the language of more adept holding-company manipulators, "being taken for a sucker."

Further, it was under private ownership and operation that an outright conspiracy was entered into by certain financiers (bearing some of the most distinguished names in American life) deliberately to sabotage the efficiency of the American merchant marine for the purpose (1) of throwing more trans-Atlantic business to British lines in which these same persons were heavily interested, and (2) to lay the basis for huge subsidy claims on the United States Treasury.

The carrying out of this conspiracy was clearly outlined in a series of copyrighted articles published by the New York Post in 1934. The financial sleight-of-hand and skulduggery which these articles reveal overshadow, in some respects, the mechanicians revolving around Teapot Dome and early-day railroad financing. One of the minor manipulations was the careful "wrecking" of the pride of the American merchant marine, the steamship Leviathan. Others were the juggling of huge mail subsidies. Another was the rerouting of certain American ships to make them show operating deficits in "competition" with British ships owned by the same interests. These charges were never refuted.

In the light of these disclosures, and in the light of the apparent intention of certain operators, not only to continue to use the merchant marine as a siphon for draining of public funds intended for more honest use but to enlarge the siphon and accelerate the process, we see no excuse for further consideration of this proposal by Congress or the American people.

GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND PRIVATE OPERATION

On the second proposal: Likewise, we see less excuse for this type of operation. Whereas, under the original proposal, the private operator must put up part of the cost of construction and is forced to invest a certain amount of money in the fleets he is manipulating, under this second plan he would be exempted altogether from that responsibility. Whereas originally he had an alleged interest in the cow he was milking, this plan would bring him a free, and probably fresher, cow. We fail, particularly, to see just what guarantees the shiper would be forced to give the American people for efficient operation of the vessels entrusted to his control. We fail to find anything in this proposal to protect the American people from the same financial abuses now so flagrantly current in shipping management. We see in this proposal nothing more or less than a method for opening the front doors of the United States Treasury to a group of interests not content with access through the back door. It would appear to be little more than a subterfuge agreed to for the purpose of sugar-coating, for public consumption, the supposedly bitter pill of outright public ownership.

GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION

The third proposal would seem, at first glance, one of last resort-a reserve proposal to fall back upon in case the public is unwilling to accept the "reform measures" suggested in the first two alternatives. Closer examination, however, reveals implications which must be considered only in the light of the broadest principles of public welfare.

The fact that the Commission was forced to examine this so-called "sick industry" from the standpoint of its relation (1) to foreign commerce and (2) to the national defense, makes it clear that even conservative opinion is coming to look upon the merchant marine as an industry approaching the status of a public utility.

If we accept that opinion as correct, it is clear that problems surrounding the development of a merchant marine must be met in the same realistic fashion as those surrounding the development of national defense, the post office, rivers and harbors, water power, and the public highways.

To turn any of these important phases of the national economy over to private management would be wholly out of the question. Private management in those fields has long ago been abandoned in the public interest.

Likewise, if we find private management of the American merchant marine inconsistent with its fullest and most effective development, we as one of the foremost and most powerful nations on earth, must face the alternative of Government ownership and operation unflinchingly. If Congress, the shipping interests, and the Maritime Commission are unable to convince the American people that these fleets can and will be operated safely, efficiently, and economically, then, in our opinion, the people should demand the only other logical alternative.

We believe that the people, in view of their overwhelming ratification of New Deal legislative principles in the 1936 elections, would, if conditions demanded, endorse an extension of these principles to include such an important arm of the national economy.

Unless adequate safeguards for the public interest can be devised by Congress, we fail to see any excuse for further tolerance by the American people of these raids on the Treasury, year after year, by persons brazenly subordinating the public good to private gain.

DO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS PROVIDE THOSE SAFEGUARDS?

The report recommends certain amendments to the 1936 Merchant Marine Act. Out of nine suggestions, only one would serve to increase the responsibility of the shipowners for the construction and operation of ships. The others, recommending a loosening of present alleged restrictions, indicate that the Commission, in suggesting these amendments, is acting as the mouthpiece of shipowners not satisfied with the license they are already allowed.

It is suggested that

The right of the Government to cancel mail contract subsidies be further restricted;

The down payment of new construction (already as low as 25 percent of domestic cost) be further decreased to 25 percent of foreign cost.

