such indifference about his own creed, he could not with decency show much bigotry about the creed of his subjects.30 We find, accordingly, that he was the author of the first public act of toleration which any government promulgated in France since Christianity had been the religion of the country. Only five years after he had solemnly abjured Protestantism, he published the celebrated edict of Nantes,31 by which, for the first time, a Catholic government granted to heretics a fair share of civil and religious rights. This was, unquestionably, the most important event that had yet occurred in the history of French civilization,32 If it is considered by itself, it is merely an evidence of the enlightened principles of the king; but when we look at its general success, and at the cessation of religious war which followed it, we cannot fail to perceive that it was part of a vast movement, in which the people themselves participated. Those who recognize the truth of the principles I have laboured to establish, will expect that this great step towards religious liberty was accompanied by that spirit of scepticism, in the absence of which toleration has always been unknown. And that this was actually the case, may be easily proved by an examination of the transitionary state which France began to enter towards the end of the sixteenth century.

The writings of Rabelais are often considered to afford the first instance of religious scepticism in the French language.33 But, after a tolerably intimate acquaintance with the works of this remarkable man, I have found nothing to justify such an opinion. He certainly treats the clergy with great disrespect, and takes every opportunity of covering them with ridicule.34

30 On his conversion, the character of which was as obvious then as it is now, compare Duplessis Mornay, Mém. et Correspond. vol. i. p. 257, with Sully, Economies Royales, vol. ii. p. 126. See also Howell's Letters, book i. p. 42; and a letter from Sir H. Wotton in 1593, printed in Reliquia Wottonianæ, p. 711. See also Ranke, Civil Wars in France, vol. ii. pp. 257, 355; Capefigue, Hist. de la Réforme, vol. vi. pp. 305, 358.

31 The edict of Nantes was in 1598; the abjuration in 1593. Sismondi, Hist. des Français, vol. xxi. pp. 202, 486. But in 1590 it was intimated to the pope as probable, if not certain, that Henry would "in den Schooss der katholischen Kirche zurückkehren." Ranke, die Päpste, vol. ii. p. 210.

32 Of this edict, Sismondi says, "Aucune époque dans l'histoire de France ne marque mieux peut-être la fin d'un monde ancien, le commencement d'un monde nouHist. des Français, vol. xxi. p. 489.

veau

33 On Rabelais, as the supposed founder of French scepticism, compare Lavallée, Hist. des Français, vol. ii. p. 306; Stephen's Lectures on the History of France, vol. ii. p. 242; Sismondi, Hist. des Français, vol. xvi. p. 376.

34 Particularly the monks. See, among numerous other instances, vol. i. pp. 278, 282, vol. ii. pp. 284, 285, of Œuvres de Rabelais, edit. Amsterdam, 1725. However, the high dignitaries of the church are not spared; for he says that Gargantua "se morvoit en archidiacre," vol. i. p. 132; and on two occasions (vol. iii. p. 65, vol. iv. pp. 199, 200) he makes a very indecent allusion to the pope. In vol. i. pp. 260, 261, he satirically notices the way in which the services of the church were per

His attacks, however, are always made upon their personal vices, and not upon that narrow and intolerant spirit to which those vices were chiefly to be ascribed. In not a single instance does he show any thing like consistent scepticism;35 nor does he appear to be aware that the disgraceful lives of the French clergy were but the inevitable consequence of a system, which, corrupt as it was, still possessed every appearance of strength and vitality. Indeed, the immense popularity which he enjoyed is, almost of itself, a decisive consideration; since no one, who is well informed as to the condition of the French early in the sixteenth century, will believe it possible that a people, so sunk in superstition, should delight in a writer by whom superstition is constantly attacked.

But the extension of experience, and the consequent increase of knowledge, were preparing the way for a great change in the French intellect. The process, which had just taken place in England, was now beginning to take place in France; and in both countries the order of events was precisely the same. The spirit of doubt, hitherto confined to an occasional solitary thinker, gradually assumed a bolder form: first it found a vent in the national literature, and then it influenced the conduct of practical statesmen. That there was, in France, an intimate connexion between scepticism and toleration, is proved, not only by those general arguments which make us infer that such connexion must always exist, but also by the circumstance, that only a few years before the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes, there appeared the first systematic sceptic who wrote in the French language. The Essays of Montaigne were published in 1588, and form an epoch, not only in the literature, but also in the civilization, of France. Putting aside personal peculiarities, which have less weight than is commonly supposed, it will be found, that the difference between Rabelais and Montaigne is a measure of the difference between 15457 and 1588, and that it, in some degree, formed: "Dont luy dist le moyne: Je ne dors jamais à mon aise, sinon quand je suis au sermon, ou quand je prie Dieu."

