Senator HILL. Yes.

General RECKORD. We could then know where to go when we want to discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman would like to have a statement on the record by General Reckord and General Walsh, individual statements as to your thinking on the value of the National Guard air units. I have seen them established around the country. They are certainly sought after, that is, by the boys who were in the Air Corps during the war, and they are following through in the National Guard air units.

You do not want to leave any impression with the committee that they should not be taken care of in a very fine manner. They are of immense value to the national security. I would like to have you make some remarks on that, General Walsh.

General WALSH. When the allotments were made by the Secretary of War through the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on February 6, 1946, the States took those allotments under advisement and by July 1, after a few adjustments, had generally accepted those allot

ments.

The CHAIRMAN. For the air branch?

General WALSH. For all branches. But there had been a tremendous increase in the number of air units allotted. Those air units of course are tremendously expensive to maintain, and up to this time almost the entire burden for providing necessary installations and facilities have fallen on the States. But notwithstanding that, the States were perfectly willing to accept all of the allotments, including the air units, to the end that you would have this M-day striking force provided in the approved War Department policies of October 1945.

Some States, notably your own, and North Dakota, are having difficulties, because of the cost of providing those installations, and then again those units must of necessity be organized in towns of generally 50,000 and up. But not withstanding that-I mention South and North Dakota because I happen to live next door, and I know what they are up against-we have been temporarily estopped from organizing any air corps units. That is because of this $60,000,000 that was taken away from us and transferred to the pay of the Army account. I think we are getting that straightened out.

If we are getting ahead as provided under these policies I cited, we will on June 30, 1948, have met every War Department schedule, and we will have 4,500 units, including the air units, with a strength of 250,000.

Senator TYDINGS. How many flyers will you have?

General RECKORD. The total is about 58,000.

General WALSH. That is all told.

Senator TYDINGS. How many planes?

General WALSH. They run 26 to the squadron; west of the Mississippi we get Mustangs, and east another variety-P-47's.

Senator TYDINGS. The planes that you are being equipped with and training with, and the planes, if the battle was tomorrow, that you would go into action with, would be modern planes, such as used by the Army and Navy flyers?

General WALSH. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. This is not the old antiquated idea that this is old equipment, but it is real up to date training that is of tremendous value.

General WALSH. The planes which we received up to date are in the fighter squadrons, the P-51 Mustangs. In addition, you have received the photorecons-the A-6, which is almost as fast as the Mustang.

Senator TYDINGS. How many flyers did you say you had in training? General WALSH. It will be 56,000.

Senator TYDINGS. That is a reservoir of flyers there.

General RECKORD. That is licensed.

Senator TYDINGS. How many flyers?

General RECKORD. Thirty-five to a unit; probably 2,500.

Senator TYDINGS. 2,500 flyers immediately available with the supporting ground forces.

General WALSH. That is right, a thoroughly balanced force. Senator TYDINGS. I think that is a real adjunct in the case of national emergency and I think your case has been well presented.

General WALSH. In spite of all of the difficulties, I would like to add, and complications which have arisen, factors over which we have no control, certain things that are not likely to be heard sometimes, but the extension of selective service, universal military training, unification, the lack of the revision of the National Defense Act, and this minute we have over 13,000 officers and 66,000 enlisted men.

Senator TYDINGS. What I am thinking of it what this force would have been worth to us at Pearl Harbor.

General WALSH. If you had the Mustangs, it would have been different.

General RECKORD. We want to thank you for giving us this hearing, and in closing I would like to say that we are not jealous with respect to the language of this amendment at all. We will accept willingly and gladly any language that you gentemen may place in the bill, just so we do have this central agency clothed with the authority, and we believe definitely that the language should specify the duties of that bureau so that it will be understood by all of the new divisions. The CHAIRMAN. The committee certainly thanks you for bringing the matter to our attention and presenting the problem so forcefully. The committee will go into executive session quite a few times in order to get this bill in shipshape form.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Might I ask at this time just as a suggestion that the personnel under the direction of our clerk take out of all of the testimony that has been given to us the specific recommendations for amendments to the bill, and put them into some form that they are clear, and are combined in one place, so that we will know all of the suggestions to each section of the bill that have been made to us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very good suggestion. Of course, the staff of the committee has been doing that, and getting them ready all during the hearings. They will be presented in proper form to the committee when we meet in executive session.

