only all morning-which we did-but even to put him on in the afternoon, because of his vast background.

It should be made absolutely clear that the grading system has very little to do with minimum safety standards. Confusion in tire marking is certainly an irritable and undesirable condition, but it does not involve the safety feature.

One of the reasons why it was thought advisable that some time be spent on this matter was because, in developing a tire grading system, we will be taking a very significant step. I believe this is the first time a manufactured product has been subjected to Government grading; and that fact poses some other questions pertinent to the whole field of grading of manufactured products.

That is another reason why there may be a little more to do than consider merely the problem of tire safety. When we get into the question how we are going to grade, what guidelines or precedents we are going to set on the question of the Government's subjecting a manufactured product to grading, there are many considerations involved. I think that should be made clear.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. Mr. RIBICOFF. I think that the Senator from Wisconsin-I do not wish to speak for him, but I know I feel that grading is very important, because I think the exhaustive research done by the Senator from Wisconsin-and I have read his speeches with great care-makes the point that today the average consumer and buyer has not the slightest idea what he is paying for. Tires come with all types of fancy names.

There is absolutely no way to know the value you are getting for your money; and while the chairman is absolutely correct, that the grading has nothing to do with minimum safety standards, yet from the consumer's standpoint, I think he should be aware of what type of tire he is getting, and whether he is paying a proper price for it. Grading is important, Mr. MAGNUSON. Oh, il important.

very

Mr. RIBICOFF. I would hope when the Secretary has the time, that he will take this into account and come up with a serious study and a set of feasible standards, so that the consuming public may know what they are buying and what they are paying for.

Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. President. I agree with both Senators. I do not own an automobile, and I do not purchase tires; but since we have gotten into the matter. I have taken a look at some tires. I cannot tell what the descriptions mean to distinguish one from another; and I suppose the average member of the public is in the same situation.

I do think grading is important; but as I have pointed out, we are embarking on a new field, the entire question of the Government imposing standards on manufactured products. We wish to be practical, and to be sure that we are taking the right steps.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the part of the report, on page 6, under the

heading of "Quality grading." which sets forth what we are trying to do.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

QUALITY GRADING

The committee knows of no consumer commodity more sharply characterized by confused and misleading nomenclature than the tire. Though no uniform grading system presently exists, the great majority of the private label marketers and domestic manufacturers market tires on the basis of an ap parent grading system. Thus premium. "first line," "second line," and "100 level." imply that an objective grading system exists. Yet these designations today have no uniforin fixed meaning or definitive value. One marketer's "premium" is the interior of another's "third line" tire-and a single manufacturer may market a tire under its own brand name as a "3d level" tire while his private label customer markets the same tire as a "rst line" tire.

Tires are unlike many consumer items which are bought, rapidly consumed, and bought again. The tire consumer has little opportunity to sample and test for himself the quality of each of the multitude of brands maketed. Fortunately, he need not buy a new het of tires every week.

But while the manufacturers and marketers establish some individual grading syntem for their own lines, tire manufacturers insist that the uniform quality grading of tires is "impractical."

Because the committee lacks the technical capacity to proclaim whether a quality grading system for tires is indeed "practical," we would direct the Secretary of Commerce, under the bill, to determine the feasibility of such a grading system, and 11 such a system is indeed feasible, to determine how such system can best be implemented. As the Department of Commerce develops expertise in the held of tire grading, the committee feels that it should work closely with both the Federal Trade Commission and industry in efforts to eliminate current deception and confusion in tire nomenclature and marketing practices.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Wisconsin to the committee amendment. The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the Senate is considering today a historic piece of legislation which will, for the first time, establish meaningful standards for automobile tires which will help to safeguard the American public and reduce the terrible toll of death on our high

ways.

On this occasion, it is appropriate to review the background of this legislation. We should review the grave public safety problem which brought it about, and what this legislation will do to meet this problem.

THE TIRF SCANDAL

I think that history will record 1965 and 1966 as the years when the American public discovered a scandal in automobile tires,

Last year, we killed 49.000 people on our highways. We inflicted disabling injuries on 1.800.000 people-enough to fill almost every hospital bed in America and we inflicted nondisabling injuries on another 1,800,000. The dollar cost of automobile accidents last year has been estimated at $8 billion.