35 His joke on the strength of Samson (Euvres de Rabelais, vol. ii. pp. 29, 30), and his ridicule of one of the Mosaic laws (vol. iii. p. 34), are so unconnected with other parts of his work, as to have no appearance of belonging to a general scheme. The commentators, who find a hidden meaning in every author they annotate, have represented Rabelais as aiming at the highest objects, and seeking to effect the most extensive social and religious reforms. This I greatly doubt, at all events I have seen no proof of it; and I cannot help thinking that Rabelais owes a large share of his reputation to the obscurity of his language. On the other side of the question, and in favour of his comprehensiveness, see a bold passage in Coleridge's Lit. Remains, vol. i. pp. 138, 139.

36 The two first books in 1580; the third in 1588, with additions to the first two. See Niceron, Mém. pour servir à l'Hist. des Hommes illustres, vol. xvi. p. 210, Paris, The first impression of the Pantagruel of Rabelais has no date on the title

1731.

39

corresponds with the relation I have indicated between Jewel and Hooker, and between Hooker and Chillingworth. For, the law which governs all these relations, is the law of a progressive scepticism. What Rabelais was to the supporters of theology, that was Montaigne to the theology itself. The writings of Rabelais were only directed against the clergy; but the writings of Montaigne were directed against the system of which the clergy were the offspring. 38 Under the guise of a mere man of the world, expressing natural thoughts in common language, Montaigne concealed a spirit of lofty and audacious inquiry. Although he lacked that comprehensiveness which is the highest form of genius, he possessed other qualities essential to a great mind. He was very cautious, and yet he was very bold. He was cautious, since he would not believe strange things because they had been handed down by his forefathers; and he was bold, since he was undaunted by the reproaches with which the ignorant, who love to dogmatize, always cover those whose knowledge makes them ready to doubt. These peculiarities would, in any age, have made Montaigne a useful man: in the sixteenth century, they made him an important one. At the same time, his easy and amusing style," increased the circulation of his works,

page; but it is known that the third book was first printed in 1545, and the fourth book in 1546. See Brunet, Manuel du Libraire, vol. iv. pp. 4-6, Paris, 1843. The statement in Biog. Univ. vol. xxxvi. pp. 482, 483, is rather confused.

Mr. Hallam (Lit. of Europe, vol. ii. p. 29) says, that his scepticism "is not displayed in religion." But if we use the word 'religion' in its ordinary sense, as connected with dogma, it is evident, from Montaigne's language, that he was a sceptic, and an unflinching one too. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that all religious opinions are the result of custom: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du pais où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." Essais de Montaigne, p. 121, livre i. chap. xxx. As a natural consequence, he lays down that religious error is not criminal, p. 53; compare p. 28. See also how he notices the usurpations of the theological spirit, pp. 116, 508, 528. The fact seems to be, that Montaigne, while recognizing abstractedly the existence of religious truths, doubted our capacity for knowing them; that is to say, he doubted if, out of the immense number of religious opinions, there were any means of ascertaining which were accurate. His observations on miracles (pp. 541, 653, 654, 675) illustrate the character of his mind; and what he says on prophetic visions is quoted and confirmed by Pinel, in his profound work Aliénation Mentale, p. 256. Compare Maury, Légendes Pieuses, p. 268 note.

39 His friend, the celebrated De Thou, calls him "homme franc, ennemi de toute contrainte." Mémoires, in De Thou, Hist. Univ. vol. i. p. 59; see also vol. xi. p. 590. And M. Lamartine classes him with Montesquieu, as ces deux grands républicains

de la pensée française." Hist. des Girondins, vol. i. p. 174.

40 He says (Essais, p. 97), "Ce n'est pas à l'adventure sans raison que nous attribuons à simplesse et ignorance la facilité de croire et de se laisser persuader." Compare two striking passages, pp. 199 and 685. Nothing of this sort had ever appeared before in the French language.

"Dugald Stewart, whose turn of mind was very different from that of Montaigne, calls him "this most amusing author." Stewart's Philos. of the Mind, vol. i. p. 468. But Rousseau, in every respect a more competent judge, enthusiastically praises “la naïveté, la grâce et l'énergie de son style inimitable." Musset Pathay, Vie de Rous

and thus contributed to popularize those opinions which he ventured to recommend for general adoption.

This, then, is the first open declaration of that scepticism, which, towards the end of the sixteenth century, publicly appeared in France. 12 During nearly three generations, it continued its course with a constantly increasing activity, and developed itself in a manner similar to that which took place in England. It will not be necessary to follow all the steps of this great process; but I will endeavour to trace those which, by their prominence, seem to be the most important.

A few years after the appearance of the Essays of Montaigne, there was published in France a work, which, though now little read, possessed in the seventeenth century a reputation of the highest order. This was the celebrated Treatise on Wisdom, by Charron, in which we find, for the first time, an attempt made in a modern language to construct a system of morals without the aid of theology.43 What rendered this book, in some respects, even more formidable than Montaigne's, was the air of gravity with which it was written. Charron was evidently deeply impressed with the importance of the task he had undertaken, and he is honourably distinguished from his contemporaries, by a remarkable purity both of language and of sentiment. His work is almost the only one of that age in which nothing can be found to offend the chastest ears. Although he borrowed from Montaigne innumerable illustrations," he has carefully omitted those seau, vol. i. p. 185. Compare Lettres de Sévigné, vol. iii. p. 491, edit. Paris, 1843, and Lettres de Dudeffand à Walpole, vol. i. p. 94.