The operators be permitted to build American ships in foreign shipyards if the differential is more than 50 percent.

The period provided for the recapture of profits be extended from 5 to 10 years.. Provision to be made to allow the contractor to build up even greater reserves than at present.

The Commission's power to relax restrictions relative to subsidiaries and foreignflag affiliations be enlarged.

The Commission be given power to waive the $25,000 salary limitation for company officials.

The nature of these recommendations leads us to believe that, if they are carried out, the next step will be to seek legislation compelling the American people (1) to stand the entire cost of building the ships, (2) pay the company for operating the ships, (3) guarantee a certain profit, and (4) buy back obsolete ships at cost. In other words, make the steamships little more than huge, floating, tax-exempt Government bonds-with automatic coupon clippers attached.

Far from attempting to curtail current abuses, these recommendations in our opinion, abolish most of the restrictions provided for in the 1936 Merchant Marine Act. It is obvious why these recommendations were clothed with the dignity of official sanction; emanating from private sources, they would be considered rediculous and unworthy of congressional consideration.

The council would be less inclined to quesion the good faith and intentions of both the shipowners and the Maritime Commission if, instead of proposing amendments calculated to ease operating restrictions, the Commission had proposed a more rigid adherence to the provisions of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act.

This act, devised and passed by Congress following the ship subsidy scandals unearthed by the Black committee, outlined as its purpose the building of a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial operation of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States Flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d) composed of the best equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.

MARITIME LABOR RELATIONS

A few words regarding the relationship of the seamen and the maritime unions to the merchant marine, whether operated by the people, through governmental agencies, or by private owners.

There is noticeable, both in the Commission's report and in the comments of the steamship owners and their spokesmen, both hired and voluntary, a deplorable tendency to use the seamen as scapegoats for the failure of the operators to satisfy the desire of the American people for an adequate merchant marine.

Prior to the publication of the report, there was laid down in the press, over the radio, and in the courts a veritable barrage of criticism, both specific and general, against the seamen. They were attacked as mutinous, disruptive, insolent, lazy, disreputable, quarrelsome, insubordinate, and red. They were attacked for organizing into labor unions. They were attacked for demanding decent wages. They were attacked for demanding decent living conditions aboard ship. These assaults were so virulent and so vicious, in many instances, as to lead one to believe that the seamen were even being attacked for going to sea. Because an occasional steward would resent the insolence of drunken passengers, he was called lacking in respect for discipline. Because a member of the crew registered his grievances with his organization, as any trade-unionist should and does, he was called insubordinate and inefficient. Because he wants wages commensurate with a decent standard of living, he is called radical and attempts were made to reflect on his political affiliations.

These attacks were nothing more nor less, in our opinion, than attempts to throw up a smoke screen, under cover of which legislation might be prepared which would take away from seamen their constitutional rights to organize and bargain collectively.

This thought is borne out by the fact that, while these attacks are loosed on many fronts, they appeared to have the same original source the shipowners. It is borne out further by the fact that every new barrage was followed by a renewed demand for a denial of the seamen the right to organize and bargain. It is borne out by the fact that the crew of the Steamship Algic was charged with mutiny (for an act which under no circumstances could be called mutiny) just prior to the publication of the report of the Maritime Commission. It is borne out by certain attacks on the seamen made through the Hearst press by Daniel S. Ring, an employee of the Maritime Commission, just prior to the bringing of charges against the Algic crew.

THE ALGIC CASE

So much has been made of the so-called Algic case that we are constrained to make one more effort to present the facts.

There is a story back of the Algic case. It is a story of a secret drive launched recently to break the maritime unions, to stem the rising tide of industrial unionism in the marine industry and put a stop once and for all to efforts by the seamen to secure the decent wages and working conditions that are being demanded by workers in every industry. That drive has taken a sort of pattern. The shipowners first tried to stop the seamen's organizational activities by teaming up with certain discredited officials of the old International Seamen's Union. They teamed up with Joseph P. Ryan, head of the Longshoremen's Association and one of Jeremiah Mahoney's principal backers in the New York City mayoralty election. They raised the cry of red radicalism. They raised the cry of revolution. They even resorted to the use of “goon squads.' (For your information, a "goon" is a water-front gangster). These "goon" squads boarded ships and attempted to terrorize the seamen into abandoning their organizational activities. That drive failed. When it did fail the shipowners took another tack. They began to sue Government agencies, the Commerce Department, the Maritime Commission, and the Department of Justice, to pull their antilabor chestnuts out

of the fire.