As chairman of the committee, we do not quite have a quorum here now, although we have had fine attendance during the meeting this morning. I will say that the committee voted some few weeks ago to conclude hearings, if possible, today.

I do not want to foreclose the possibility of hearing any further witness that might be required next week or later, but it is my understanding now that the committee feels there is some unanimity of opinion that we have spent about 8 weeks on this bill, I think this is the twentieth day we have actually been in session, to hear witnesses, so if we are going to get this bill in this Congress we should probably conclude hearings now.

I do not want to completely foreclose a chance of calling some further witnesses, so if there is no objection, we will recess today on that basis. I want to keep the record open because there is some more information coming in, in the way of endorsement of the bill, and some further information may come in presenting other views. So we will hold the record open, if that is all right.

Are there any further remarks?

I certainly want to thank you, General Walsh and General Reckord. General WALSH. May I express our appreciation, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. If you have any further statement to make in behalf of your proposed amendment, the committee will be glad to receive it, and we will incorporate it in the record.

General RECKORD. We will be free if you or the clerk of your committee wish us to sit down with them to rewrite this amendment. We will be available any time on call. As I said, we are not tied to this specific language. This is what we thought it ought to be. But we will revise that in the light of this discussion if you wish us to sit in. The CHAIRMAN. At this point in the record we will insert an editorial that appeared in the Washington Post, May 8, 1947. (The editorial referred to is as follows:)

[From the Washington Post, May 8, 1947]

STIMSON'S ADVICE

Henry L. Stimson's succinct comments on behalf of the armed forces merger are entitled to the respect due the advice of an elder statesman. During two terms as Secretary of War and one as Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson had an opportunity accorded few Americans to see our national interests in long perspective. His personal integrity rules out any possibility of partisanship. When he stands unequivocally for prompt passage of the unification bill now before Congress, he does so because his long experience has convinced him that this unified approach to national security is organizationally necessary in a modern world.

Mr. Stimson uses the phrase "strategic economy" to describe one of the principal advantages he envisions in the merger. He refers, of course, to economy in lives and natural resources in any future war, and he notes that such an element "might well be critical." He cautions that we cannot continue to operate with the "wasteful opulence" that has characterized our efforts in the past. In this connection the saving in dollars as well as resources cannot be ruled out, especially at a time when Congress has such a penchant for reducing expenditures. A recent report by Lt. Gen. Leroy Lutes, Army procurement director, adds weight to Mr. Stimson's argument. During the years 1942 to 1945, the Lutes report charges, "duplication and lack of coordination in the supply activities of the Army and Navy" cost the staggering sum of $1,150,000,000. Regardless of other compelling considerations in the merger, the monetary saving alone should make Congressmen take the proposed integration seriously.

Mr. Stimson demolishes the fear expressed Tuesday by Admiral King that the powers of the proposed Secretary of National Defense would constitute a danger. A strong Secretary, Mr. Stimson points out, is essential to accomplish the job, but the Secretary of National Defense is only to be delegated some of the authority over the Defense Establishment that now rests upon the President. Nor is the bill now pending a partisan bill favoring one service over another. Mr.

Stimson emphasizes the careful study and the basic compromises and agreements that went into the measure endorsed by leaders of both the Army and Navy. The crux is expressed by Mr. Stimson in this passage: "I would like to stress the importance of considering this organization of the armed forces from the standpoint of fundamentals rather than details. If the basic plan of centralization can be determined upon, hundreds of vexing problems will fall into proper perspective. They will lose much of their controversial aspect and be decided as a matter of specific planning rather than of primary policy." These words should be pondered deeply on Capitol Hill.

The CHAIRMAN. You also have a letter and resolution from the Disabled American Veterans which we will include in the record. (The document referred to is as follows:)

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,

DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,

1701 Eighteenth Street, NW., April 23, 1947.

Chairman of Senate Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: I am taking the liberty of forwarding to you a copy of a resolution adopted by the Disabled American Veterans at our last national convention held in September 1946 at Portland, Oreg., which urges the coordination and unification of our armed services.

I shall appreciate it if this is incorporated into the record of the hearings on the proposed unification of the armed services.

Thanking you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

RESOLUTION

FRANCIS M. SULLIVAN, National Director of Legislation.