These facts have been cited by others on many occasions-so often in fact that

the American public sometimes seems immune to them. To put them in perspective, let me point out by comparison that we killed 253 people on scheduled airlines during 1965. And the total of American deaths in the war in Vietnam presently stands at about 2.000. It seems probable that ever the next 5 years we will kill on the highways of this country as many people as we lost to enemy acJn tion in all 4 years in World War II the next decade, we can expect to kill more than 500,000 people and injure about 40 million.

Among young people from 1 to 21 years of age, motor vehicle accidents are now the No. 1 cause of death. More than one-third of our highway fatalities are youngsters in this age group.

These death and injury figures are so staggering that we must move against them with every weapon at our disposal. The causes of automobile deaths are complex. We must take action at every level of government if we are roing to make any meaningful effort to reduce them.

In the past 2 years, it has become crystal clear that automobile tire failure is responsible for a significant number of these highway deaths. No one can say exactly how many deaths are caused by tire failure, and no serious student of our highway safety problem would ever imply that tire legislation alone will solve the entire problem.

Nevertheless, since I first raised this issue. I have been swamped with letters from motorists all over the country telling the most appalling stories of automobile tire failures which led to accidents, injuries, and deaths.

Here in the Senate today, we will act on a significant piece of legislation which should be just one part of an aroused Nation's effort to meet the scandal of highway slaughter.

THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

I introduced the first tire safety legislation in May of 1964, in response to an alarm sounded by some of my own constituents who had had disastrous experiences involving tire failure. This was a modest proposal to have the Government draw up tire safety standards but involving no enforcement or compliance requirements whatever.

That proposal and the efforts of many others helped to touch off a nationwide discussion of the tire safety problem.

One of the most significant developments which followed was a series of hearings conducted by the Federal Trade Commission in January of 1965. Here for the first time, the shocking facts on automobile tires were told to the American people by the top ofcials of the American tire industry. They admitted under questioning:

First. That many new automobiles are being sold with tires which are not designed to carry the normal load for which the automobile was designed.

Second. That size labels on tires-the only basis a motorist has for determining load capacity-were never meant to indicate the precise size. An 8.00 by 14 tire. which official tables indicate should carry an 1. 1.180-pound load, may actually be smaller than a 7.50 by 14 tire, which is supposed to carry only 1,090 pounds.

Third. That quality labels on tires. such as deluxe, premium, and first-line, have no meaning whatever and "there is no way to tell one tire grade from another."

Fourth. That the ply or ply-rating Jabels on tires-which are crucia! in determining strength-have "no understandable meaning any more." in the view of one tire industry spokesman.

The FTC Commissioners were AS shocked as I at these revelations. The FTC Chairman, Paul Rand Dixon, after hearing this testimony, commented that "anyone in his right mind" buying a new car would ask the dealer to install larger and safer tires than are normally supplied.

THE AUTOMAKERS REPLY

It seemed unbelievable to me, despite this impressive testimony, that the automobile industry would countenance a scandal as grave as this. For that reason, I wrote to the presidents of the four major automobile manufacturing firms to ask them directly whether the tires supplied with their new cars were adequate to carry the loads for which the cars were designed.

To my astonishment, not a single automobile manufacturer replied with an unqualified "Yes."

American Motors replied that its cars could safely carry a full load, provided the tires were specially inflated. If this was done, American Motors said its cars were "adequate for occasional full-load service."

General Motors stated that the design guide in selecting tires was three passengers, but that its secans could safely carry six passengers plus 200 pounds of luggage, provided the tires were specially inflated.

Chrysler said simply that its tires were adequate provided they are properly maintained." But it uses similar tires and its cars have similar weights so apparently the same principles apply.

The Ford Motor Co. said that it has been customary to make tire selections on the basis of a three-passenger load. But Ford said its sedans could carry six passengers plus luggage if the tires were specially inflated.

The complicated rules for tire inflation, the automobile manufacturers said, could be found somewhere in the manual supplied with each new car. They expect that each motorist will know the weight of his car, its occupants, and also its accessories, equipment and luggage to within a few hundred pounds, and that he will carefully inflate his tires so that they will be able to carry full normal loads.

