1 Opinion of the Court articles in calculating the rate increases under Amendments 2 and 3 to Quotation No. 64-B. The defendant makes three claims in support of its argument: in 1941 the carriers offered the manufactured iron and steel rate on the shipment of aircraft landing material which moved over rather short, domestic lines from New Jersey to North Carolina; the transcontinental export rates of the 64series were based on the rates appearing in a tariff applicable to manufactured iron and steel articles; and historically the rates offered on iron and steel landing mats were the same as those applicable to manufactured iron and steel articles. On the validity of these claims depends the applicability of the maximum rate increase for which defendant contends. We think, notwithstanding the historical background, that the Quotation No. 64-B rates applicable to westbound transcontinental traffic (Item 2(b)) reflect an offer of rates to the Government under Section 22, part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 22 (1958)), on a specific article of commerce in certain clearly defined circumstances. In addition, the quotation offered the existing manufactured iron and steel rates on shipments of the same article which were not in transcontinental traffic (Item 2(a)). Irrespective of what was the source of the rates offered for transcontinental shipment of the landing mats, they were clearly special rates for a specific service as distinguished from the standard domestic commodity rates appearing in published tariffs. The defendant is incorrect in reasoning that because the railroads moved a small domestic, local shipment of landing mats at iron and steel rates in 1941 and in 1943 revealed that they had been authorized to offer the Government iron and steel rates without specifying if the rates applied to transcontinental traffic, the railroads thereafter bound themselves to treat landing mat shipments for all purposes as shipments of manufactured iron and steel. It must have been apparent to the defendant when it acknowledged and accepted the Quotation No. 64-A that the railroads were offering the manufactured iron and steel rate on landing mats only on those shipments not in east or westbound transcontinental traffic. Item 2(a) spelled that out just as Item 2(b) tabulated the rates for those shipments which were in transcon tinental traffic. Opinion of the Court 150 Ct. CL. If the manufactured iron and steel rates were to apply to all shipments, what necessity was there to specify the rates on transcontinental shipments? And, it is to be remembered that all the shipments at issue in Groups II and III were transcontinental in nature. It is true that the transcontinental rates in Item 2(b) were the same as manufactured iron and steel rates which the railroads had published and desired to put into effect. Whether this means that the transcontinental rates were based on manufactured iron and steel rates is another matter entirely. In any event, the rates spelled out in Item 2(b) were identified as the rates to be charged for "landing mats or runways, airfield, iron or steel, loose or in packages" shipped by the Government transcontinentally. Whatever basis the A.A.R. may have used in arriving at the rates, they were specifically denominated as something other than manufactured iron and steel rates. It should be noted also that while the rates on manufactured iron and steel had been published and were identical with Item 2(b), the publication was rescinded by the ICC and therefore never became effective. The plaintiff does not deny that at all times the manufactured iron and steel rates applied to domestic shipments. But, in contrast to the Government's claim of a history of manufactured iron and steel rates on all types of shipments under the quotation, the record reveals a specific instance in which the plaintiff rejected a request to include landing mats in currently effective iron and steel tariffs. (See finding 26.) Defendant fails in its claim that the transcontinental export rates of Quotation No. 64-B are manufactured iron and steel rates. It does not follow, then, that the rate increases of X-162 and X-166 should be limited to the maximum applicable to iron and steel articles and other commodities. But there is another reason why the general rate increase should apply. Amendments 2 and 3 to Quotation No. 64-B increased the enumerated rates of Item 2(b) by the charges in X-162 and X-166. These tariffs assigned specific general rate increases to certain commodity groups including those in Note 5 1 Opinion of the Court thereto. Specifically indexed to that Note and those groups were “mats, landing airfield, iron or steel." Therefore, not only were the "iron or steel, airfield landing mats" of Quotation No. 64-B not subject to manufactured iron and steel rates, and hence a maximum increase, but they were definitely indexed as a commodity subject to the general rate increase pursuant to X-162 and X-166. Amendments 2 and 3 to the quotation create no ambiguities because the tariffs they invoke provide but one basis for the increases. As to Group III, the plaintiff's justification for claiming a port service charge of 5 cents per 100 pounds for movements between February 25, 1943, and May 26, 1945, is simply that the negotiated quotations in the 64-series provided for it during that period. Plaintiff points out that normal port services, such as switching and spotting, were performed in connection with the