42"Mais celui qui a répandu et popularisé en France le scepticisme, c'est Montaigne." Cousin, Hist. de la Philos. II. série, vol. ii. pp. 288, 289. "Die erste Regung des skeptischen Geistes finden wir in den Versuchen des Michael von Montaigne." Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. vol. ix. p. 443. On the immense influence of Montaigne, compare Tennemann, vol. ix. p. 458; Monteil, Divers Etats, vol. v. pp. 263-265; Sorel, Bibliothèque Françoise, pp. 80-91; Le Long, Bibliothèque Historique, vol. iv. p. 527.

43

Compare the remarks on Charron in Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ix. p. 527, with two insidious passages in Charron, De la Sagesse, vol. i. pp. 4,

366.

"The obligations of Charron to Montaigne were very considerable, but are stated too strongly by many writers. Sorel, Bibliothèque Françoise, p. 93; and Hallam's Literature of Europe, vol. ii. pp. 362, 509. On the most important subjects, Charron was a bolder and deeper thinker than Montaigne; though he is now so little read, that the only tolerably complete account I have seen of his system is in Tennemann, Gesch. der Philosophie, vol. ix. pp. 458-487. Buble (Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 918-925) and Cousin (Hist. de la Philos. II. série, vol. ii. p. 289) are short and unsatisfactory. Even Dr. Parr, who was extensively read in this sort of literature, appears only to have known Charron through Bayle (see notes on the Spital Sermon, in Parr's Works, vol. ii. pp. 520, 521); while Dugald Stewart, with suspicious tautology, quotes, in three different places, the same pas sage from Charron. Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, vol. ii. p. 233, vol. iii. pp. 365, 393. Singularly enough, Talleyrand was a great admirer of De la Sagesse, and presented his favourite copy of it to Madame de Genlis! See her own account, in Mem. de Genlis, vol. iv. pp. 352, 353.

45

indecencies into which that otherwise charming writer was often betrayed. Besides this, there is about the work of Charron a systematic completeness which never fails to attract attention. In originality, he was, in some respects, inferior to Montaigne; but he had the advantage of coming after him, and there can be no doubt that he rose to an elevation which, to Montaigne, would have been inaccessible. Taking his stand, as it were, on the summit of knowledge, he boldly attempts to enumerate the elements of wisdom, and the conditions under which those elements will work. In the scheme which he thus constructs, he entirely omits theological dogmas ; and he treats with undissembled scorn many of those conclusions which the people had hitherto universally received. He reminds his countrymen that their religion is the accidental result of their birth and education, and that if they had been born in a Mohammedan country, they would have been as firm believers in Mohammedanism as they then were in Christianity. From this consideration, he insists on the absurdity of their troubling themselves about the variety of creeds, seeing that such variety is the result of circumstances over which they have no control. Also it is to be observed that each of these different religions declares itself to be the true one;" and all of them are equally based upon supernatural pretensions, such as mysteries, miracles, prophets, and the like. It is because men forget these things, that they are the slaves of that confidence which is the great obstacle to all real knowledge, and which can only be removed by taking such a large and comprehensive view, as will show us how all nations cling with equal zeal to the tenets in which they have been educated. And, says Charron, if we look a little deeper, we shall see that each of the great religions is built upon that which preceded it. Thus, the religion of the Jews is founded upon that of the Egyptians;

45 See his definition, or rather description, of wisdom, in Charron, De la Sagesse, vol. i. p. 295, vol. ii. pp. 113, 115.

46 De la Sagesse, vol. i. pp. 63, 351.

47 "Chacune se préfère aux autres, et se confie d'être la meilleure et plus vraie que les autres, et s'entre-reprochent aussi les unes aux autres quelque chose, et parlà s'entre-condamnent et rejettent." De la Sagesse, vol. i. p. 348; see also vol. i. pp. 144, 304, 305, 306, vol. ii. p. 116. Expressions almost identical are used by M. Charles Comte, Traité de Législation, vol. i. p. 233.

48"Toutes trouvent et fournissent miracles, prodiges, oracles, mystères sacrés, saints prophètes, fêtes, certains articles de foy et créance nécessaires au salut." De la Sagesse, vol. i. p. 346.

49 Hence he opposes proselytism, and takes up the philosophic ground, that religious opinions, being governed by undeviating laws, owe their variations to variations in their antecedents, and are always, if left to themselves, suited to the existing state of things: "Et de ces conclusions, nous apprendons à n'épouser rien, ne jurer à rien, n'admirer rien, ne se troubler de rien, mais quoi qu'il advienne, qu l'on crie, tempête, se resoudre à ce point, que c'est le cours du monde, c'est nature qui fait des siennes." De la Sagesse, vol. i. p. 311.