Thus, a tenant for life and the remaindermen of an estate, either legal or equitable, may join in a suit to protect the estate. 19 Beneficiaries of a trust fund may join in a suit for an accounting, although their interests are several.20 Where either the corporation or its stockholders might have brought a suit, it was held that their joinder as complainants did not prejudice them.21 The buyer of a secret formula and the vendor who sold the same with a guarantee, may join in a suit to enjoin the unlawful use of the same. 22 The owners of a patent and an exclusive licensee may join as complainants in a suit for its infringement.23 Three plaintiffs were allowed to unite in a bill to enjoin an infringement of three patents, one of which belonged to all the complainants and the others to two of them.2 24 Although usually there had to be some privity between the complainants in a bill, and a common interest in the questions involved could not alone lay the foundation for the joinder of parties; 25 yet in certain cases those between whom there was no privity were allowed to sue together when they sought to avert an injury which would affect them all alike.26 Thus persons with a common interest in trademarks and labels, as owners and selling agents of the goods upon which they were affixed, might join in a suit to prevent their imitation.27 Several persons who were injured by a statute regulating their separate business of the same character were permitted to unite in a suit to enjoin its enforcement.28 Several tenants or parishioners might unite in a bill of peace seeking to dispose of a disputed right claimed 19 Story's Eq. Pl., § 27a; Buckeridge v. Glasse, 1 Cr. & Phill, 126; Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 99; Rainey v. Herbert, C. C. A., 55 Fed. 443. 20 Watson v. National Life & Tr. Co., C. C. A., 162 Fed. 7. 21 Bellevue Mills Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co., 214 Fed. 817. 22 James B. Sipe & Co. v. Columbia Refining Co., 171 Fed. 295. 23 Bellevue Mills Co. v. Baltimore Trust Co., 214 Fed. 817. 24 Low v. McMaster, 255 Fed. 235. Fed. Prac. Vol. I-50 25 Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 720; Watson v. Huntington, C. C. A., 215 Fed. 372. 26 See §§ 114, 116 supra. 27 Jewish Colonization Ass'n V. Solomon, 125 Fed. 994. 28 Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 605; a trading stamp case. But in Ohio v. Cox, 257 Fed. 334, held that dif ferent taxpayers could not unite in a suit to enjoin the governor from transmitting to the legislature the amendment to the Constitution forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. 29 against them by the lord of the manor or the parson of the parish.30 The owners of several lots of land claiming under a common source of title might unite in a bill of peace against several other claimants to the same lots, who also relied upon a common source of title adverse to that of the complainant.31 Several owners of different lots of land who have a common interest in an easement derived from the same source may unite in a suit to enjoin the obstruction of the easement.32 Several claimants in possession of several parcels of land whose rights depend upon the same question of fact or law may unite in a bill of peace against the same defendant who claims title to all the land by reason of the same disputed facts or legal propositions.33 The owners of several mines might join in a suit to restrain different assayers from buying ore from laborers employed by the complainants, although there was no concert of action among the defendants in their various purchases.34 The owners of adjacent property might join in a bill in equity to enjoin smelters from injuring their crops,35 to enjoin a defendant from erecting. 29 Annon., 1 Chan. Cas. 269; Smith v. Earl Brownlow, L. R. 9 Eq. 241. 30 Rudge v. Hopkins, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 70. 31 Crews v. Burcham, 1 Black, 352; Prentice v. Duluth S. & F. Co., C. C. A., 58 Fed. 437. It has been held that the pastor and some of the members of a religious association may unite in a suit to recover possession of the church and parsonage, to enjoin the trustees and the remainder of the congregation from interfering with each in his ecclesiastical rights; and also to compel an accounting for collections taken up, which are payable to the elder and pastor as salary. Fuchs v. Meisel, 113 Mich. 559; s. c., 60 N. W. R. 773. But see Douglas v. Boardman, 113 Mich. 618, s. c., 71 N. W. 1100. Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. 605; Everglades D. League v. Napoleon B. Broward D. Dist., 253 32 Norton v. Colusa Parrot Mín. & Smelting Co., 167 Fed. 202. Springer v. Lawrence, 47 N. J. Eq. 461, s. c., 21 Atl. 41. See Union Mill & M. Co. v. Dangberg, 81 Fed. 73; Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 43 Fed. 824; Cent. Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; infra, § 141. Flint v. Russell, 5 Dill. 151; Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.), 341, 80 Am. Dec. 632. Contra, Hudson v. Madison, 12 Simons, 416. 33 Holst v. Savannah El. Co., 131 Fed. 931; Rafferty v. Central Tr. Co. 147 Pa. 579, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763, 23 Atl. 884. 34 Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Richardson, 194 Fed. 198, reversed C. C. A., 202 Fed. 637. 35 Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Godfrey, C. C. A., 158 Fed. 225, 89 C. C. A. 139. a livery-stable,36 an unauthorized street railroad 37 or other nuisance in their vicinity. But another case holds that different persons, each of whom will suffer a distinct injury from the levy of a tax, cannot unite in a bill to enjoin its levy on account of its alleged unconstitutionality.38 Several stockholders who had been compelled to pay corporate debts were allowed to join in a bill against another stockholder or compel him to contribute his proportion, and several persons who had been induced by identical fraudulent misrepresentations to subscribe to stock in a corporation were allowed in Virginia to join in a suit to cancel their subscriptions.39 It has been held: that several depositors may join in a suit against directors of their common bank, for loss through improper loans of the bank funds.40 But that several stockholders cannot unite in a bill against an officer of their corporation based upon his fraudulent acts by which some of the complainants were induced to buy their stock and others, who had previously bought, were otherwise injured. A stockholder might sue on his own behalf and on behalf of his corporation, in the same bill, when the same facts sustained the cause of action on behalf of both, such as an attempt to make a fraudulent consolidation between his company and another on terms unduly unfavorable to his corporation.42 But, it has been held, that a suit by a stockholder, who is indebted to a building and loan association, to cancel his loan contract for fraud, usury and incapacity of the association to do business within the State, who also prays, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders, to have a receiver of the property of the corporation within 36 Cutting v. Gilbert, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 259. See, however, Central Pac. R. Co. v. Dyer, 1 Saw. 641; Union Pac. R. Co. v. McShane, 3 Dill. 303; infra, § 141. 