2: 18. comp. Jer. 31: 15. (Gen. 37: 35.)-Matt. 2: 23. comp. Gen. 49:26. (Is. 11:1. comp. Jer. 23: 5. 33:15.)-Matt. 12: 39 f. 16: 4. (John 2: 18 ff.) comp. Jonah 2: 1; and so a multitude of other passages. Such appearances, the like of which are found in the writings of every nation, cannot surely justify the assumption of a double or manifold sense, intended by the Holy Spirit at the moment of inspiration. - (B) The allegorical interpretation, which grounds itself on such an assumption, is further not to be admitted, because there are no clear and certain laws by which it must be practised. The Holy Scriptures must, in this manner, become a prey to the subjective caprice of interpreters, who, being as they suppose at a higher stage of attainment, do not hold themselves bound to render any other account for their often fanciful and ingenious interpretations, than to admonish their opposers, that they must make farther advances in the divine life, until they become able to look into the deeper sense and connexion of the revealed word. And since such admonitions may be expressed in words which have a very good sense, and one which all would approve, viz. that he, to whom the inner, deeper, holy life of the men of God is unknown, is also of course incapable of rightly understanding their language and writings; it is therefore very difficult effectually to come at those, who favour this mode of proceeding. (7) This method moreover is entirely superfluous; which alone is reason enough against it. It can give throughout no new and tenable results, which the grammatico-historical method, when exercised in a pious spirit, does not give. For since the Scriptures themselves authorize us to hold the Christian revelation as closed, (Gal. 1: 8 f. Rom. 16: 17. 1 Tim. 6: 3 ff. 2 Tim. 1: 13 f. and elsewhere,) the apprehension must ever remain, that everything professedly new, which an allegorical interpretation may derive from the Scriptures, and which is not clearly contained in the words and in the connexion,-and consequently known or knowable by grammatico-historical exposition,-must be merely human imagination, be it ever so well meant. And this just apprehension should restrain every judicious evangelical Christian and theologian, from adopting any such results as doctrines of divine revelation; Rom. 16: 17. Col. 2: 18. 1 Tim. 6: 4 ff. comp. 2 Thess. 2: 2. ART. IV. REMARKS ON HAHN'S DEFINITION OF INTERPRETATION, AND SOME TOPICS CONNECTED WITH IT. By M. Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover. It would be difficult, within the same space, to express in a plainer and better manner than Prof. Hahn has done, the correct, and only correct idea of genuine interpretation.* To interpret an author must mean, to give that sense to his words which he himself gave. To connect those ideas with an author's language which he himself connected, is the first step toward a real interpretation of him; the second is, to express the result of this in language that is intelligible to others. Whoever does both of these, may be considered as a true and adequate interpreter. Whoever does either of them in a defective manner, has come short of the real design of all genuine interpretation. From this simple and intelligible statement it follows, that all accommodation of the Scriptures to our own preconceived notions of truth and propriety, unless indeed these entirely agree with those of the sacred writers, is foreign to the business of true interpretation. This concerns itself exclusively and solely with the sentiment of the writer to be interpreted. All the principles of language and criticism which it applies to exegesis, are only means which common sense has pointed out, as necessary and proper to be used in the explanation of any written or spoken language. Mankind have universally been interpreters, to a great extent, ever since our first progenitors commenced the use of language in paradise. All men interpret, every day, what is addressed to them by their fellow men. The laws of interpretation are a consequence of the practical, exegetical instinct (I had almost said) of the human race. I mean, that the interpretation of language is as natural to man, as the use of it is; and that this is natural, is sufficiently proved by a possession of the faculty of speaking and by the universality of its use. The laws of interpretation are neither more nor less, as to all their substantial and most important parts, than the practical principles by which men have always been guided, in interpreting each other's language. Language was not formed by the rules of grammarians and critics; but grammarians and critics, by study and observation, obtained a correct view of the phenomena of language, and then delineated this view in writing. It was thus that grammars and lexicons originated. And it is in the like * See p. 124 above. manner, that systems of hermeneutics, or systems in which the principles of interpretation are developed, have arisen. Men interpreted for thousands of years, before they began to form systems and written rules, in order to aid in the business of interpretation. When this was done, it was done by first observing the phenomena of interpretation, the facts that respected the manner in which men were accustomed to interpret language. These facts being ascertained, the principles on which they were grounded, or from which they resulted, were made out by consideration and reasoning, and then presented in words. Repeated experience and long continued observation corrected, enlarged, amended, and reduced to more perfect order these rules; so that at last, like regular systems of science in other departments of learning, hermeneutics claim a place among the sciences of the learned. The whole thing may be illustrated by an appeal to natural philosophy. The philosopher did not create or arrange or modify the laws of nature; nor was the world created, nor is it sustained, by any system of philosophy; but philosophers by observing phenomena, have deduced from them certain laws or principles which accord with these phenomena, and help us to comprehend and explain them. In this way, the systems