this convention and with the legislation which has been formulated by your committee: Does the legislation you have formulated conform to this?

Admiral HAMLET. Very closely.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your question, Senator Maloney? Senator MALONEY. Perhaps it has already been taken care of because, as you know, I have had to attend other committee meetings at times, but I understand that members of the Maritime Commission, or the Commission itself, have made a study of conditions on many vessels. I am wondering if a member of the Maritime Commission has testified; or if not, whether it would not be wise to have such information.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had such testimony, but not as explicitly as you perhaps desire. So I will be glad to ask for it.

Senator MALONEY. I know that some of the labor groups might give us a picture that would be overcolored. So I thought if we could get the information from the Maritime Commission we would have something pretty accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Make a note of that, Mr. Mann. We will have somebody from the Maritime Commission, Senator Maloney, to give you that information.

Any further questions? [A pause, without response.! There being no further questions at this time the joint committee will stand adjourned for the day.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., Wednesday, January 5, 1938, the committee adjourned subject to call.)

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY STATE DEPARTMENT

NOTE. A considerable number of documents not quoted here were submitted by the State Department, mostly concerning incidents which occurred prior to 1937.

EXHIBIT 1

EXCERPT FROM PERSONAL LETTER OF AN AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL TO A DIVISION CHIEF OF THE STATE DEPARTment, Dated August 30, 1937

I regret that my first letter to you should be a gloomy one, but a gloomy one, unfortunately, it is.

The facts are that, insofar as concerns the American merchant marine, conditions are bad, and on the ships of some of the lines they actually are mutinous. I feel quite certain that if you were to get an opinion from consular officers on the line, San Francisco-Hong Kong-Marseille, they just don't know where they are.

On May 8th, last, we had difficulty with the President Adams of the Dollar line, and on May 22nd in despatch numbered 338 the various phases of the situation were communicated to the Department and, with a view to handling future difficulties which were and are to be expected, certain categorical questions were asked. They were asked only after an exhaustive study of the regulations, the navigation laws, and all the various volumes of international law and the statutes to be found in our library.

The questions were:

(a) Is a sit down strike on an American vessel on continuous voyage [in the port of Marseille] legal? If not, what remedy is provided by law? What is the effect if the vessel is carrying mail?

(b) Is a vessel on call at a foreign [the] port [of Marseille] while on a continuous voyage to be considered as on the high seas for purposes of the navigation laws? (c) Is the action of calling a strike to be considered as depriving the master, of rightful command and therefore mutiny?

(d) In the event, in compliance with an order from the master, the engineer officers attempt to turn on steam on the winches in a foreign port and are prevented by the crew: Is that mutiny?

The answer to the fourth question is at first sight obvious, but as you know the obvious interpretation is not always supported; and consular officers have to protect themselves in the event the Department of Justice should not prosecute the case.

In so far as the first question is concerned, a clear-cut answer thereto is at the root of everything. If a sit-down strike is legal, there is no use talking of mutiny or insubordination.

The second was asked in order to ascertain whether refusal on the part of the crew constitutes insubordination on the high seas or in port. There is quite a difference, and one American master informs me that to his knowledge the Department has ruled the vessel to be constructively on the high seas.

The third was asked to clarify the status of so-called delegates.

The Department's reply of June 7, 1937, transmitted a copy of a report of the Attorney General to the effect that under certain circumstances seamen charged with mutiny by American consular officers on American vessels in a foreign port would be prosecured by the district attorney of the United States. The opinion is further illustrated by discussions as to what constitutes a "port of distress", and the Department further amplifies by pointing out in answer to what it states was my inquiry as to the circumstances which constitute mutiny on an American vessel, that when such mutiny does occur it is within the jurisdiction of the United States, and further, that any action tending to deprive a master of rightful command is mutiny.

I regret that I can find nothing in the Department's instruction that answered the questions proposed, and they were and are very important.

I can assure you that the conditions which obtain today are most serious, and the service in the firld uegently needs the constructive and sympathetic co-operation of the section of the Department concerned with this work.

To my knowledge the Department is in receipt of despatches from Kobe, Hong Kong, Bombay, and this office and undoubtedly has heard from Singapore and elsewhere, from all of which you will see that the record of insubordination is continuous.

