ART. II. ON SIMPLICITY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE

NEW TESTAMENT.

By J. A. H. Tittmann, Professor of Theology in the University of Leipsic. Translated from the Latin by the Editor.*

THAT the church of Christ is governed not by the will of man, but by the Spirit of God, we are admonished by the approach of the holy festival, on which we are to celebrate the remembrance of that Pentecost, when the apostles were first divinely imbued with this same Spirit; in accordance with the promise which our Lord had given them at his departure from the world. At that time, indeed, it was the case, as often happens to those who seek the hope of safety or the cause of fear in the external vicissitudes of things, that the full import of the high benefit which the apostles then received, was understood by very few. Nor was it entirely comprehended at a later period, when the church had become corrupted by the lust of power and the authority of mere human opinions. But in this our day, when we behold all things governed by an external power, and the laws of right reason haughtily contemned, it is very seldom that men raise their minds to the contemplation of the holy, pure, divine, internal, and eternal kingdom of God; but borne down under the sense of present evils, they either acquiesce through torpor in those things which they see and feel to be inevitable, or are compelled, however unwillingly, to yield to them the service of their whole lives.† There are also not a few, so forgetful of the promise of our Lord that he will bestow τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας upon his church, as to regard the church of Christ as little other than a human institution. But this opinion is refuted by the voice of time; for never has the Spirit of God wholly deserted the church, even in the periods

* See the Introductory Notice in No. I. p. 160. The present article appeared originally in 1811, as a Programm or invitation to the celebration of the festival of Pentecost or Whitsuntide. This circumstance will account for the manner in which the subject is introduced. The introduction, as well as the conclusion, is here retained as a specimen of this mode of writing.-ED.

+ There would seem to be in this sentence a general allusion to the political thraldom and despondent feeling of Germany, at the period when the article was written.-ED.

of her greatest danger; and never will the same Spirit cease to direct and govern her in future; but will preserve her, though surrounded with imminent perils, until the final consummation of all human things.

It is however the duty of all, especially in these our days, to watch and see how the influence and power of the divine Spirit may be preserved and augmented among Christians. It is incumbent particularly on those who have consecrated their lives to learning, to beware, lest through their fault this light of human life should be obscured or extinguished. This may happen, it is to be feared, chiefly through the neglect of those, by whose erudition and zeal the word of God, that instrument through which the Holy Spirit operates, ought to be daily more thoroughly understood and made to illuminate more and more strongly the life of man; that thus the Gospel may be preserved in its purity in the church forever. For if the Spirit of God operates through the power which is inherent in the word of God, it is obvious, that this divine gift can neither be preserved, nor the church remain secure, unless the sacred Scriptures correctly interpreted by men of real learning, are open and accessible to all Christians; so that they may draw from this pure fountain the precepts and principles that are necessary, in order to the right discharge of all their duties towards God and man.

This subject of the interpretation of the New Testament, however, although exceedingly ample, has yet been so often treated of by learned writers, that there seems scarcely a remaining topic, on which to make suggestions relative to the true method of interpretation. Inasmuch however as the most useful precepts can avail nothing, unless the interpreter possess that disposition and those qualities which enable him rightly to employ them; we therefore do not fear that we shall lose our labour, should we dwell for a few moments on some of those qualities of which an interpreter must not be destitute; and thus attempt either to excite the learned or instruct the ignorant. Other writers, and especially Ernesti, have spoken of the manner in which the judgment of the interpreter is to be exercised and formed. But in regard to the general qualities, character, and disposition of mind, which are required for the proper interpretation of the New Testament, there seems yet to be room for other remarks; especially on that simplicity which all recommend in interpreting the New Testament, but which very few understand, and to which still fewer have attained. This topic, therefore, we will now briefly discuss.

It will first be necessary to define and determine in what simplicity in the interpretation of the New Testament consists. It differs from that facility, which when conjoined with simplicity, Ernesti does not hesitate to call the chief excellence of an interpreter.* .* This facility, which requires an interpretation to be such as to present itself spontaneously to the mind, has indeed thus much in common with simplicity, viz. that the interpretation must not be sought with art and subtilty, but must as it were voluntarily offer itself to the mind. It is however possible, that an interpretation which is difficult to be made out, may at the same time be extremely simple; while others, less simple, may put on the appearance of facility. Indeed an interpretation in itself simple, often requires great skill and study in order to arrive at it. The facility of an interpretation moreover consists not only in the circumstance, that it may seem to be found without labour; but also therein, that it presents a facile sense, i. e. a sense which connects itself easily with the views, object, and character of the writer. In this view also simplicity is connected with facility; and both are opposed to every thing that is subtile and forced. Indeed the term simple implies that which is perfect and consistent in all its parts; just as we speak of simplicity of character in a person, in whom the different virtues are exhibited in completeness and harmony. The Greeks, who were much more exact in marking the distinctions of ideas than the Romans, appear to have designated that quality of simplicity which thus consists in completeness, by the term τὸ ὁλοκληρές, and the other by τὸ ἀφελές, evenness, and metaphorically, that which gives no occasion for censure. And simplicity may properly be called agénea, in so far as there is nothing plain and certain, which does not accord with that from which it arose or to which it is to be referred, i. e. with its source or with its object; just as we call men uncertain and insincere, whose words and actions do not correspond with their views and purposes, but are often inconsistent one with another, and repugnant to those very things on account of which they appear to have been spoken and done.

