them, of a kind in which a third nation, not itself concerned in the result, has no sort of qualification for passing judgment, and therefore no right whatever to interpose. In general, it may be said that, where the subject-matter of the quarrel is one which, fairly considered, admits of dispute,-where the proceeding which it is proposed to prevent is one of which the criminality or injustice is matter of question,-in other words, where the case is such as, if brought before a legal tribunal, would be decided upon, not as presenting no sort of doubt or difficulty, but only after discussion or deliberation, "intervention" is not justifiable. In such circumstances neither of the two nations concerned can be expected, or ought to be compelled, to accept the decision of a third, which is neither invested by common consent with judicial authority, nor is possessed of any qualities entitling it to decide. The tribunals by which, in an ordinary community, such differences are settled are deliberately selected by the society itself, and are supposed to be endowed with information or intelligence peculiarly fitting them for the purpose in view, and to be wholly free from personal interests in the questions submitted to them; in all of which qualifications (in two of them invariably, and in the third very frequently) an intervening state is deficient. As regards intelligence, not only is there no special qualification, but the dense ignorance which exists in all countries as to the political condition of others, and as to the views, opinions, and modes of thought prevalent in them, and the apparent impossibility which pervades a body-politic of looking at international questions from any point of view but its own, constitute a positive disqualification for judicial power. As regards As regards impartiality, there is, by the supposition, no such direct interest in the issue as could be supposed to justify intervention; but the circumstances of the case are almost always such as to ensure a very decided bias in the judgment formed of them in a third country. Considerations as to the manner in which its own

trade will be affected, jealousy of the growing wealth and power of other states, historical associations, dynastic alliances, antipathies of race, and prejudices of education, as well as other causes, operate with nearly absolute certainty, where there is any doubt as to the justice of the case, to preclude impartial judgment. Accordingly, we find that the verdicts pronounced by nations upon the conduct of their neighbours have, in by far the greater number of such instances, been wrong. "In the "large volume of human folly there is

no page longer or more discreditable "than that which contains the judgments "of nations upon each other."1 Even if this were not the case, the enforcement of such judgments would be indefensible, the objection to it being not only that they are frequently or generally wrong, but also that those against whom they are directed cannot fairly be expected to accept them. It may be said that, since the community of nations is one in which law, as ordinarily understood, does not exist, the world must be content with the best substitute that can be found for it, and that it is better that the peace should be preserved by the self-constituted authority of any one or more states, to whatever objection on the score of justice this may be liable, than that it should be perpetually broken for the purpose of deciding questions otherwise insoluble. But this argument proceeds upon a wrong estimate of the comparative value of justice and of peace. It is true that the question at issue is as likely to receive an unjust solution when it is settled by a trial of strength between the disputants, as when it is settled by the fiat of an authority incompetent to decide. But in the former case the nation which, being in the right, is compelled to yield, has at least had the opportunity of using its best efforts for the satisfaction of its claims, and the chance of successfully asserting them; in the other, it is allowed no voice whatever in the matter. In the one case there is the single injustice of

1 Sir G. C. Lewis, "Dialogue on the Best Form of Government."

a wrong solution; in the other there is the double injustice of a wrong solution, and of its enforcement by an unqualified authority.

It is, of course, possible to conceive a condition of affairs in which the rule here contended for must be exceptionally disregarded. A war, for instance, carried on with unusual ferocity, protracted beyond all ordinary duration, and of which the termination seemed still distant, might be an instance of the kind; for the necessity of putting an end to such a war might have become paramount to all other considerations. But, in order that a particular event may be entitled to such exceptional treatment, it must possess strongly marked features distinguishing it clearly from almost every recorded occurrence of a similar kind.

It appears, then, that there is a large class of international dissensions in which a state not directly interested in their issue could not, under any circumstances, justifiably interpose. But there is another class of them in which the interposition of such a state would, apart from all consideration of its cost in money and in human life, not only be justifiable, but desirable. A clear and unquestionable breach of any of the well-understood and generally recognised rules of international law (including among them the obligation of such treaties or diplomatic compacts as have not been invalidated by subsequent events or by the mere progress of civilization1) would be one ground for such interposition. The reasons which we have found to exist against it, where the point at issue was one admitting of doubt and argument on the score of legality or justice, are here inapplicable. Not only a combination.