It was hoped that the unfortunate conditions were passing, Only last Friday, however, the local press and the New York Hearld, Paris edition, had a story of mutiny on the President Adams at Naples, which caused the Italian Government to confine the crew to the ship at Genoa.

EXHIBIT 1-A

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ABOVE QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED BY RECENT DECISION IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE CHARGE TO THE JURY IN THE "ALGIC" CASE, HEREWITH SUBMITTED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND United States of America vs Walter H. Rees et al. No. 18626-Criminal. Baltimore, Maryland, December 15, 1937

CHESTNUT, J.

CHARGE TO THE JURY

Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of the jury: I am sorry to keep you a little later this evening, but this case will have to be argued by counsel tomorrow and I wish to give counsel the fullest time possible to fully discuss the case before you on the facts and, therefore, in order to give them an opportunity to start at ten o'clock tomorrow, I think I had better give you my charge this evening.

Now, the testimony in this case having been completed, it is now the appropriate time, in accordance with the usual practice in this Court, for the Judge to instruct you as to the law of the case and to make some summary of the testimony in relation to the charge brought by the Government against the fourteen defendants in this case. The respective functions of the Court and jury are that the responsibility for determining the law of the case rests with the Judge alone and the responsibility for determining the facts is solely the province of the jury. While you will therefore accept without question the law as announced by the Court, you yourselves are the sole judges of the facts established by the testimony, and anything that I may say in summarizing the facts is intended merely as an aid to you in reaching a proper verdict. You are in no way bound by my view of the testimony but should consult your own recollection and give it

such weight as you find proper. is merely advisory to you.

Anything that I say with regard to the testimony

Now, first before coming to the specific charge and announcing the law of the case, I wish to state to you some general principles of law that are applicable to this case as a criminal charge as contrasted with civil cases. In a civil case in general the jury properly gives a verdict for the Plaintiff or Defendant as the case may be, based on the preponderance of the evidence for one party or the other; but in a criminal case the rule is different and before anyone is convicted of a crime the Government preferring the charge must establish the truth of the charge to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that is to say, the measure of proof required in a criminal case is greater than in a civil case. In a crime such as is charged here the Defendants may be prosecuted only after indictment by a Grand Jury, which has been complied with in this case, but the indictment itself is no evidence of the commission of the crime but only the formal method of accusing the Defendants and putting them on their actual trial before a petit jury. Then again the Defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence; that is to say, the burden of proof is on the Government to show their guilt; and this presumption remains with them as a positive protection until the Government has established their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Various definitions have at times been given as to what constitutes a reasonable doubt. It is said that it must be of such a satisfactory nature that the jury is convinced of the truth of the charge to such an extent that they have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty. But it is seldom possible in any Court trial to establish a proposition to what may be described as a mathematical certainty and therefore the law does not require the jury to be convinced beyond merely speculative or whimsical or every possible doubt, but only beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, a doubt of such a character that one can give to one's self a substantial reason. Then you can properly say you are nevertheless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the word "reasonable" is not equivalent to the word "whimsical" or "fanciful" or "imaginary.' So much for. the general principles that should guide the jury in weighing the evidence in this case as in other criminal cases.

We come now to the specific charge in the indictment. It is based on a statute of the United States passed by Congress and which has been in force for more than a hundred years and indeed to the extent embraced in the indictment in this case, it has been in substance in effect since 1790. The statute as it now reads with amendments from time to time is Section 483 of Title 18 of the United States Code, being that part of the laws of the United States which is sometimes called the Criminal Code, which reads as follows: The heading is "Inciting revolt or mutiny on shipboard. Whoever, being of the crew of a vessel of the United States, on the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, endeavors to make a revolt or mutiny on board such vessel, or combines, conspires, or confederates with any other person on board to make such revolt or mutiny, or solicits, incites, or stirs up any other of the crew to disobey or resist the lawful orders of the master or other officer of such vessel, or to refuse or neglect their proper duty on board thereof, or to betray their proper trust, or assembles with others in a tumultuous and mutinous manner, or makes a riot on board thereof, or unlawfully confines the master or other commanding officer thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

"

The particular part of this statute which embodies the charge made against these defendants is that which reads: "Endeavors to make a revolt on board such vessel or combines, conspires or confederates with any other person on board to make such revolt.' You will note that the defendants are not charged with having completed or perfected or consummated an actual revolt or mutiny, but merely with an endeavor or conspiracy to make a revolt. In this connection a conspiracy means an agreement of two or more members of the crew to make a revolt and an nedeavor to make a revolt necessarily implies something more than mere agreement, that is the doing of some act to put the agreement into effect. These defendants are charged with two separate counts or charges in the one indictment, one count charging merely the conspiracy or agreement to revolt, and the other an endeavor to make a revolt.

