92 Opinion of the Court. We now turn to petitioner's constitutional contention. Though as we have pointed out petitioners have alleged that the Act applied to setting a maximum price for school-land timber violates the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, the argument here seems to spring from implications of the Tenth Amendment only. The contention rests on the premise that there is a doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that "the two governments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the free and full exercise of the powers of the other." It is not contended, and could not be under our prior decisions, that the ceiling price fixed by the Administrator is constitutionally invalid as applied to privately owned timber. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503. Nor is it denied that the Administrator could have fixed ceiling prices if the State had engaged in a sales business "having the incidents of similar enterprises usually prosecuted for private gain." Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 452. But it is argued that the Act cannot be applied to this sale because it was "for the purpose of gaining revenue to carry out an essential governmental function-the education of its citizens." Since the Emergency Price Control Act has been sustained as a congressional exercise of the war power, the petitioner's argument is that the extent of that power as applied to state functions depends on whether these are "essential" to the state government. The use of the same criterion in measuring the constitutional power of Congress to tax has proved to be unworkable," and we reject it as a guide in the field here involved. Cf. United States v. California, supra, 297 U. S. at 183–185. The State of Washington does have power to own and control the school lands here involved and to sell the lands See the several opinions in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. Opinion of the Court. 327 U.S. or the timber growing on them, subject to the limitations set out in the Enabling Act. And our only question is whether the State's power to make the sales must be in subordination to the power of Congress to fix maximum prices in order to carry on war. For reasons to which we have already adverted, an absence of federal power to fix maximum prices for state sales or to control rents charged by a State might result in depriving Congress of ability effectively to prevent the evil of inflation at which the Act was aimed. The result would be that the constitutional grant of the power to make war would be inadequate to accomplish its full purpose. And this result would impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment. To construe the Constitution as preventing this would be to read it as a self-defeating charter. It has never been so interpreted. Since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 420, it has seldom if ever been doubted that Congress has power in order to attain a legitimate end—that is, to accomplish the full purpose of a granted authority-to use all appropriate means plainly adapted to that end, unless inconsistent with other parts of the Constitution. And we have said, that the Tenth Amendment "does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national government." 8 Where, as here, Congress has enacted legislation authorized by its granted powers, and where at the same time, a State has a conflicting law which but for the congressional Act would be valid, the Constitution marks the course for courts to follow. Article VI provides that "The Constitution and the Laws of the United States... 8 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 362. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124; California v. United States, supra; United States v. California, supra; Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534–535. made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would reverse the judgment for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U. S. 105. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. HULBERT ET AL. v. TWIN FALLS COUNTY. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO. No. 238. Argued January 10, 1946.-Decided February 4, 1946. Maximum Price Regulation No. 133, promulgated by the Office of Price Administration pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act, applies to a sale of a tractor by a county. Case v. Bowles, ante, p. 92. P. 104. 66 Idaho, 156 P. 2d 319, reversed. An Idaho district court held the sale of a farm tractor by a county to be subject to the Emergency Price Control Act and Maximum Price Regulation No. 133 promulgated pursuant thereto. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed. 66 Idaho, 156 P. 2d 319. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 707. Reversed, p. 105. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Milton Klein. Submitted on brief for respondent by Frank Langley, Attorney General of Idaho, and Everett M. Sweeley. For application of this principle see Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U. S. 52, 68; Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94, 104. Opinion of the Court. 327 U.S. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner Hulbert bid $1,050 for a used farm-type gasoline tractor which Twin Falls County, Idaho, offered for sale at an auction. His was the highest bid. Upon being informed by the Office of Price Administration that the amount bid was above the ceiling price of $723.56, petitioner refused to pay the full amount. He tendered $723.56 which the County refused to accept. Thereupon the County sued the petitioner in the state district court for $1,050. Petitioner tendered $1,050 to be disposed of according to the outcome of the case. He defended on the ground that he had been advised by the Office of Price Administration that the regulation setting a ceiling price was applicable and stated that he was willing to pay any sum up to $1,050 which was not prohibited by this regulation. The Administrator intervened, alleging that the bid price exceeded the ceiling price fixed by Maximum Price Regulation 1331 and that the regulation was applicable to the sale of a tractor by the County. The County stated that prior to the sale it had been advised by the County Prosecuting Attorney that the sale would be controlled by § 30-708 of the Idaho Code, Ann., and that the Office of Price Administration regulations were inapplicable. The Idaho district court held the sale subject to the Emergency Price Control Act and to Regulation No. 133. The court gave judgment for the County for the ceiling price of $723.56, holding that the sale as to the amount above that ceiling price was void. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed. 66 Idaho, 156 P. 2d 319. 156 P. 2d 319. We granted certiorari because the supreme court's decision conflicted with that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bowles v. Case, 149 F. 2d 777. The only question properly before us is whether Maximum Price Regulation No. 133 applies to sales of tractors 17 F. R. 3185, 6936, 7599; 8 F. R. 234. 103 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. by a county. In defining the term "person" the regulation uses the same language as § 302 (h) of the Emergency Price Control Act. In Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, we held that that language makes the Act applicable to sales by States and their subdivisions such as this one. For the reasons set out in that opinion, this language as employed in Regulation No. 133 makes that regulation applicable to the sale of the tractor by the County. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. I think Judge Givens, writing for the Supreme Court of Idaho (66 Idaho, 156 P. 2d 319), has shown that it is at least doubtful if Congress meant to include the States as sellers under this Act.1 I think there is little to add to his analysis except to say that the doubt for me is increased when the whole scheme of regulation is considered. While § 302 (h) would relieve the States from the criminal sanctions of the Act, they would be subject to the treble damage provisions of § 205 (e), which are remedial, not punitive, in nature. Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F. 2d 377, 379. And the Administrator would have the power under § 205 (f) (1) to require a State to get a license from him in order to sell its commodities-a license which would be subject to suspension. § 205 (f) (2). These are sub 1 Sec. 302 (h) defines the term "person" as including "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, or any other organized group of persons, or legal successor or representative of any of the foregoing, and includes the United States or any agency thereof, or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of any of the foregoing: Provided, That no punishment provided by this Act shall apply to the United States, or to any such government, political subdivision, or agency." 2 See note 1, supra. |