Opinion of the Court. 327 U.S. of that sort was satisfied by the Administrator's showing in this case, including not only the allegations concerning coverage, but also that he was proceeding with his investigation in accordance with the mandate of Congress and that the records sought were relevant to that purpose. Actually, in view of today's ruling in Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., supra, the showing here, including the facts supplied by the response, was sufficient to establish coverage itself, though that was not required. The result therefore sustains the Administrator's position that his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury's, or the court's in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence," and is governed by the same limitations. These are that he shall not act arbitrarily or in excess of his statutory authority, but this does not mean that his inquiry must be "limited . . . by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation ." Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282; cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. Nor is the judicial function either abused or abased, as has been suggested, by leaving to it the determination of the 56 55 The bill of discovery in equity would seem to furnish an instance. Cf. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Co., 289 U. S. 689, 696697. See also the provisions for pretrial examination and the taking of depositions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26 (b), 30 (d), 45; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 556; Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., 4 F. R. D. 167, 8 F. R. S. 26b.31, Case 3; Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946, 947. The power of Congress itself to call for information presents a related illustration. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 156-158. 56 In General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. 2d 596, 599, the court said: "In the exercise of the judicial power to review questions of law, as conferred by an Act of Congress, the seal of a United States Court should not become a mere rubber stamp for the approval of arbitrary action by an administrative agency." In this case, No. 63, the district court said: ". . . the functions of the Courts remain, and those functions are not merely to act as an adjunct of administrative bodies. . . ." 49 F. Supp. 659, 661. 186 Opinion of the Court. important questions which the Administrator's position concedes the courts may decide." Petitioners stress that enforcement will subject them to inconvenience, expense and harassment. That argument is answered fully by what was said in Myers v. Bethlehem Corp.58 There is no harassment when the subpoena is issued and enforced according to law. The Administrator is authorized to enter and inspect, but the Act makes his right to do so subject in all cases to judicial supervision. Persons from whom he seeks relevant information are not required to submit to his demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable or overreaches the authority Congress has given. To it they may make "appropriate defence" surrounded by every safeguard of judicial restraint. In view of these safeguards, the expressed fears of unwarranted intrusions upon personal liberty are effective only to recall Mr. Justice Cardozo's reply to the same exaggerated forebodings in Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission: "Historians may find hyperbole in the sunguinary simile." 59 Nor is there room for intimation that the Administrator has proceeded in these cases in any manner contrary to 57 The issues of authority to conduct the investigation, relevancy of the materials sought, and breadth of the demand are neither minor nor ministerial matters. Nor would there be any failure to satisfy fully the discretionary power implied in the statute's use of the word "may," rather than "shall," see note 24, in authorizing the court to enforce the subpoenas. It would be going far to say that Congress could not proceed upon this basis, but could go forward only by requiring a showing of probable cause of coverage in the sense of probability in fact of coverage. Cf. note 44 and text. Coverage is but one element in violation and if probable cause, in that sense, must be shown concerning it, it is difficult to understand why probable cause must not be shown also concerning exemptions, see Martin Typewriter Co. v. Walling, 135 F. 2d 918; Walling v. La Belle S. S. Co., 148 F.2d 198, or any other essential element in violation. 58 See note 50 supra. 5 See note 30. MURPHY, J., dissenting. 327 U.S. petitioners' fundamental rights or otherwise than strictly according to law. It is to be remembered that petitioners' are not the only rights which may be involved or threatened with possible infringement. Their employees' rights and the public interest under the declared policy of Congress also would be affected if petitioners should enjoy the practically complete immunity they seek. No sufficient reason was set forth in the returns or the accompanying affidavits for not enforcing the subpoenas, a burden petitioners were required to assume in order to make "appropriate defence." Accordingly the judgments in both causes, No. 61 and No. 63, are Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting. It is not without difficulty that I dissent from a procedure the constitutionality of which has been established for many years. But I am unable to approve the use of non-judicial subpoenas issued by administrative agents. Administrative law has increased greatly in the past few years and seems destined to be augmented even further in the future. But attending this growth should be a new and broader sense of responsibility on the part of administrative agencies and officials. Excessive use or abuse of authority can not only destroy man's instinct for liberty but will eventually undo the administrative processes themselves. Our history is not without a precedent of a successful revolt against a ruler who "sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people." Perhaps we are too far removed from the experiences of the past to appreciate fully the consequences that may result from an irresponsible though well-meaning use of 186 MURPHY, J., dissenting. the subpoena power. To allow a non-judicial officer, unarmed with judicial process, to demand the books and papers of an individual is an open invitation to abuse of that power. It is no answer that the individual may refuse to produce the material demanded. Many persons have yielded solely because of the air of authority with which the demand is made, a demand that cannot be enforced without subsequent judicial aid. Many invasions of private rights thus occur without the restraining hand of the judiciary ever intervening. Only by confining the subpoena power exclusively to the judiciary can there be any insurance against this corrosion of liberty. Statutory enforcement would not thereby be made impossible. Indeed, it would be made easier. A people's desire to cooperate with the enforcement of a statute is in direct proportion to the respect for individual rights shown in the enforcement process. Liberty is too priceless to be forfeited through the zeal of an administrative agent. 327 U.S. Syllabus. GRIFFIN v. GRIFFIN. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 86. Argued December 10, 1945.-Decided February 25, 1946. In 1924 a New York court entered an interlocutory decree divorcing respondent from petitioner. The decree was modified in 1926 to provide that petitioner should pay to respondent alimony in a specified amount annually. Both parties were then residents of New York, and the proceedings were contested. In 1936 the court, also in contested proceedings, entered an order declaring that there was due from petitioner to respondent, for the period ending October 25, 1935, alimony arrears and accrued interest in a specified amount. In 1938, without notice to the petitioner, a judgment was by order of the court docketed in favor of the respondent against petitioner, and execution ordered to issue thereon, in an amount embracing what was due upon the 1936 order plus alimony arrears and interest from October 25, 1935, to the date of the 1938 order. Respondent sued petitioner in the district court of the District of Columbia upon the 1938 judgment, and was awarded summary judgment in the amount of the 1938 judgment plus interest. Held: 1. To the extent that it adjudged as due and owing arrears of alimony accrued since October 25, 1935, the 1938 judgment was wanting in procedural due process and unenforceable. Pp. 223, 233. (a) Because of the want of notice to petitioner of the proceeding to docket judgment against him for accrued alimony, and to the extent that petitioner was thus deprived of an opportunity which under the law of New York was open to him to raise defenses in such a proceeding, there was want of procedural due process and hence want of that jurisdiction over the person of petitioner prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment in personam against him. P. 228. The law of New York is examined and found to differ significantly from that involved in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1. P. 233. (b) It is immaterial whether petitioner at the time of the 1938 proceeding was a domiciled resident of New York, either within or temporarily without the State, or a resident of some other jurisdiction. In any event, a judgment in personam direct |