ORDERS JUNE 1, 1960 TO JULY 31, 1960 Garnett R. Davis. No. 267-59. JUNE 17, 1960 Civilian pay; dismissal; Veterans' Preference Act; Tennessee Valley Authority; Court of Claims-jurisdiction.Plaintiff, a veteran preference eligible who was dismissed from his civilian position with the Tennessee Valley Authority, sues to recover back pay on the ground that his dismissal was violative of section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 5 U.S.C. § 863, in that the employing agency and the Civil Service Commission committed substantive and procedural errors and acted arbitrarily and in bad faith. Defendant moved the court for a dismissal of the petition on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction of the claim by virtue of section 7 of the Act of July 28, 1953, 67 Stat. 226, as amended September 3, 1954 (section 44 (a) and (b), 68 Stat. 1241, 1242), providing that the Court of Claims should not have jurisdiction in suits against or founded on actions of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Plaintiff contended in opposition that the Veterans' Preference Act was applicable to all veterans employed by the Government, including those employed by TVA, and that both TVA and the Civil Service Commission had followed the procedures outlined in section 14 of that act in affecting plaintiff's dismissal. Plaintiff urged that his claim arose under the Veterans' Preference Act and not under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, and that the Court of Claims does have jurisdiction of claims arising under the former act by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1491 providing that the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States: ** (2) Founded upon any Act of Congress". 150 Ct. Cl. On June 6, 1960, defendant's motion to dismiss was argued and submitted and on June 17, 1960, the court issued an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1491 over plaintiff's claim" and the petition was dismissed. Richard Harris. No. 10-60. JUNE 17, 1960 Civilian pay; additional pay; refusal to promote.-Upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition and plaintiff's reply thereto, together with oral argument by the parties, and on the basis that this court lacks jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff's alleged claim is barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, it was ordered that defendant's motion be granted and plaintiff's petition dismissed. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court, 364 U.S. 830. No. 170-58. JULY 1, 1960 Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation. Contract; counterclaim by Government for overpayments. Opinion 145 Ct. Cl. 496. The court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing defendant's counterclaim to recover alleged overpayments to plaintiff on the same contract. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties filed June 23, 1960, whereby plaintiff and defendant agreed that the petition should be dismissed and that judgment should be entered for defendant on defendant's counterclaims, it was ordered on July 1, 1960, that judgment be entered for defendant for $38,000, and plaintiff's petition dismissed. No. 93-59. JULY 15, 1960 Riverview Manor, Inc., and Riverview Manor Annex, Inc. Contract; Wherry Housing project; certificate of need.Upon consideration of plaintiffs' and defendant's motions for summary judgment, together with briefs and oral argu 877 ment of counsel, and based on the opinion rendered this date in Henry Barracks Housing Corp. v. United States, ante, p. 689, it was ordered that defendant's motion be granted, and plaintiffs' like motion denied and the petition dismissed. No. 50027. JULY 22, 1960 Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Carriage of goods; applicable tariff; Interstate Commerce Commission determination of reasonableness. 146 Ct. Cl. 863; reversed by the Supreme Court, 363 U.S. 202. In this case, on the mandate of the Supreme Court, the following order was entered: This case comes before the court on remand from the Supreme Court, filed July 19, 1960, wherein that Court ordered the reversal of the judgment entered in this court, with further proceedings here to be held in conformity with that Court's opinion of June 13, 1960, Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. United States, No. 451, Oct. Term 1959. Upon consideration thereof IT IS ORDERED this 22nd day of July 1960, that the judgment entered for plaintiff on June 5, 1959, 146 Ct. Cl. 863, be and the same is vacated and withdrawn, and IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that further proceedings in this case be and the same are suspended pending completion of the proceedings permitted under 28 U.S.C. 1336, 1398, and 49 U.S.C. 17(9). BY THE COURT. MARVIN JONES, No. 226-56. JULY 22, 1960 Grand River Dam Authority. Eminent domain; waters. Opinion 146 Ct. Cl. 728; reversed by the Supreme Court, 363 U.S. 229. In this case, on the mandate of the Supreme Court, the following order was entered: This case comes before the court on remand from the Supreme Court, filed July 19, 1960, wherein that Court ordered the reversal of the judgment entered in this court, with further proceedings here to be held in conformity with that Court's opinion of June 13, 1960, 150 Ct. Cl. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, No. 503, IT IS ORDERED this 22nd day of July 1960, that the judgment entered for plaintiff on July 15, 1959, 146 Ct. Cl. 728, be and the same is vacated and withdrawn, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's petition be and the same is dismissed. BY THE COURT. MARVIN JONES, 1 REPORT OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN COURT OF CLAIMS CASES THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY No. 226-56 [146 Ct. Cl. 728; 363 U.S. 229; 364 U.S. 855] On writ of certiorari (361 U.S. 922) to review the action of the United States Court of Claims in holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover just compensation for the taking of its water rights and its franchise resulting from the Government's construction of a dam on a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable river, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution the United States had the superior right to build the dam to protect the navigable capacity of the Arkansas River and that the frustration of plaintiff's plans and expectations was not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Rehearing was denied by the Supreme Court, 364 U.S. 855. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, No. 50027 [146 Ct. Cl. 863; 361 U.S. 922; 363 U.S. 202] Judgment of the Court of Claims reversed by the Supreme Court June 13, 1960. 881 |