Now for some years after the statute was first passed in 1790, there was some uncertainty as to the precise meaning and scope of the word "revolt" as used in this statute, that is to say, just what acts were contemplated and prohibited by the statute. But such doubts and uncertainties as first existed with regard to the meaning of the word have been removed by many judicial decisions in cases in federal courts, including about 1824 a definition of revolt given by the Supreme

Court of the United States; and further in 1835 a statutory definition contained in an Act of Congress which defined a revolt as follows, in section 484, of Title 18, at page 372.

Now here is the definition in a law of Congress of what a revolt consists of. The statute I just read you was an attempt or endeavor or conspiracy to make a revolt. This statute defines what a revolt itself is. "Revolt or mutiny on shipboard. Whoever, being of the crew of a vessel of the United States, on the high seas, or on any waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, unlawfully and with force or by fraud, or intimidation, usurps the command of such vessel from the master or other lawful officer in command thereof, or deprives him of authority and command on board, or resists or prevents him in the free and lawful exercise thereof, or transfers such authority and command to another not lawfully entitled thereto, is guilty of a revolt and mutiny, and shall be fined not more than $2,000, and imprisoned not more than ten years."

You will note that this latter statutory definition is in the alternative presenting different phases or classes of facts or acts which separately constitute a revolt. But all of them have in general the feature of in some way depriving, by the crew the master of the ship of his effective command of the ship. That is to say, there are different kinds of revolt which differ from one another in the extent of gravity of the offense. The most serious form of a revolt would be that which by actual force deposes the master from the command of a vessel by imprisoning or otherwise confining him as a prisoner. But also a revolt of the lesser degree of gravity may consist in merely resisting the captain or master of the ship in the free and lawful exercise of his authority as commander.

Now, the statutes of the United States also provide what shall be the duties of an individual member of a crew with regard to obeying the command of the captain and in the statutes of the United States, Chapter 18 of Title 46, Section 701 of the United States Code, there is defined various offenses and punishment with regard to seamen. "Whenever any seaman who has been regularly engaged or any apprentice in sea service commits any of the following offenses he shall be punished as follows," and then quite a number are listed, "first, for desertion and for neglecting or refusing without reasonable cause to join his vessel or quitting a vessel without leave or willful disobedience of any lawful command at sea by being at the option of the master placed in irons until such disobedience shall cease and upon arrival in port by forfeiture of his wages" and so on, and "for continued willful disobedience of lawful commands or continued willful neglect of duty at sea by being at the option of the master placed in irons on bread and water with full rations every fourth day.' That applies to the individual seaman who refuses to obey the orders of the captain. We are not concerned here with that because obviously there is a more serious charge when not only one but a group of the crew willfully disobey the orders of the captain and it is that kind of a case for which this indictment is brought which charges an endeavor on the part of fourteen of the crew to make a revolt or conspiracy or agreement to do so. And, of course, the character of revolt herein referred to in the testimony in the case is of the lesser degree of the offense only with which we are concerned; that is to say, no effort was made here to physically use force against the captain or to shut him in his room or to turn over the general command of the ship to somebody else and the meaning of revolt, which is referred to by the Government in the testimony, is that of resistance to the lawful orders of the captain or refusal to carry out the ordinary commands which were in force and you will note, as I have already said, that the Government has not charged an actual consummated revolt, but only an agreement or endeavor to consummate it, that is, a degree of offense is charged against the defendants less than an actual consummated revolt. I turn now to a brief summary of the more important features of the testimony which the Government has produced in support of the burden imposed upon it by law to prove the charge it has made against the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, as I have said, you must consult your own recollection of the whole of the testimony and what I say in summarizing it is merely intended as an aid to you in arriving at your verdict and is advisory only. Now, in this case the Government has produced the testimony of a number of witnesses from which you may find the following facts. Now, I will review the substance of the testimony by the Government with regard to this charge. Whether you find all of those facts as the Government contends for is a matter for you to determine, and in considering that you must consider, of course, the defendants' testimony, but I have to summarize one side of the case at one time before I come to the other side of the case.