But since nothing is or can be entire and consistent in all its parts, which comes from any improper source; it follows that

* Institut. Interp. N. T. P. II. c. I. § 22. ed. Ammon. [Omitted in the English Translation.]

+ See the next following article.

simplicity is to be sought in the circumstance, that every thing springs from the source from which it ought to be derived, while nothing is engrafted as it were from any other quarter, which is not in itself inherent in the nature of the person or thing in question. A necessary adjunct also is, and this is a principal mark of simplicity, that nothing be found present, except what could not possibly be absent. Art and subtilty, on the other hand, are easily detected, when any thing is introduced, the necessity of which is not apparent. It is thus that simplicity is so pleasing in the fine arts; when we see each and every part essential to the completeness of the whole, and find nothing which is superfluous, or that could be spared. So also we applaud the simple elegance of a poem or other work, when it exhibits nothing which does not seem to belong to it. In the same manner, then, must we form a judgment respecting the simplicity of an interpretation. For that interpretation only can be called simple, which gives to the words of a writer such a sense as seems to be the necessary one; so that when this sense is presented to us, we are immediately conscious, that the author could not have meant any thing else.

It will perhaps be said, that such an interpretation is to be called necessary rather than simple. Indeed the simplicity lies in the very circumstance, that nothing extraneous is intermixed, but all is necessarily consistent and accordant with the nature of the thing itself; and therefore just as we term the words of a person simple, when they are the necessary signs of that which he has in his mind, so also may we properly call that a simple interpretation, which derives from the words of a writer that sense which appears to be the necessary one.

This necessity, however, requires some further illustration. When we say that simplicity of interpretation is manifested in the circumstance, that it proposes no other sense than what seems to be the necessary one, it may be thought that our definition is more obscure than the thing itself which is to be explained; inasmuch as this necessity would seem to be something ambiguous and uncertain in all writings, and especially in the New Testament. The whole subject is indeed much embarrassed, and requires very great caution, as we shall afterwards see; but still it may be easily disentangled and developed in a twofold method; of which those who either do not know, or do not well weigh the nature and importance of the duties of a grammarian, appear not to be at all aware.

In the first place, if words be the signs of ideas, and that not arbitrarily, but have become fixed through the usus loquendi and by a sort of necessity, it is obvious that we can have no doubt in regard to that which is necessarily signified, or that of which the necessary signs are exhibited to us; provided we are acquainted with the usus loquendi, (the extent and influence of which is much greater than is usually apprehended,) and with that necessity which, inasmuch as it depends on and consists in reason, the inventress of all languages, may be properly termed the logical necessity. There are however not a few interpreters, who after having read a few books, and got by rote the common rules of the grammarians, and turned over the lexicons, which in this respect are for the most part miserably written, suppose themselves to have imbibed treasures of philological learning; and being accustomed without consideration to regard all languages, both ancient and modern and especially the former, as the result of chance, they pay of course no regard to that necessity which lies in the essential and universal laws of language, such as every where necessarily regulate the manner of expressing ideas by words. Such persons therefore pronounce that to be the simplest interpretation, which is most easily confirmed by the meagre authority of the lexicons. To us however those persons, above all others, seem to be ignorant of the true character of language, who are accustomed to refer every thing, of which they cannot explain the cause, to the mere will or custom of the people among whom this or that language was vernacular. And although we can scarcely hope, ever to be able to perceive fully the logical grounds and causes of all languages; still we ought to make it the object of zealous and unremitted exertion, that these causes, so far as they are necessary and essential, and have sprung up not by accident, but from the laws of human reason itself, should be detected and developed.

In the second place, it is an instinctive quality of the human mind, always to employ the means nearest at hand, and to seek for nothing at a greater distance than is necessary. This indeed is the surest mark of simplicity and integrity even of personal character. We are naturally impelled, not to art, but to seek and to communicate the truth by the shortest and simplest means possible; and the use of art may be said to arise rather from some obliquity of life or perverseness of mind. Hence, inasmuch as the same law prevails in the use of lan