I ask you to remember this injunction to the motorist-this responsibility for determining a tire's maximum tire-carrying capacity-in the light of expert testimony which I will ce later.

The May 1965 issue of Consumer Bulletin magazine, on the basis of apparently reliable statistics, stated that:

The full-size Ford, Chevrolet, and Plymouth "have overloaded tires, and we suggest that the consumer order his car with tires of the next larger size."

PERSONAL CASE HISTORIES

These disclosures of brandnew cars with overloaded tires seemed to explain

Mrs. Williams wrote.

While traveling through Arizona, out in the middle of nowhere, we blew two tires at one time.

These are random samples of several hundred letters I have received.

To me, this firsthand testimony, combined with the admissions of the tire industry officials before the FTC and the automobile manufacturers in their lctters to me, proved the existence of an extremely grave tire safety problem.

I stated at the time, it was obvious that thousands of American families were buying new cars in the belief that they were adequate for the use for which they were designed, filling them up with children and luggage, and setting out across our highways, often at high speed, unaware that they were driving on overloaded tires which could fail at any time.

NEW "BOMBSHELL” TESTIMONY

However, it was not until a lengthy court trial late last year in San Francisco, Calif., that we received the really conclusive testimony on the American tire scandal.

I want to point out that although a Judgment for $207,375 was entered in this case against one of our major tire manufacturers, the B. F. Goodrich Co., the case has not yet been concluded. Goodrich plans to appeal. I do not wish in any way to prejudge the specific questions which were at issue in this case. I make no determination as to any negligence or liability among the various parties involved. Regardless of whether this case is ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, the sworn testimony provided by top officials of the tire and automobile industries should shock the Nation.

This testimony should prove once and for all why tires are falling on some of

our finest new cars and causing tragic injuries and death.

This case involves a 1961 six-passenger Chevrolet station wagon which was carrying six women. It was equipped with 8.00 by 14 Goodrich Silvertown four-ply rayon first-line tires-the model tire which was regularly supplied with such cars by General Motors and also the tire recommended for replacement purposes by Goodrich. The accident which led to this damage suit was caused when the inner sidewall of one of these tires blew out. The car veered across the highway and overturned. Two of the women were killed and four were inJured. The owner of the car, whose wife was one of those killed, sued Goodrich.

The defense produced as its expert witness the western region service manager for the company, Harold J. Poole of Los Angeles. He was identified as a man with long experience with the company and an acknowledged authority.

This company expert made a detailed investigation of the accident and of the tire which failed.

He testified that this fatal blowout was not caused by any defect in the tire nor by any specific instance of abuse which it suffered. He said that the tire failed because it was driven in an overloaded condition, "either not enough air pressure or too much load on the tire, and either one will give you exactly the same appearance condition."

This tire company witness, and others who followed him onto the stand, testified in detail exactly why tires fall from overloading or underinflation.

SIDEWALL FLEXING BLAMED

The sidewalls of an overloaded tire bulge and undergo much more flexing – than in a normally loaded tire. If this condition continues for some time, the tire can be permanently damaged.

Picking up the testimony at that point, let me quote this tire industry expert:

If the tire is overloaded or underinflated, it can receive a blow in the sidewall which will start-maybe it won't break through at that point-but it will start a weakening of the curds. The cords will weaken and they will travel around the tire, either in this area (pointing to one section of the tire) or this area up here. When you see this (pointing to the tire) it may have started from a slight impact but it will always indicate that the tire was operated overloaded or underinflated.

The failure of the tire can result from a flexing in the sidewall or shoulder area, which is due to overload or underinflation.

The blow might not necessarily rupture the cords, but it will weaken the cords, and the continued flexing will cause the tire to fall. And it will show this flex break which la either in the shoulder or in the sidewall.

Referring to the specific blowout which caused this accident, this tire industry expert testified:

I assume that the blow occurred when the tire was overloaded or underinflated, or occurred after the tire had bee:: overloaded or underinflated, and the blow itself weakened the sidewall of the tire which was probably flexing abnormally due to the overload or underinflation. This probably broke through several cords and that is what started the flex break. This was probably

a very light blow that the tire probably

should have been able to withstand if it weren't for the overload and underinflation which probably weakened the cords.