In the past 2 months a series of simple strikes and steps taken by various crews to better their conditions and to protect themselvs, have been labeled as "mutiny.” Now, everybody knows that the term "mutiny" is used exclusively to describe insubordination on the high seas. Marine authorities and the United States courts (even the Supreme Court, as recently as October 1935) have held that insubordination anywhere but on the high seas is not mutiny.

In the case of the Algic the ship was resting at anchor in a safe harbor. There was a longshoremen's strike in progress. When the ship dropped anchor, power launches filled with striking longshoremen circled the ship warning the crew not to man the winches for cargo handled by scabs and strikebreakers.

The

They meant business and every member of the crew knew that they meant business. So did the captain. He, too, knows what these things mean. crew held a meeting. That is the natural and orderly way to meet a situation of this kind. They decided that it was only common sense to refuse to handle cargo handled by strikebreakers in a situation of that kind.

The

Immediately, the captain got in touch with the Maritime Commission. Maritime Commission, acting in the interest of the shipowners, and seeing an excellent opportunity to discredit union seamen, raised the cry of mutiny and ordered the captain to put the so-called ringleaders in irons.

The action of the crew could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be called a mutiny. The ship was not on the high seas. She was in a safe harbor working cargo. A dangerous situation existed which imperiled the lives of the crew. Regardless of the individual daring af any member of the crew, it was the duty of each to vote, in ship's meeting, to take steps to safeguard the crew as a whole. The crew was perfectly within its rights in refusing to work in a dangerous situation when the ship was at anchor. Dangerous situations are nothing new to American seamen. Their individual bravery during voyage crises has been written about since the days of the Phoenicians. It is legend.

But bravery and fool-hardiness are two different things. It is foolhardy to "dare" striking longshoremen, the improvement of whose working and living conditions depend on the success of their strike.

The crew had a perfect right to demand proper protection under the circumstances. In fact, it would have been negligent had it not done so. When the ship got back to Baltimore, the home port, the reason for all this hullabaloo became apparent.

There began a whole series of attacks on maritime labor, and on American seamen in the press, on the radio, and in the courts. Daniel S. Ring, who is supposed to be the labor representative on the Maritime Commission, came out in a public statement congratulating the master of the steamship Algic on his effective handling of a mutinous situation. This he did even before the investigation had begun or before Ring had any opportunity to hear from the crew or to get the real facts in the case.

Editorial writers and columnists in various papers tried to lay the blame to the so-called radicals in the maritime unions.

The day the investigation into the so-called mutiny was to start, the Maritime Commission released an exclusive story to the Hearst Press in Washington outlining a whole series of events with which they wanted to link up the charge of mutiny.

They listed a water-front brawl in which a seamen was killed in Florida 10 days before the ship arrived in Montevideo. They even listed an exchange of words between a steward and a passenger who had counted a little too strongly on the servility of American seamen.

And then the chairman of the Commission, Joseph P. Kennedy, proceeded to reveal the real reason for this series of mutiny charges and the drive against the union. He said that he was preparing to sponsor legislation for the marine industry similar to the Railway Labor Act now in effect for the railroad industry.

THE REASONS

Every trade-unionist knows what that means. It means that an attempt is going to be made to take away from the American seamen their Constitutional rights to strike and organize into unions of their own choosing for the betterment of their working and living conditions.

The demands of the maritime workers are simple economic trade-union demands. They are demands for decent wages and decent living conditions aboard ships. There is but one way in which the seamen can win those demands and that is by exerting their economic power. The shipowners and the Maritime Commission

know this.

That is why they are concentrating their efforts on a campaign to limit that right to strike and that right to exert economic pressure. That is why this is a threat not only to the maritime workers but to the whole of American labor.

The right to strike has already been limited in the railroad industry. If it is limited in the maritime industry now, it won't be very long before there will be attempts to limit it in other industries, and every trade unionist knows what that means.