1 Contingencies in which any nation is required by the stipulations of a treaty, either singly or with other countries, to interpose (among which some of the proceedings recently taken by Germany towards Denmark in reference to Schleswig-Holstein must, it would appear, be classed) are not here in question. The intervention considered in this paper is that to which nations are not bound by any special and explicit obligation.

of states, but, if that was impossible, any one state, would have the right, on the present hypothesis, to compel obedience to a rule which had been made by all of them for the general good. The want of those attributes (regular constitution, special intelligence, and impartiality) which, as already observed, justify the coercive action of legal authorities, does not in this class of cases, as it did in the former, disqualify a nation from acting as a substitute for such authorities. There being no reasonable doubt that the crime is being committed or is contemplated, and none at all as to the identity of the criminal, there is no question here of misjudgment either owing to ignorance, or to bias arising from personal interest for or against the accused. The defect of self-constitution is the only one of the three from which the intervening authority, if it consisted not of a general congress, but only of one or two or a minority of the whole body, would suffer; but this must be considered as a defect of little importance when set against the object of the intervention. For the same reasons, the decided and obvious breach of any great principle of international justice sanctioned by the moral sense of mankind, or the violation of any of those axioms of right and wrong, which, not falling within any positive rule of international law, are yet fully established and unhesitatingly appealed to by nations in their intercourse with each other, or which, though they may not be accepted by all governments, are so by the majority of educated men, would afford another ground on which intervention might be justifiable. The wholly unprovoked aggression of one state upon another, or the seizure of its territory without anything like a fair or rational excuse for doing so, would be obvious instances of such misconduct. The French occupation of Rome-one of the most lawless acts ever committed by a nation-and the suppression in 1849 by a Russian army of the Hungarian insurrection, are clear examples of it; for, in what

ever cases interference in the civil dissensions of foreign states may be justifiable, it is certain that to assist a government in crushing the liberties of the people over whom it rules is an act of flagrant immorality. The two latter instances are of value as illustrating with singular force the distinction between the two questions now under consideration; for they are of a kind in which, as regards the part to be taken by this or any other country, the duty of intervention considered apart from the price to be paid for it, and the duty of non-intervention in the actual state of the case, are equally clear.

Thus far with respect to "intervention" as regards the proceedings of one state towards another. Take next the contingency of a contest between two parties in the same state. It is easy to see that in this case the objections to intervention are far more cogent and comprehensive than when the quarrel is between distinct nations. The general body of states has obviously far less concern with the internal affairs of one of its members than with the proceedings of its members towards one another. The principle which in an ordinary community is fully recognised, that each of the individuals comprising it ought to be allowed to regulate his own concerns as he thinks fit, so long as he abstains from injuring others, holds good also for the community of nations; and this principle, superadded to the reasons which we have found to exist as against the right of interference in a large class of international transactions, tends to confine that right within the very narrowest limits as regards civil contests. Such interference is, as we have seen, justifiable, even as between distinct nations, only when some universally admitted rule of international law, or some great principle of justice or humanity, has obviously and undeniably been infringed. As between two parties in the same state, international law does not apply; and, as regards the great principles of justice or humanity, it is obvious that the case is very dif

ferent when they are contravened by a member of the community, not as against other members of it, but as against itself. Take the frequent instance of a people rising against tyrannical rulers. On which side justice lies does not admit of a doubt. Yet even in this case foreign intervention cannot be justified, and that for these reasons:Firstly, That the wrong done is not done to any individual of the society of which the interposing state is a member, and as a member of which, and as such only, it has any right to interfere; and, secondly, because such intervention would violate the wholesome rule which, apart from all question whether it is on the right or the wrong side, condemns the interference of one state in the internal concerns of another. The justification of this rule as applicable to the contingency now under consideration is sufficiently evident. For a people which owes its freedom to foreign bayonets, and not to such a sense of the value of the possession as would give it courage and endurance sufficient to ensure the ultimate success of its efforts, will neither enjoy nor preserve it.

It appears, then, that, except in those rare and extreme cases in which, in political as in other sciences, it is sometimes necessary to set aside established laws, intervention in the civil differences of foreign states is, irrespectively of all question as to the amount of resistance with which it will be met, unjustifiable. The conditions of the question are altered when one of the parties to the contest is of a distinct race, or has preserved a separate nationality, as, for instance, in the struggle of Belgium with Holland, of Poland with Russia, or of Italy with Austria. In so far as such conflicts are not between a people and its native rulers, but of a people against the superior power of foreign rulers, they fall within the rules which we have found to be applicable to quarrels between distinct nations. In so far then as they are of this character, whenever the justice of the case is palpably and wholly on one side, so that, by the conduct of the opposite party,

either some universally recognised rule of public law, or some fundamental principle of morality, or some undoubted right incidental to humanity, such as that of a nation to reject the yoke of a foreign government, has been broken, there can be no doubt that intervention would, on our present supposition that its object could be effected without expense and without war, be both lawful and desirable. But, in each instance, the double category to which such contests belong, and the degree in which they belong to each, must be taken into consideration in any question as to the right of intervention. In the contest, for instance, of Italy with Austria, the element of distinct nationality so far predominates as that the case may fairly be considered to come under the rules by which the right of intervention between separate nations is determined; and, judged by these rules, it is a case in which intervention, on the present hypothesis, might properly be exercised. As regards Poland, on the other hand, and as regards Hungary, the occurrences have in their nature more of insurrection against native rulers than of resistance to a foreign yoke, and in them therefore the right of a foreign state to pass judgment is less clearly assured.