shipments (finding 30). The defendant has cited authority for the proposition that line haul rates cover all of the services which must be performed in getting the shipment to the export carrier at dockside, thus implying that the 5-cent charge in addition to the quoted rates is unjustified. While this may be a correct statement of the law, the defendant overlooks the fact that the rates in the 64-series were considerably less than the line haul rate under the applicable tariffs would have been. Moreover, the ICC has found in the War Materials Reparations Cases, 294 I.C.C. 86 (1955), that the rates charged for the shipments in question were not unreasonable. There is no foundation for the position taken by the Government that the Commission did not consider the port service charge in determining the reasonableness of the rates. The defendant has suggested that the railroads tacitly admitted that the service charge was unjustified from the beginning because they extended the Government a 3-cent port allowance which partially offset the 5-cent service charge and because the service charge was later wholly eliminated as of May 26, 1945. This reasoning, in so far as it attempts to affect service charges prior to May 26, 1945, is specious. We think it would be going too far to read that much into those acts. Opinion of the Court The facts and discussion of Group IV 150 Ct. CL The dispute with respect to Group IV arises because shipments from Ogden, Utah, to Oakland, California, were not covered by the rates in Item 2(b), Quotation No. 64-B. In other words, the quotation provided no transcontinental export rates on landing mats moving from Ogden to Oakland. We are faced with the question, therefore, as to what rate structure properly did apply. Plaintiff contends for the domestic iron and steel rate in Item No. 3780 of Supplement 262 to Pacific Freight Tariff Bureau (P.F.T.B.) No. 260-A. Defendant contends for the export iron and steel rate in Item No. 1903-C of Supplement 105 to West-bound Export Tariff No. 29-I. All of the shipments in this group moved from Ogden to Oakland on consignment to the Port Transportation Officer, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, in November 1950, and were certified as delivered for export. Except as to transcontinental shipments covered by the rates appearing in Item 2(b), Quotation No. 64-B, Item 2(a) makes applicable to the Government on landing mat shipments "general *** basis of rates *** applicable on manufactured iron and steel articles, in effect by tariff or provided in any applicable Section 22 Quotation on the date of shipment from point of origin." A.A.R. Section 22 Quotation No. 265-A is an applicable section 22 Quotation within the meaning of Item 2(a). It makes available to the Government the rates then in effect under T.C.F.B. Tariffs of the 29-series, at the same time relieving the Government of the obligation of first complying with certain policing items of the 29-series. Item 2(a) of Quotation No. 64-B makes Quotation No. 265-A applicable to the otherwise rateless Ogden to Oakland shipments. The latter quotation, in turn, makes the 29-series applicable on Pacific Coast export shipments without requiring the Government to comply with certain rules. The adjusted rate per 100 pounds under these tariffs is 53 cents. The tariff which the plaintiff contends is applicable provides a rate per 100 pounds of 63 cents. Previously, the plaintiff had contended that in the absence of a transcontinental export rate from Ogden, class rates or another applicable 1 Findings of Fact Section 22 Quotation should be used. The position now taken by the plaintiff was formerly the alternative position of the Government. The tariff which Western Pacific advocates applies to domestic shipments. Therefore, it seems to us that we are asked to choose between two tariffs, one for domestic freight, the other for export freight, neither of which violates the meaning of Quotation No. 64-B. The list of iron and steel articles in both tariffs was similar, and apparently neither listed nor rated airplane landing mats. It is a familiar principle in construing freight tariffs that when two tariffs are equally appropriate the one which provides the shipper with the lower rate is to be applied. Moreover, there is language in each of the tariffs presented to us in connection with Group IV to the effect that on export traffic, a rate designated as an export rate will take precedence over other rates between the same two points. The applicable tariff provisions are not ambiguous and need no reformation. They do, however, require interpretation. In choosing between the two potentially applicable tariffs for the Group IV bills, logic as well as the law compels us to select an export tariff rather than a domestic one. to cover export shipments. We find in accord with plaintiff's theory of the case in regard to Groups II and III, and in accord with defendant's theory of the case in regard to Group IV. The plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $112,484.20. It is so ordered. LITTLETON, Judge (Ret.); LARAMORE, Judge, MADDEN, Judge; and WHITAKER, Judge, concur. FINDINGS OF FACT The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Mastin G. White, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows: 1. The plaintiff, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, is a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce over its own lines and jointly with other carriers. |