By 1965, it became clear to the Congress that exclusive reliance on judicial remedies had cost grieved parties an inordinate amount of time and effort. Litigation was time consuming; and the progress it yielded in 8 years, namely, from 1957 to 1965, was insignificant. And I emphasize "insignificant." An effective Federal solution was imperative.

In 1965, the Congress responded. Both Houses overwhelmingly endorsed the Voting Rights Act. The House approved 328 to 74. The Senate approved 79 to 18.

The act created administrative remedies that became automatically applicable under a statutory coverage formula to certain jurisdictions without the delays occasioned by prolonged litigation. This approach has worked. Indeed, many consider the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the most effective of all civil rights enactments.

And I concur in that conclusion.

In the past 4 years, it has been interesting to note that over 800,000 Negro applicants have been registered to vote in areas where literacy tests had formerly operated as "engines of discrimination."

When the act was approved in 1965, it was hoped that within a 5year period Negroes would have gained sufficient voting power and access to political processes in the States which were affected, so that Federal protection would no longer be needed. But reports of the United States Commission on Civil Rights as well as the history of litigation over the past 4 years, all of which is set forth in the record of hearings held before our committee, has convinced our Judiciary Committee that it is essential to continue this act for an additional 5 years. It is necessary to do so, not only to safeguard the gains thus far achieved but also to prevent future infringements of voting rights based on race or color.

Under the act, you may remember, there are three central remedies which apply to those areas covered by the statutory formula. These include: one, suspension of literacy tests and similar devices; two, prohibition against enforcing new voting rules or practices pending Federal review to determine whether their use would perpetuate voting discrimination; and, three, assignment of Federal examiners to list qualified applicants to vote and assignment of Federal observers to monitor the casting and the counting of ballots.

In order to obtain exemption from these remedies, a State or a subdivision which is covered by the act must obtain a declaratory judgment to the effect that no literary tests or similar devices have been used during the preceding 5 years, with the purpose or with the effect of denying the right to vote because of race or color.

Under this procedure several jurisdictions have been released from the prohibitions of the act. They include the State of Alaska, three counties of Arizona, one county in Idaho, and one county in North Carolina. Jurisdictions now subject to suspension of literacy tests and other remedies of the act will be able to obtain exemption beginning in August 1970, 5 years after the passage of the act.

H.R. 4249 would continue the coverage of these remedies for 5 years. until August 1975.

We have seen dramatic progress in voter registration in the past 4 years, but it should not obscure significant disparities which continue between white and nonwhite registration.

For example: Alabama-Less than 50 percent of Negroes of voting age are registered in 27 of 67 counties. In five counties, Negro registration is less than 35 percent. Georgia-Less than

Mr. YOUNG. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Could I ask a question? What is the percentage of white people registered there? Do you have that?

Mr. CELLER. Yes, we have that.

What State?

Mr. YOUNG. The figure you just gave.
Mr. MATSUNAGA. The same jurisdiction.

Mr. CELLER, I have it on the State.

In Alabama, the percentage of whites of voting age registered is 82.5; in Georgia, 84.7; and Louisiana, 87.9; in Mississippi, 92.4; in North Carolina, 78.7; in South Carolina, 65.6; and Virginia, 67.0.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beg your pardon for the interruption.

Mr. ĈELLER. Mississippi --Less than 50 percent of Negroes of voting age-less than 50 percent of Negroes of voting age are registered in 24 of 82 counties. In six counties, it is less than 35 percent.

South Carolina-Less than 50 percent of Negroes of voting age are registered in 23 of 46 counties; in three counties it is less than 35 percent.

Although Negro registration has risen from approximately 29 percent to 52 percent of the Negro voting age population in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the percentage of Negroes registered still does not approach that of white persons registered, which is 82 percent.

If the Voting Rights Act is not extended, resumption of literacy tests and similar devices could occur. For example, a wholesale rereregistration of voters could be attempted which would erase all gains thus far realized. The Attorney General would be denied authority to appoint Federal examiners to register voters and to assign Federal observers to monitor the conduct of elections.