Now,

even if the injury wasn't there, I believe that the tire would still have failed from the overload and underinflation condition.

RUPTURE WOULD BE EXPECTED

This tire industry witness was examined and cross-examined at length. He testified repeatedly that the tires on this car apparently had not been abused, except for overloading, and that he would normally expect the tires on this car to have lasted for another 14,000 miles or so if they had not been overloaded. This witness was asked:

Question. You would expect a tire that is overloaded to fall by a rupture?

Answer. Yes, sir.

He answeredYes, sir.

Question. And you would expect such a tire to fail before its tread would wear out? Answer. I would expect it probably would. Now, the tire might deliver full service but there would be an expectancy that it would fall before the complete trend was gone.

you Question. In other words, by "fall," mean there would be a rupture of the kind that you see here or some such thing? Answer. Yes.

Question. Are you trying to tell us. that every one of your tires that would be run overloaded would be expected to rupture? Answer. There would be an expectancy. Yes, sir.

Question. Every one would be expected to rupture before you would wear out the initial tread on it?

Answer. There would be an expectancy.

The witness stated that

some tires are built well enough that they make it, but there is always an expectancy of failure.

CAR WEIGHT REVEALED

was

Having testified that he would expect a tire to rupture if driven more than 25 percent overloaded, the witness handed engineering specifications supplied by the manufacturer of the make of He was car involved in this lawsuit. shown that a nine-passenger station wagon of this make of car had a weight of 3,430 pounds on its rear wheels when loaded with six persons weighing 150 pounds.

Question. That would mean that each of the wheels would carry half of that weight? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Or 1,715 pounds?
Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Now, you have testified that the maximum carrying capacity of each of your tires of this particular model is 1,175 pounds. Is that correct?

To me, this testimony came as a bombshell. Here we have the sworn testimony of a tire expert selected by the tire manufacturer, testifying that the tires which his company supplies and with which one of our leading automobile manufacturers equips one of their most popular cars, would be "expected to rupture" if the car were driven with a normal full load.

ness.

This sensational testimony was no isolated incident in this trial. Similar testimony was given by an independent tire expert, also called as a defense witThis was Arthur W. Bull of Clearwater, Fla., who served for 33 years as a top tire engineer for the U.S. Rubber Co. and who was once president of the Tire and Rim Association, the industry's principal source of data on tire loads.

This independent tire expert also examined the tire involved in this fatal accident. His conclusion was that it had been "very carefully driven," but that "it was probably run at more than its 6918 rated load for some periods of time." He concluded that the tire probably had struck a chuckhole while overloaded and had then ruptured about 1,000 miles later because of a fabric separation. He testified that when overloaded tires strike objects such as chuckholes, the rubber on the sidewall tends to become separated from the tire cords and some of This allows the cords tend to break. air to work its way through the sidewall, sometimes raising a bubble on the sidewall. He testifled in vivid language:

I believe this went over some kind of obstacle to produce an extra deflection at this point which started the initial separation. It started the ply separating and when it did that, you began to get a rubbing and heat generation in this area and that progresses rapidly ns that heat builds up the cords become weaker and this whole thing is working as a sandwich, and gets hotter and hotter, and finally these cords can no longer stand that stressing and that tempernture and they break, and the air gets out. forms a bubble on here, and only a few minutes later the bubble gets far enough to rub, and it bursts, and the tire starts losing air at a fairly fast pace.

This independent tire expert was asked for his estimate on just how much overloading tires could stand before they would suffer this bursting process.

For 65-mile-an-hour driving, he said: I think 30 percent overlond would begin to get you in difculties.

This witness was then shown engineering specifications which indicated that

Vol. I

the six-passenger station wagon involved in the accident had an official loaded weight of 2,815 pounds on the rear wheels or 1,407 pounds per wheel compared with a load rating for the tires of 1,175 pounds. The manufacturer's loaded weight figure assumes six passengers weighing 150 pounds each.

The plaintiff's attorney pointed out that one of the women in the car weighed 175 pounds.

Question. If the other ladies were of average size, this vehicle would be substantially overloaded, would it not?