The Commission's bias as regards maritime labor relations is apparent in its report. After placing the responsibility for the seamen's grievances at the door of the shipowners, what does it propose as a remedy? Does it propose restrictions on the employer's right to pay the meanest wages possible? Does it propose restrictions on the employers to force seamen to strike? Does it propose to set up machinery to safeguard the seamen's right to organize and bargain collectively?

Hardly. What it does propose is restrictions on the seamen. It proposes to train seamen in the Coast Guard, where he will be thoroughly inculcated with antilabor philosophy and prejudices. It proposes to hamstring the seamen's right to bargain collectively and strike our only weapon in a struggle to force something approaching decent working and living conditions aboard ship. It

1

recommends the establishment of a mediation board, similar in purpose and content to the Railway Mediation Board, which has, in the words of the report "been conspicuous in minimizing labor strife in that field." It is obvious from the tone of the report that the aim of such a board would not be to provide machinery for the settlement of disputes (the unions are providing that already in those rare instances in which the shipowners will cooperate) but rather to provide machinery which will hamper the seamen's right to bargain collectively. The provision in the Railway Labor Act for the postponement of strike action is an example. Never in the history of maritime labor relations was the postponement of strike action ever used, by the employers, for anything other than rounding up an army of scabs in preparation for breaking a strike.

We are forced, as a result of these recommendations, to conclude that the Commission is not making its suggestions in good faith. It first places the blame for dissatisfaction among the seamen at the door of the shipowners and then proposes to alleviate this dissatisfaction, not by coercing the shipowners, but by stifling the seamen. Such a suggestion is little short of laughable. One might as well suggest that an army can win a battle by turning its ammunition over to the enemy.

It is, we believe, significant that the Commission in gathering information on wages and working conditions from seamen saw fit to ignore the labor organizations formed by the seamen for the express purpose of bettering these conditions. and instead hired one of those groups whose activities in the industrial field have so recently been revealed in all their scandalous relationships by the La Follette investigating committee. We refer to Metcalf & Co. and the Industrial Management Corporation. The committee, we understand, hired these companies to interview seamen and investigate their reaction to the labor policies of the steamship companies.

What kind of a questionnarie did these outfits prepare and send out to the seamen? What are the facts revealed therein? Who got the questionnaries? Were these companies themselves under investigation by the La Follette committee? The labor philosophy of such companies is well-known. The revelations before the La Follette committee were printed in great detail far and wide. There is scarcely a man, woman, or child in the United States but who is familiar with the operations, tactics, and general attitude of these companies in the field of labor relations. To employ this type of industrial service, when the seamen themselves by the thousands would have been only too glad to go to Washington at their own expense for interview, can hardly be viewed as anything but an insult to organized maritime workers. But, insult or no insult, it has significance here as exemplifying the attitude of the Commission toward the men who man the great fleets of the American merchant marine.

SEAMEN AND THE LAW

Freedom to carry on organizational activities, freedom to strike for the enforcement of wage increases or other improvements, freedom to take steps to protect our lives in dangerous situations-all this is guaranteed by law.

It took American workers many years, many generations, to secure these things. It took decades of struggle, thousands of strikes, years of hardship, suffering, and even bloodshed, to win the rights now enacted into law.

Consequently, this council is hardly in a mood to stand by and see those rights curtailed without protest. Our obligations to ourselves, to other maritime workers, and to the rest of the trade-union movement makes it encumbent on us to fight such withdrawal of our rights with every ounce of our strength.

An examination of our efforts, since we have formed our organization will show that, not only are we willing and anxious to mediate disputes, to curtail strikes and build up discipline, but that a great deal of energy has been devoted to trying to bring the ship owners around to that point of view.

They have refused most of our requests for conferences on wages and other bargaining issues. They have not only refused to cooperate with us in avoiding strikes but have time after time taken steps which can only be regarded, even in the most charitable light, as attempts to force us out on strike.

In certain agreements which some of our organizations are at present negotiating, there are provisions for the settlement of disputes through port councils on which both parties are represented equally. Yet, the shipowners, instead of agreeing to such proposals, are attempting to take away from us by legislation any rights that we would have under such agreements.

Such indications of bad faith, we believe, are a key to their attitude as regards the collective bargaining statutes recently enacted into law. They are also, we believe, a key to the motives behind the move for antiunion legislation.