The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 5
... existence. This variety might—and usually does—conceal the fact that it is possible to discover formal structures common to many of these situations, and thus generalize over contexts. It is a known fact from the realm of pragmatics of ...
... existence. This variety might—and usually does—conceal the fact that it is possible to discover formal structures common to many of these situations, and thus generalize over contexts. It is a known fact from the realm of pragmatics of ...
Page 7
... existence. The rationale of this suggestion is. posed distinction between norms which belong to normative systems and norms— 'isolated norms'—which do not. It is the latter to which Raz's suggestion refers. * The remarks which follow ...
... existence. The rationale of this suggestion is. posed distinction between norms which belong to normative systems and norms— 'isolated norms'—which do not. It is the latter to which Raz's suggestion refers. * The remarks which follow ...
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Edna Ullmann-Margalit. are their conditions of existence. The rationale of this suggestion is simple and pointed. Norms do not as a rule come into existence at a definite point in time, nor are they the result of a manageable number of ...
Edna Ullmann-Margalit. are their conditions of existence. The rationale of this suggestion is simple and pointed. Norms do not as a rule come into existence at a definite point in time, nor are they the result of a manageable number of ...
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... existence' and 'survival of the fittest” were put hardly need to be dwelt upon. It is with caution, therefore, that I propose to regard the argument underlying this book as, in a borrowed and somewhat metaphorical sense, a natural ...
... existence' and 'survival of the fittest” were put hardly need to be dwelt upon. It is with caution, therefore, that I propose to regard the argument underlying this book as, in a borrowed and somewhat metaphorical sense, a natural ...
Page 12
... existence. To be sure, there are references to such mechanisms, especially in the case of co-ordination norms, but they are of a rather general nature and should be considered of only secondary importance. 1.5 JWorms It is a complicated ...
... existence. To be sure, there are references to such mechanisms, especially in the case of co-ordination norms, but they are of a rather general nature and should be considered of only secondary importance. 1.5 JWorms It is a complicated ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser common concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts course covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means methodological individualism mortarmen’s mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one’s ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations persons possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling Schelling points sense social choice social norms society solution solving specific stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure threat tion types of norms unilateral violation zero-sum