of natural philosophy arose, which have at last come to a scientific form that is almost complete in its essential parts. It is so with the science of interpretation. It is, indeed, comparatively a new science, (not a new practical thing,) and is yet far from being perfected in all its minuter parts. Every ten years, however, is making some sensible progress towards a completion of the science, so far as its theory can be reduced to writing; and the hope may be rationally indulged, that at some future day, hermeneutics will be a science as definite and as well bounded and discriminated, as most other sciences which have long been taught as completed. The design of these remarks is, to shew that the science of interpretation is not one which has its basis in imagination, or that it depends, as to its most important principles, on farfetched illustrations or recondite and obscure facts. The great excellence and certainty of this science is, that it is grounded in the experience of all nations and of all ages. In other words, it follows the laws which our very nature has prescribed, in the explanation of language; it does not make new ones. If now principles such as nature prescribes, be regarded in the interpretation of the sacred writers; if our sole aim be, (as surely it ought to be,) to find out and to develope the very same meaning which the writers themselves attached to their own words, and we endeavour to do this in the natural way already described; then we may act as bona fide interpreters. But this we cannot do, if we interpret in any other manner. If I bring along with me my philosophical creed, or my party theological creed, or my rationalist creed, or my convictions as an enthusiast, and in the explanation of Scripture permit either of these to influence or guide me, instead of the plain principles of exegesis which nature has taught all men in regard to the interpretation of language; then I do not make an explication of the sacred text, but an implication, (non explicatio sed implicatio,) i. e. I do not unfold to others what the sacred writers meant to say, and have actually said, but what I believed before I undertook to interpret them; I do not deduce from their words the sense which the writers gave to them; but I superinduce a sense which these writers never designed to convey. This is not to bring a sense out of the words of Scripture, i. e. it is not explication, but it is to bring IN one upon it, or to add one to it, which is implication, in the Latin sense of this word. On this subject Prof. Hahn himself has made remarks, in the course of his essay. I would call the attention of the reader, therefore, to some other important considerations, which connect themselves with the definition that this excellent writer has so truly given, of the sense of a writing and of the interpretation of it. It would seem to be a necessary deduction from his definition, that the Scripture can never mean any more than what the writer of it meant to convey; that is, the words of Scripture convey the idea which the writer attached to them, and neither more nor less. If you deny this, you set aside the definition itself of the meaning of any writing. But as this definition is, one might almost say, self-evident; or at least, if it be questioned, a better one surely cannot be substituted in its place; so I must abide by it, and take the consequences which necessarily flow from it. And what are these? One is, that the writer must have had some meaning in all that he uttered, i. e. he did not utter sounds without attaching ideas to them. Another is, that in interpreting his words, we must have reference simply to the times in which he lived and the views which he entertained, and not de duce our explanation from the present times, and the more perfect knowledge which may now exist. I. The sacred writers attached some ideas to every word and phrase which they employed. What are words? They are the signs of ideas. But of whose ideas? Surely of his who employs the words. If then words are the signs of ideas, and every word must be the sign of some idea in the mind of him who employs it, (I speak now, of course, of the rational, intelligent, sober use of language, and such must be that of the sacred writers,) then every word employed by a sacred writer, is the sign of some idea that was in his mind when he employed it, and is meant to designate that idea. There is no avoiding this conclusion, except in one way only, viz. by denying that the sacred writers were themselves authors, in the usual sense of that word, or that they always understood, i. e. attached an intelligible idea to what they uttered. If we consider them as mere instruments in the hands of the Spirit of God, as a musical instrument is in the hands of him who plays upon it, and that they responded to the impulses of the Spirit in like manner as the musical instrument does to him who strikes its strings, then indeed it will not follow, that the sacred writers did attach ideas to all the words which they uttered. But shall we so consider them? I am aware that this has often, perhaps I may say generally, been done. Nay, the advocates of this opinion may say, that they are pleading only for a most ancient tradition or belief; that even before the days of the apostles such an opinion was current among the Jews; that the apostles themselves have helped to confirm it; and that the early fathers, who received opinions from them, have in like manner taught it. In all this there is some show of truth; and in fact some part of the allegations is strictly true. It is a clear case, that Philo Judaeus, for example, previous to the days in which the apostles wrote, fully declared a belief like that which has just been stated. "The prophets," says he, "are the interpreters [of God whom he uses as instruments in disclosing what he pleases," "Opp. I. p. 222 edit. Mangey. And again: "A prophet utters nothing at all of his own, but is an interpreter, merely uttering what another suggests; and so long as he is under the influence of inspiration, he has no proper consciousness of his own, for the power of thought departs and quits the |