If the act were not extended, the existing protections against manipulative changes in the existing laws would be eliminated. Section 5 of the act requiring Federal review would no longer be a condition precedent to enforcing election law changes.

It has become very clear that various devices are being used in these States now covered by the act to dilute the newly gained voting strength of Negroes. The devices which have been resorted to include: switching to at-large elections when Negro voting strength is concentrated in particular districts; extending the terms of incumbent white officials; substituting appointment for election--in other words, making certain offices selective rather than elective; increasing filing fees for candidates, and the like.

Under section 5 of the act, enforcement of voting qualifications or procedures different from those in force and effect in November, 1964, is prohibited unless and until judicial approval or acquiescence of the Attorney General of the United States is obtained. Thus, Federal review places the burden of proof on the covered jurisdiction.

The significant advantage of this procedure is that private persons, not merely the Attorney General, have authority to challenge the im

plementation of new voting practices or election laws on the grounds that such changes have not been subjected to Federal review. These provisions of the Voting Rights Act, similar to the authority to assign examiners and observers, assure a continuing Federal presence and provide an essential safeguard that new subterfuges will be promptly discovered and enjoined.

In the course of the subcommittee hearings on H.R. 4249 and similar measures, an alternative to simple extension of the Voting Rights Act was submitted by Attorney General Mitchell. The Department of Justice recommendations, however, were not adopted, the committee preferring a simple extension of the Voting Rights Act as presently constituted.

During its executive deliberations the committee separately considered and rejected (1), an amendment providing a nationwide ban on literacy tests and devices until August 6, 1975, and (2), an amendment establishing uniform residency requirements for voting for President and Vice President of the United States.

Outside of the seven Southern States which are covered in whole or in part by the act, there are 12 other States (Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming), which today have constitutional or statutory provisions requiring a showing of literacy as a precondition to voting. But-and it is a big but-there has been no evidence nor any complaint to support the conclusion that the right to vote has been abridged in these areas on the basis of race or color by the application of literacy tests.

No lawsuits have been instituted by individuals, civil rights groups, or the Federal Government, through the Attorney General, alleging a discriminatory purpose or effect of such tests in these States.

It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the act provides that in any action brought by the Attorney General to enforce the 15th amendment anywhere in the country, the court is empowered to suspend tests or devices, authorize appointment of Federal examiners and Federal observers, and determine the validity of any new voting law or procedure.

That is in this act, section 5. In other words, the act already contains. provisions which permit the application of the three central remedies of the statute to any State or to any political subdivision in the Nation.

Under the circumstances, the committee concluded that nationwide. literacy ban was not justified at the present time. The committee also rejected an amendment to establish uniform residency requirements. Such an amendment it is believed anticipates a case now pending in the Supreme Court which challenges the constitutionality of existing residency requirements for voting in presidential elections.

It also introduces a subject not related to racial discrimination in voting which indeed is the primary focus of the act.

Finally, many members of the committee raised serious doubts about the constitutionality-the constitutional authority of the Congress to legislate with regard to residency requirements. I would make clear that in rejecting these amendments to the Voting Rights Act we did not foreclose total consideration of any voting reform for which a sufficient need is demonstrated.

However, the committee's approval of H.R. 4249 without amendment indicates our studied judgment that all of the pervasions of the act of 1965 are of proven effectiveness and their retention without change is of the highest priority.

Finally, it must be remembered, gentlemen, that the right to vote has an evanescent quality. Once an election has passed, interference with the right is irredeemable. Unless the right to vote is made secure and free from racial discrimination, all of the rights are insecure and subject to denial to all our citizens.

Every American must have an equal right to vote. No duty weighs upon the Congress more heavily than the duty to assure that right. That is my formal statement. Mr. Chairman, and we ask that there be an open rule with 3 hours' debate.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Celler, I listened with great interest to the gentleman's statement, and while I certainly do not concur in his views-and that is an understatement-I would compliment the gentleman. As usual, he has done his homework and presented his side of the argument with his usual effectiveness.