Whereas the experience of World War II demonstrated that combined operations under unified command contributed greatly to the effectiveness of American and Allied armed forces in all theaters; and

Whereas in consequence of combined operations under unified command the United States will necessarily function in a single global theater of war as a single team, the effectiveness of which will depend on unity of command: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Twenty-fifth National Convention of the Disabled American Veterans in session at Portland, Oreg., this 5th day of September 1946, That in the interest of national security, Congress be urged to unify the armed services under a single Department of Common Defense, in which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces would be coequal;

Resolved, That the unified Department of Common Defense be headed by a single civilian Secretary who would be a member of the President's Cabinet, with a Secretary for the Army, a Secretary for the Navy, and a Secretary for the Air Forces responsible to him;

Resolved, That a Council of Common Defense be created, responsible to the President, to coordinate all military and related activities essential to the national security, and to consist of the Secretary of Common Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and the Chairman of a National Resources Board;

Resolved, That under the Secretary of Common Defense, the three armed services be completely coordinated for planning, operations, research, intelligence, budgeting and administration, including personnel and supply, both for maximum effectiveness as a team and to prevent waste, duplication, overlapping of function and unnecessary expenditure for the national security, and Resolved, That every effort be made to obtain the enactment of a unification bill by the Eightieth Congress in conformity with this resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess subject to call of the Chair.

(Thereupon at 12:45 p. m., the committee recessed subject to call.)

The CHAIRMAN. Before the final printing of these hearings are made, if any members of the committee desire to include any additional information, it will be incorporated in the record at this point:

[From the New York Times, May 8, 1947]

ADMIRAL KING'S BOGEYMAN

Fleet Admiral King is consistent in his opposition to unification of the armed services. He has been envisioning the proposed Secretary of National Defense as a "man on horseback" ever since it was first suggested that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force be combined in one department. He has followed that line in his latest testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

To us it seems that the alternative which Admiral King now suggests is about as involved and as confused a countersuggestion as has been made in the unification controversy. In addition to having two or three services, Admiral King would also have three new committees or conferences-in addition to Congress itself-weighing strategy and tactics and making recommendations, through channels, to an already overworked President and Commander in Chief. As for the broad powers of the proposed new Secretary, which the admiral sees as a threat of possible military dictatorship, the best answer has been given by Henry L. Stimson in his letter to Senator Gurney. "The Secretary of National Defense will be a powerful officer," Mr. Stimson wrote. "That is entirely proper. He cannot successfully exercise his functions without adequate and flexible power. But it should be observed that he is given no powers which do not already belong to the President as Commander in Chief. What this bill does is to delegate to a recognized officer of the Government a part of the authority over the Military Establishment which in the end always belongs to the President. Under this bill the President as Chief Executive retains his powers unchanged; he is provided with a suitable officer for the proper exercise of these powers; that officer remains under his entire control. This appears to me to be a wholly proper and natural step, entirely in keeping with our best administration practices."

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[From the Washington Star, May 9, 1947]

BRING IT TO A VOTE

The national security is suffering from the adverse effects of continued congressional delay in coming to a final decision on Army-Navy-merger legislation. After months of uncertainty, the War and Navy Departments find themselves facing the approach of another fiscal year without knowing whether they are to be two departments or one, whether they must plan and act independently or together, whether the things they do today will be approved or countermanded under the super-Secretary set-up. It is inevitable that the administrative machinery of both Departments should be slowed up by the exasperating state of indecision now prevailing.

It is true that there have been interminable delays in past years on the hotly debated question of armed forces unification, but, fortunately, the Nation in those days faced no crisis demanding prompt action. Numerous other merger bills have been argued and allowed to die in committee pigeonholes, without impairing the national defense. A far different situation confronts the Army and Navy in this troubled postwar era, however. The peace is not yet secure. An atomic race is reported to be under way, pending adoption of international compacts precluding possibility of another war.

This is no time for our armed forces to be holding in abeyance their vital preparations to strengthen themselves in a period of revolutionary changes in military equipment, tactics, and strategy. They cannot afford to relax in their planning and training for even a day. Yet they cannot push forward with the requisite determination and confidence when they do not know whether they are to travel separate, though closely parallel paths, or one course as a consolidated unit.

It is time that Congress make up its mind, one way or the other, on the merger proposition. The subject is too important to be permitted to expire in a pigeonhole. Failure to take decisive action now, for or against unification, will only extend the demoralizing period of uncertainty for our defense planners and further weaken our military position. Congress will be doing a grave disservice to the Nation if it permits this to happen, for want of a vote on the merger issue.