37 Allen v. Fairbanks, 45 Fed. 445. 38 Rader v. Bristol Land Co. 94 Va. 766, 27 S. E. 590. 39 Foster v. Abingdon, 88 Fed. 604; Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 54 Am. St. Rep. 725, 24 S. E. 478. 40 Boyd v. Schneider, C. C. A., 131 Fed. 223. Several stockholders may unite in a suit to enjoin the directors of a corporation from issuing new stock without giving the complainants a reasonable opportunity to take their proportionate share and from allowing any holder thereof to vote at a corporate meeting. Snelling v. Richard, 166 Fed. 635. 41 Watson v. Huntington, C. C. A., 215 Fed. 472. 42 Jones V. Missouri-Edison El. Co., C. C. A., 144 Fed. 765. the State appointed upon allegations of mismanagement and misappropriation by its officers, is multifarious; 43 that so is a suit. by a corporation for a breach of contract, coupled with claims by individuals, to compel the delivery of stock of the same defendant.4 44 It has been said that the fact that separate decrees may be requisite in order to afford complete relief does not necessarily make the bill multifarious.4 45 § 141. Multifariousness by misjoinder of defendants. The Equity Rules of 1912 provide: "If there be more than one defendant the liability must be one asserted against all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice."1 This seems to broaden the former rule, which was as follows: No persons could be joined as defendants to a bill in equity who had not a joint or common interest in opposing the relief prayed.2 Different relief might, however, be obtained against different defendants when the bill sought to prevent or annul the effect of acts in pursuance of a common scheme, or so connected with each other as to form part of the same transaction.3 The rule was thus stated by Sir John Leach: "In order to determine whether a suit is multifarious, or, in other words, contains distinct matters, the inquiry is not, as this defendant supposes, whether each defendant is connected with every branch of the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks relief in respect of matters which are in their nature separate and distinct. If the object of the suit be single, but it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of that single object, it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the court, in order that the suit may conclude the whole object."4 43 Emmons v. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of New York, C. C. A., 135 Fed. 689. 44 Backus v. Brooks, 189 Fed. 922. 45 Neal v. Rathell, 70 Md. 592; s. c., 17 Atl. 566. $141. 1 Eq. Rule 26. 2 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; U. S. v. Alexander, 4 Cranch, C. C. 311. 3 Calvert on Parties, Book I, ch. vii; Manners v. Rowley, 10 Simons, 470. 4 Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Maddock, 138, 146. "The entirety of the case against one defendant constitutes the connecting link." But a bill is multifarious, when the charge against one is in no way connected with those against other defendants.6 When the liabilities of the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions are several, independent, and unconditional, and they have no common defense depending on the same questions of fact and law, the remedy of the corporation or the trustee in bankruptcy, or its receiver, is an action at law against each of them or a bill against several of them to collect such subscriptions is multifarious." But it was held: that a receiver's bill to collect the amount due by subscriptions to stock was not multifarious when filed against several stockholders, who had a common defense depending upon the same question of fact and law; and that a bill filed by a creditor on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, to wind up the affairs of the bank, to determine the amount due him, to ascertain the amounts due to other creditors, to distribute the assets among them, and to enforce the liability of the stockholders, who were made defendants with the bank, was not multifarious.9 Bills were held to be multifarious when filed by receivers against several stockholders to enforce a statutory liability to creditors,1 10 or to collect an assessment made in another proceeding, to which 8 5 Calvert on Parties (2d ed.), 98, quoting Sir John Leach in Turner v. Robinson, 1 Sim. & S. 313; and Lord Cottenham in Attorney General v. Corporation of Poole, 4 M. & Cr. 17, 31; Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed. 25; Porter v. Robinson 2 Va. Dec. 183, 22 S. E. 843; Crickard v. Crouch's Adm'rs, 41 W. Va. 503; s. c., 23 S. E. 727; Middleton Sav. Bank v. Bacharach, 46 Conn. 513. But see Washington City Sav. Bank of Thornton, 83 Va. 157; Buffalo v. Town of Pocahontas, 85 Va. 222; Sylvester v. Boyd, 166 Mass. 445; s. c., 44 N. E. 343; Staude v. Keck, 92 Va. 544; s. c., 24 S. E. 227. 6 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 200; Lewarne v. Mexican Int. I. Co., 38 Fed. 620; Seales v. Pheiffer, 77 Ala. 278; Sumter County v. Mitchell, 85 Ala. 313; Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 46 N. J. Eq. 380; National Surety Co. V. Washington Iron Works, 243 Fed. 260; Beveridge v. Crawford Cotton Mills, 257 Fed. 832. 7 Kelly v. Gill, 245 U. S. 116. 8 Wyman v. Bowman, C. C. A., 127 Fed. 257; Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Cochran, C. C. A., 247 Fed. 449; John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Kinnicutt, 248 Fed. 596; supra, §§ 81, 83. 9 Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 50, 30 L. ed. 864, 871; Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U. S. 230, 242, 50 L. ed. 738, 741. 10 Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 47 L. ed. 380. |