one years shew unto this Court good cause to the contrary. Denny v. Blowers, L. C. 12th July, 1745. Reg. Lib. A. 1744. fol. 569.

For decree by default against infant. See Equity Draftsman, 664.

NOTES.

(1) Day to shew Cause.

Infant Plaintiff.

In Napier v. Lady Effingham, 2 P. W. 402. S. C. 3 Bro. P. C. 15., a day was given to an infant plaintiff to shew cause against a decree dismissing his bill. But this was a very particular case, and not to be argued from. Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckingham, 1 West, 684. And see Bennet v. Lee, 2 Atk. 531. Gregory v. Molesworth, 3 Atk. 627. And in general the Court follows the rule of law, where it is held, that an infant is as much bound by a judgment in his own action as if of full age. Gregory v. Molesworth, supra. And see Lord Brook v. Lord Hertford, 2 P. W. 519. And the judgment of Lord Hardwicke in Tuckfield v. Buller. Decree for Partition against Infant, No. VII. post. Unless in a case of gross laches or fraud. Gregory v. Molesworth, supra. And see Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckinghamshire, 1 Atk. 631. Lord Redesdale, 21.

In Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. W. 387. the Master of the Rolls would not bind an infant by an offer made by her bill, through the mistake of her agents. But in general infants are as much bound as adults by the conduct of their solicitor. Tillotson v. Hargrave, 3 Mad. 495.

Infant Defendant.

In Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury, 2 P. W. 120. it is said that in all decrees against infants, even in the plainest cases, a day must be given them to shew cause when they come of age. And see Napier v. Lady Effingham, 2 P. W. 403. Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 342. And the omission of it is said to be error in the decree. Savage v. Carroll, 1 Ba. & Be. 551. And see Bennett v. Hamil, 2 Sch. & Lef. 577. But in Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckingham, 1 West, 684. Lord Hardwicke said he took it to be the course of the Court not to give a day, unless a conveyance was directed either in form or substance. And see Adams v. Gould, 2 Dick. 443.

So where lands are devised to trustees to be sold for payment of debts, and the heir at law is an infant, he has no day given him to shew cause on his coming of age; otherwise where there is no devise of lands expressly to any particular person, and consequently a conveyance from the infant is necessary. Blatch v. Wilder, 1 Atk. 421. S. C. 1 West, 324. And see Cooke v. Parsons, Prec. in Ch. 184. S. C. 2 Vern. 429. Uvedale v. Uvedale, 3 Atk. 119. Anon. 3 P. W. 389. note. And see Parol Demurring, No. II. note, post.

So where the legal estate is in trustees, and an execution of the trust is to be directed, there is no occasion to give the infant cestui qui trust, a day to shew cause. Thoroton v. Blackbourne, Harr.

367. note.

(2) The subpoena is a judicial writ and must be returnable in Gilb. For. Rom. 160.

term.

The infant after coming of age, having gone abroad to avoid his creditors, service of the subpoena upon his clerk in Court was held sufficient. Elcock v. Glegg, 2 Dick. 764.

(3) Enlarging Time.

After the infant comes of age the Court will enlarge the time for shewing cause against the decree. Trefusis v. Cotton, Mos. 203.

If upon

Making Decree absolute.

the subpoena to shew cause being served upon the defen