We have hitherto considered the question as one respecting a single state acting by itself. It is evident, however, on looking to the grounds of the conclusions at which we have arrived, that the association with it of one or two other states cannot materially modify those conclusions. And, practically speaking, it is as concerning the action of one, or two, or at most three states, that the question presents itself; the conflicting interests, real or supposed, of nations in general rendering them, amongst other causes, unable in most cases to arrive at, and unwilling to attempt, a solution by means of a congress. But, in order that the inquiry may be complete, it is necessary to consider whether the case would be altered if the decision were to emanate from such a body. In events of such a character as to fall within the class with respect to

which we have found, as between distinct nations, that intervention was justifiable on the part of a single state, it is needless to observe that the interposition of a majority of states would be equally so; while it would be preferable as affording less excuse for that sense of injustice which is sure to be felt by any nation coerced by the authority of one or two others. But would it not also be justifiable, in respect to events of that class in which it has been seen that the intervention of one or two states, or of a majority of them, would not be so? Those events were, to describe them in general terms, events in which the matter in dispute was one with respect to which two opposite opinions might fairly be held, there being on each side, as it is termed, a "colourable" case; and the ground on which it appeared that in such circumstances intervention was indefensible was the absence from the intervening power of three elements of qualification for judicial authority-constitution by the general body, special intelligence, and impartiality. Now of these qualifications, the first, though not literally, may be considered to be virtually possessed by a majority of states. To the second, though the misapprehension which prevails in every nation in regard to the affairs of other nations is such as in a great measure to disqualify even a congress for the purpose under consideration, a majority of states has necessarily more claim than a minority of them. As regards the third, that of impartiality, there seems no more to be said in favour of the former than of the latter; the strong personal interest of most nations in every international difficulty which arises being, as already observed, one of the chief causes which have led to the opinion that a congress is a futile expedient for their solution. On the whole, it may be concluded, as regards differences of this class, that even a majority of the states composing the general community, though less open to objection as an authority pronouncing judgment than one, or two, or a minority of them, would not be free from it; and

that coercion by such a body would be a measure of doubtful justice. It is true that power to make laws for the community must be considered to reside in a majority of its members. But it is one thing to make laws, and another to apply them, when they are made, to particular cases in which the interest of the administrators is involved. Where the dispute is between two parties in the same state, the reasons which would condemn the intervention of a single state are valid also against that of a congress. In those extreme cases, in which only we have found that intervention would be defensible on the part of a single state, it would obviously be more easy to defend, because bearing a greater weight of judicial authority, if it were the act of a congress.

Having thus obtained an answer to the first question-viz. what are the cases in which, its own interests not being concerned, a nation would have the right to intervene, supposing that it could do so without expense to itself, and without actual war-we proceed to consider the second, viz. how far, in such cases, a nation is justified in intervening, if to do so successfully it must either incur the expense of irresistible armaments, or must engage in war, to its own detriment and that of the general community.

Now the proper objects of intervention are (as has been seen) first, to prevent or redress injustice; and, secondly, to prevent or put an end to violence and bloodshed. But, in order that the first of these objects may be attained, it is in many cases not only necessary, but desirable, to sacrifice the second. For it is obvious that, if the nation against which the intervention is directed is powerful, and that on whose behalf it is exerted is weak, the intervention, so far from preventing war or shortening its duration, will in all probability ensure and prolong it. Even, therefore, if the question was one affecting the general interest only, it is obvious that a nation should be cautious in entering upon such a war, and should carefully consider whether the case is

one of those in which the sacrifice referred to will be necessary to success, and, if so, whether success is desirable. But the question does not affect the general interest only. It concerns also in an especial degree the interest of the interposing state itself. By the sup

position, that state undertakes the task not for its own advantage, but for the sake of justice or of peace-that is, for the general good. By the supposition also it incurs some expense and suffering for that object; and the question is, whether it is called upon to incur, or is justified in incurring them. In the community of nations, owing to the absence of established laws, each nation is charged with the defence of its own territory and the maintenance of its own rights, and is compelled to support for the purpose large and expensive armaments. If it voluntarily goes beyond this, and submits to further expense for the sake of preserving peace or of enforcing justice as between other countries, it does more than can reasonably be required or expected of it. The burden of self-defence is one of the necessary evils which anarchy imposes; the burden of defending others is gratuitous and self-imposed. It is certain that no nation can properly be condemned because it refuses to injure itself for the benefit of the rest of the community. But, though the refusal to adopt such a course may not be censurable, would not its adoption be justifiable and commendable? The answer is, that selfsacrifice is commendable only when the object in view bears a reasonable proportion to the amount of self-inflicted injury. Unless there is a due ratio between the suffering submitted to and the object to be attained, self-sacrifice is not heroism, but Quixotism. But, in counting the cost to a nation of any such act of generosity, it must be remembered that the cost falls with very different pressure upon the different classes of which the nation is composed. In almost every country there is a very numerous class of persons many of whom are undergoing the misery of absolute pauperism, and many more,