Answer. The rear tires would be overloaded. Question. Would you say that putting out tires that were going to be subjected to an overload of this kind would create a dangerous situation?

Answer. It would create a probability of early failure or unsatisfactory performance.

WHAT IS THE LOAD RATING?

Here again, we have the shocking testimony of the tire industry's own experts: Expert No. 1 testifying that tires on fully loaded popular cars would be "expected to rupture" and expert No. 2 testifying that "there would be a probability of early failure."

The tire manufacturer, confronted with this testimony from its own witnesses, made the claim that the 1,175pound-load figure, which came froin the Tire & Rim Association yearbook, was not, in fact, a maximum load rating.

The tire manufacturer contended that this 1,175-pound-load rating applied only if the tire was inflated to 24 pounds pressure, and that the tire could carry greater loads if inflated to higher pressures. The plaintiff's attorney, however, read from the official Tire & Rim Association manual a statement which said that the carrying capacity of a tire could not be increased beyond the stated figure by increasing the air pressure. That drew this response from expert No. 3, Lawrence W. Keltner the senior engineer of the tire company and a 39-year veteran with the firm:

That is what the Tire & Rim book says ... but that is not a fact.

A fourth witness for the defense, Robert L. Collins, of Birmingham, Mich., the chassis design engineer for General Motors, testified that the Tire & Rim Association manual was "advisory only" and that any use by a nonmember of the association is "entirely within the control and direction of the user and is wholly voluntary."

This caused the judge to comment: They get out from legal liability then, don't they?

The witness answered:
Yes, your honor.

After reviewing this testimony, I am more convinced than ever that we need some new labels in the tire industry. It would seem that the tires on some of our most popular cars should be labeled "expected to rupture."

And perhaps the official handbook of the tire industry, the Tire & Rim Assoclation manual, should be labeled "Not a Fact," or "Use at Your Own Risk."

OVERLOAD IS DEFINED

Inasmuch as these tire experts have testified that they would expect over

loaded tires to rupture, it becomes important to determine just what constitues "overload." We will recall that the automakers expect each individual motorist to do this-to know exactly what load his tires will carry, for if they fail, it is he or his family who may be killed or injured.

Yet how is he to determine maximum safe tire loads when the top experts in the automobile and tire industries say that they are unable to do so?

In the San Francisco trial, expert No. 3, the senior engineer for the tire manufacturer, testified:

Overload is defined as "any load that is imposed on the tire that is greater than the recommended load for the given inflation pressure as set forth in the Tire and Rim Association recommended load tables."

So this expert tire engineer tells us that overload is anything over the Tire and Rim Association recommended load tables.

Yet the Ford Motor Co. stated in a letter to me:

The Tire and Rim Association yearbook load inflation tables have never indicated maxlinuin capacity.

This position has been reiterated again and again-before the FTC, before the Senate Commerce Committee, in letters to me from the automakers, and in the San Francisco trial. When pushed to the wall, all segments of the industry repudiate the only source of tire load figurcs which have been available to the public.

HOW TIRES ARE SELECTED

In addition to its sensational disclosures as to why tires fail even on new cars, the San Francisco trial provided a wealth of information as to how tires are selected by the automobile manufacturers.

One might think that the procedure would be something like this:

The automobile manufacturer would design a vehicle to meet certain use requirements. It would then submit full engineering facts on that vehicle to tire manufacturers who would supply the tire best suited to meet the power, speed, and load requirements of the vehicle.

Actually the procedure which is followed is nothing like that. The testimony indicates that no serious consideration is given to engineering data or weight and load figures either by the automobile manufacturer or by the firm which supplies the tires.

As expert No. 3-Mr. Keltner-testified in the San Francisco trial:

We All the orders for the tires that are ordered. As far as what vehicle they are put on, that is entirely the determination of the automobile manufacturer.

He testified that the tires for the make and model of car involved in this accident were supplied to Chevrolet by Goodrich without any knowledge as to the weight of the car on which they were to be installed.

Expert No. 2, the former president of the Tire and Rim Association and a 33-year veteran from U.S. Rubber, told of the difficulties the tire makers face in getting the automobile makers to use proper tires. He testified: