lidé sa situation extérieure. Et s'il avait compris et suivi l'exemple de Robert Peel et des tories réformateurs, peut-être eût-il aussi trouvé là, en France même, l'occasion de sauver son trône et sa dynastie, en cessant d'en lier le sort à celui d'une classe sociale plus détestée que lui encore, et qui devait, au reste, l'abandonner au jour du danger.

CONCLUSION

U terme de cette étude, assurément bien incomplète,

A de la première Entente cordiale, il nous sera sans

doute permis de revenir, en conclusion, sur deux constatations déjà faites à plusieurs reprises au cours du récit, et qui nous paraissent avoir, aujourd'hui encore, conservé toute leur valeur.

La première est que l'alliance franco-anglaise, ébauchée en 1830, et poursuivie, avec des interruptions et des trayerses, jusqu'à la fin de 1846, a été, bien que restreinte et troublée, profitable aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe et au maintien de la paix.

La seconde est que l'insuccès partiel de cette alliance, ses crises, sa rupture finale, tenaient surtout à son caractère exclusivement politique, au défaut de connaissance réciproque, d'union intellectuelle et morale des deux peuples, et à l'absence de tout accord économique. Si la reprise et le succès de l'entente cordiale ont été différés pour de si longues années, la faute en est à l'insularisme, non seulement des Anglais, mais des Français eux-mêmes (1), et aussi à l'antagonisme commercial entre deux puissances pourtant indispensables l'une à l'autre.

(1) Cobden écrit en 1846 à John Bright, qui déplorait la rupture : « L'origine de tout le mal vient de la nature combative, énergique, vaniteuse, pleine de dédain pour l'étranger... de cette noble créature insulaire, John Bull ». (Cité par J. Bardoux, Essai d'une psychologie politique de l'Angleterre contemporaine; les crises belliqueuses, 259). Et Sinclair Lewis a noté de nos jours que la France est peut-être de tous les pays civilisés celui où l'on remarque le plus d'insularité dans la masse du peuple, et le moins parmi les esprits cultivés. (Figaro, du 4 sept. 1925).

Que conclure de là, sinon qu'une semblable alliance est possible, et à de certains égards nécessaire, mais ne saurait jamais être durable, si elle n'est que l'œuvre des diplomates, et ne se fonde pas solidement, de part et d'autre, sur l'accord des hommes d'affaires et l'entente des hommes de pensée?

APPENDICES

No I

(Voir page 234)

H.-L. BULWER TO THE EARL OF ABERDEEN

Paris, Sept. 10. 1841.

My Lord,

...There is this moreover to be said with respect to M. Guizot, viz. that he is the first Minister in his Country, since M. C. Perier, who pursues a system and professes that sort of character which, if not unsuccessful at first, finishes by improving its authority over a nation. Indulgent, as to men. Positive, as to things, moderate in his views, determined in their execution, if he can but pass through the novitiate of office, he is more likely to take root there than any of his Predecessors.

But much, after all, will depend on accident,-which in this Country has greater influence than in any other, and many events in the ensuing Session may derange the most sensible speculation that can be now formed as to its fortunes.

With respect to ist Foreign Policy, this must in the main be guided by the disposition of the King, the disposition of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the disposition of the nation.

In one sentiment these all unite-a desire for peace; and I am therefore firmly of opinion, that peace will be the great object with the present Government, to which all will be subordinate, but at the same time it is not to be imagined, that it is the only object.

No ministry in France will ever exist without perpetually struggling to increase the influence of France in Foreign Countries. The difference will be in the manner of so doing.

M. Guizot has his own notions upon this subject, notions in conformity with his pursuits and his disposition, and which are combined with the Policy he would wish to pursue at home.

This Policy teaches him to desire a constitutional Government but to keep the Constitution and the Government strictly respected. He would give the power to the middle classes (there exist no higher in this Country) but to that portion of the middle Classes which is sober, temperate and disciplined.

He thinks that if such a Government on such a foundation could be established it would reestablish the moral influence which he believe to be the real influence of France on the continent, an influence compromised by perpetual follies and perpetual changes of late years thus restoring to the French that consideration which they once undoubtedly had and now no longer possess. He is for extending this influence not by the army (for which he has none of the respect entertained by M. Thiers) but by alliances, treaties, intercourse.

Germany is the Country which especially attracts his attention because he has studied its literature, has in some respects the mind of its inhabitants, and believe moreover that this alliance between two people, of which the one has wished for and enjoyed every liberty prematurely, and the other is moving slowly and step by step towards liberal institutions, will in some degree steady the movement of ideas in his own country. He wishes, therefore, if possible, to create a propensity in France to look to the public opinion in Germany, and a feeling in Germany favorable to the French character and constitution.

This seems in a certain degree bookish (if I may use such an expression) and theoretical: but it is according to the character of the person of whom I am speaking, and I have the means of knowing that it is precisely in accordance with the language he holds to those he wishes to influence, and that he has taken no small pains to carry it out by forming connexions with the German Press, and dictating the inspirations of French writers.