Now, I was particularly interested in the gentleman's statement about the need for this legislation in other than several of the Southern States.

My brief opportunity to look into this matter leads me to a different conclusion. First, I want to ask the gentleman, did I understand that there was 52 percent of the eligible minority voters in Mississippi that were registered, or not registered?

What was the gentleman's comment on that?

Mr. CELLER. In Mississippi, in 1968 the percent of whites of voting age that were registered was 92.4 percent

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, I am having difficulty up here. Can you speak a little louder, Mr. Celler.

Mr. CELLER. I say, making the comparison in Mississippi, the percentage of whites that were registered in the 1968 presidential election was 92.4 percent, and the percentage of nonwhites was 59.4 percent. The CHAIRMAN. In Mississippi?

Mr. CELLER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fifty-nine percent of the nonwhites were registered? Mr. CELLER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you don't need this legislation as far as Mississippi is concerned, do you?

Mr. CELLER. We need

The CHAIRMAN. I say, you don't need it as far as Mississippi is concerned?

Mr. CELLER. I must respectfully differ with the gentleman, and I take it the gentleman means that when more than 50 percent of the population is registered, then the formula should not apply. But, taking it all in all, you must remember that-and I anticipated you would ask this question because you spoke to me about using different figures; namely, using 1968 presidential election year figures instead of 1964 presidential election figures which are used in the statute. Now, may I respond to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. As a matter of fact, I suggested to you earlier in an appearance here that you do spell that out.

Mr. CELLER. If you would use the 1968 election results, the result would be to exclude the States of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, from automatic coverage under the act.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. What?

Mr. CELLER. If you took the 1968 presidential election figures, the result would be

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me just a second so we can get this in proper perspective and also understanding, Mr. Celler. Your triggering device here that brings these Southern States into disrepute from your point of view, and those who advocate this in the voting rights, was based upon the 1964 presidential election, and now you are continuing to base that, your so-called extension, upon the 1964 and not the 1968 ? Mr. CELLER. That is correct, the formula remains unchanged.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what you are saying is that you set out to reform the voting system in these States, and you base that on a 1964 election.

Now, if I understood you correctly a moment ago, you said that there had been some 800,000 nonwhites who had voted-increased, rather, over the previous number in that 4-year period.

Now, while again I dispute that reasoning, you still go back to the 1964 election and you do not give these States, these subdivisions of Government, any credit for what you say they have accomplished. So you are going now back to your original stand of 1964 rather than basing it upon 1968, the most recent election, are you not?

Mr. CELLER. But I do give credit to these States because it was the act itself which sparkplugged the advance that was made in the States. And if I may be permitted, I would be very glad to respond at length, fairly at length, to the gentleman's observation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the gentleman, of course, has the privilege, that is what he is here for, and we will see that he has every opportunity to explain his position.

Mr. CELLER. I was saying that if you would use the 1968 presidential election figures rather than the 1964 figures, the result would be to exclude the States of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia from automatic coverage of the act. However, the States of Georgia and South Carolina would remain subject to the act.

Now, let's take the State of Alabama. The percentage of persons of voting age voting in the 1964 presidential election was 35.9 percent. The percentage of persons voting in the 1968 presidential election was 50.3 percent.

Louisiana. In 1964, it was 47.2 percent; in 1969, 53.8.

Mississippi, 33.2 in 1964; in the 1968 presidential election, 50.6.
In Virginia, 41.1. In the 1968 presidential election, it was 50.4
The CHAIRMAN. What was that last figure?

Mr. CELLER. 50.4. Such an amendment to the triggering formula of the Voting Rights Act is unjustified because one, the 1968 election turnout reflects the success and impact of the Federal presence in the eovered States where tests were suspended. Federal examiners and ob servers had been appointed and election law changes were subject to Federal review. Using 1968 figures would enable "covered jurisdictions" to use the fruits of the past 4 years to gain exemption for the future. If we take away the protection of the voting rights law, then these States would very likely revert back to their old practices.