Now, from the Government's testimony, as I say, you may possibly find that these are the facts established:

The steamship Algic is a steam cargo-carrying vessel, what is frequently termed as a freighter, owned by the United States Maritime Commission, which is an agency of the Government of the United States. She is registered in the Port of Philadelphia, and is a vessel of the United States, within the meaning of the statute which I have quoted to you. She is approximately 435 feet long with a beam of 521⁄2 feet and is of approximately 5,000 tons burden. For some years past she has been engaged principally in making freight-carrying trips to South American ports. On July 16, 1937, Shipping Articles were signed for her complement of officers and crew consisting of thirty-eight in all, and on July 19th she sailed from Jacksonville, Florida, for South America. After touching at various ports in South America, as contemplated by the Shipping Articles, she steamed into the port of Montevideo, Uruguay, on her return northbound voyage on the early morning of September 10, 1937. She arrived there about 6:45 and anchored about three-quarters of a mile off shore between the inner and outer breakwater. The purpose of her call at Montevideo was to load a miscellaneous cargo on the ship. This is generally done by stevedores and the principal function of the crew in that operation is to furnish steam from the engineering department of the ship to give power in the operation of the winches and other machinery of the ship, which functions in the lifting of the cargo from the lighters alongside the ship into the holds of the ship. On this occasion the stevedores to do the work of loading had been arranged for by the agent of the ship at Montevideo, and they were on hand and came aboard the ship at seven o'clock in the morning. They started to load the cargo, but after they had been so occupied for half an hour or possibly an hour, or maybe two hours, the exact time is not, perhaps, fixed, the work of loading had to be discontinued because the steam was shut off and the circumstances under which the steam was so shut off and how it came to be shut off is one of the most important facts to be determined from the testimony in this case. All the fourteen defendants in this case were members of the crew of the ship and all had signed the shipping articles in the customary form. The whole ship's crew, including the officers, are divided into three divisions: (1) The deck crew, (2) the engine room crew, and (3) the steward's department. All the members of the crew have duties to perform both at sea and in port but their duties differ somewhat between the time when the ship is actually on the high seas in motion and when she is stationary in port. Each member of the crew, including officers, have assigned duties to perform daily, but at different times or, as is called on shipboard, different watches, which, generally speaking, are each for four hours. It is customary for the Captain of the ship, who is, of course, in complete and final charge of all operations of the ship, to give his orders to the crew not in person, but through his officers, generally the first mate, and of course, most ships have an established routine for all members of the crew. On the particular day the first officer issued the orders for the day to the boatswain about 7:45 o'clock in the morning, after the ship had anchored at Montevideo. Two anchors were put out, as the first officer did not consider the place safe holding ground, and two anchors were required by the pilot. Stevedores engaged by the Line's agency came aboard at seven o'clock and began to stow the cargo. For this purpose steam power was on the deck. The chief officer, according to his testimony, gave the boatswain orders to start some of the crew washing paintwork on the boats, others chipping on the forecastlehead, and others painting the rails on the after boat deck. At eight o'clock the chief officer said he did not see any members of the crew on deck. At 8:05 the boatswain reported the crew were holding a meeting and the chief officer told the boatswain to go down and turn them out, as they were not supposed to hold meetings during working hours.

They were Lampkin,

At 8:20 two delegates of the crew reported to the officer. of the engine department, and Rees of the deck department. They stated to the chief officer that the crew refused to work as long as the stevedores were aboard the vessel.

The complaint was that the stevedores were thought by the crew to be strikebreaking stevedores, and the reason the crew did not work with them was because the crew belonged to a labor union which has a policy not to work with strikebreakers. That is the ground of their objection, the objection of the crew, to continuing their work, as reported by their representatives.

The chief officer told Rees and Lampkin, in effect, that the stevedore strike situation was none of the crew's business, and asked them to go back and notify the rest of the crew as to the situation of the strike ashore as the chief officer explained it to them; there being some testimony to the effect that the strike was not such as what the defendants might call a bona fide union and non-union strike dispute, but a personal factional fight between members of a stevedoring gang.