We had made no effort to train any of our manpower. In 1940, it was still against the law to give any military training in the CCC-no Nazi goosestep for our boys. What was more important, we had made no move even to register, classify, and tabulate our manpower-the "militia"-as a preliminary measure. None of this foreign regimentation for us, who had forgotten a militia heritage going back 1,500 years to the Anglo-Saxon "hundreds." We frowned upon any measures to organize competent intelligence agencies; no dirty spy business for America. We starved such research and development agencies as we hadthe merchants of death should not fatten on our taxes. We just buried our head in the neutrality laws and refused to face the facts.

Yes, we were a hot 60 percent in 1945, but we were a chilly 10 percent in 1939, when the shooting began, and I am afraid we had better not be caught cold like that the next time. Any questions?

(NOTE.-Charts and references to charts have been omitted in the foregoing

extracts.)

Senator ROBERTSON. The other two lectures in the pamphlet are devoted to the Army's attitude toward universal conscription-a matter not directly germane to the present issue, but an essential element in obtaining positive military control over the manpower of the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point I would like to interrupt the hearings to have inserted in the record a memorandum respecting section 202central intelligence agency of the bill-submitted by Charles S. Cheston, 1421 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., formerly deputy director, Army Specialist Corps, and also Assistant Director of the Office of Strategic Services. The memorandum is as follows:

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, before giving you my specific suggestions in regard to section 202 of the proposed bill (H. R. 2319) providing for the creation of a central intelligence agency, I should like to express very briefly the point of view on which these suggestions are founded.

My basic concept is this: That from the standpoint of national security modern science and methods have annihilated one of the major bases of our defense; that is, the defense of space. It is now primarily a question of defense in point of time. By this I mean that any nation which is capable of striking a surprise blow with adequate resources and modern weapons (such as atomic warfare, chemical warfare, and bacteriological warfare, backed by air power with sufficient striking force), will have an excellent chance of winning with the first blow, perhaps in a matter of days. If this is not true of any nation today, it is certainly a likelihood to be reckoned with in the near future.

The all-importance of the time factor makes intelligence the key to defense. Hence, it follows that intelligence is far more vital today than it ever was in the past. Just as there is a need for new and fresh thinking about modern warfare, so there is a parallel need for new and fresh thinking about the increased importance of intelligence.

For this reason, on the question of national security alone, I view a coordinated effective central intelligence service as one of the major arms of our national defense establishment of equal importance to national security with the Air Force, the Army, or the Navy. If it is to be fully effective, it must therefore be given the status, authority, funds, and personnel with which to do its job adequately. In my opinion a so-called central intelligence service can no more do its job, if it continues to be related to a subordinate position in a department of some other branch or branches of government, than the Air Force could have done its job in World War II as a subordinate unit of one or more of the armed services.

It is my belief that from the standpoint of a national intelligence service we are unprepared today. I earnestly urge that in this section of the bill, as well as all its other provisions, full recognition be given to the fact that our problem is to create an organization equipped to deal, not with the problems of the last war, or of today alone, but with the future as well.

In my opinion there are three basic prerequisites for a central intelligence service.

First, there should be a civilian director, who must of course have the necessary qualifications and background.

There are three reasons why I am convinced that it is essential to have a civilian director.

The first reason is that political, economic, technological, and other intelligence with which the agency would be concerned are highly specialized fields. They require specially trained personnel-people who have devoted years to studying the intricate and subtle nature of international relations, people who have spent years in learning to know and understand foreign countries. It is certainly not slighting of our national service academies to say that they do not prepare officers for the special requirements of political and economic intelligence. Our two academies, faced with the task of training officers in the many specialtties of modern technical warfare, cannot be expected to provide the broad and extensive education required for the complex field of political and economic intelligence. It follows, therefore, that we must turn to the civilian world to find the man who by years of study and experience is qualified for the specialized requirements of directing political, economic, and technological intelligence operations.

Secondly, the appointment of a civilian director gives greater assurance of continuity of leadership. I do not have to point out to you gentlemen the vital importance of continuity in intelligence operations. Intelligence specialists are not made overnight. It takes years of training and experience to develop professional intelligence personnel. If a military man were appointed director of CIA, the inclination would be to alternate the office among Army, Navy, and Air Corps. The essential continuity of leadership would be lost. We, have already seen an example of this. The Central Intelligence Authority in a period of 14 months has had as director one Army general, a Navy admiral, and I understand is about to change again with the appointment of another Navy officer. A military man as director would be likely to regard his appointment as little more than another tour of duty, another assignment to be discharged as part of his own military career. He would be unable to view his appointment as having a certain permanence so long as he is subject to Army or Navy orders. No organization can progress under a series of temporary directors. The dangers resulting from a constantly changing leadership can be removed only by the appointment of a man who will-and can-regard the office of director as a career in itself. Permanency of leadership will have a favorable effect upon the entire staff of the intelligence agency, for it will help to develop the esprit de corps which is vital to the efficient functioning of any professional group. It will help to attract men and women who are willing to make intelligence work their lifetime career.

Thirdly, the appointment of a civilian director will free the CIA from the rigidities of the military system. The reasons why this country historically has placed its armed forces under civilian members of the Cabinet apply with force to the director of central intelligence. A professional officer, who has spent his life in the military or naval service, can hardly be expected to ignore the principles of seniority, chain of command, and similar elements which are so vital to the efficient functioning of any military organization but which are totally unsuited to the work of a national central intelligence service.

The second basic prerequisite for a central intelligence agency is that it should have its own funds appropriated by Congress.

The nature of CIA's work requires that it be independent of any department of government; since it is obliged to serve all, it must be free of the natural bias and special viewpoint of any one operating department. This means that it must have its own budget and its own personnel. If such agency is to be completely dependent upon the Army, Navy, Air Corps, and State Department for its funds, it will lose much of its independence of operation, which is so vital to its success. No director of a central intelligence agency could in these circumstances adequately plan or efficiently execute even the least of the duties and responsibilitiese which conceivably would be entrusted to such an agency, nor would he be in a position to attract and hold the type of men who are required for this work. A national intelligence service must be a career service. The men who serve in it must undergo years of training and preparation, and they must be able to look forward to making their career in a service that has the authority, status, and permanence necessary to do its job. The central intelligence group as now constituted offers no such incentive; on the contrary its uncertain status acts as a deterrent to men of the very type it should attract. Third and last, the director of the central intelligence agency should be responsible to a Secretary of National Defense having the duties and responsibilities outlined in this bill.

It has been amply demonstrated that problems of peace and war in modern times require total intelligence. Each of the principal departments and agencies of Government requires information for the determination of basic questions of policy, the collection and analysis of which are entirely outside the scope of its own operations. It does not solve the problem to create a kind of clearing house for information gathered in the ordinary operations of the several departments. What is needed is an effective, integrated, single agency with clearly defined duties and authority to analyze and correlate information from all sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing methods of collection of information. Such an agency must serve all principal departments of the Government and also bring together the full and comprehensive information upon which national policy must be based. It should not supplant existing intelligence units within the several departments. Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen these units wherever possible. The problem is national and not departmental. And it will not be solved by having the policies and operation of such an agency determined by a committee of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge the full-time responsibilities of their own offices.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue Senator Robertson.

Senator ROBERTSON. It is important that we should understand what the Army Information School is. It was established on January 23, 1946, as a special installation at Carlisle Barracks under the supervisory control of the Director of Information.

The instructions contained in the circular are effective until July 29, 1947, unless sooner rescinded or superseded. The objective of the Army Information School is to train competent personnel for public relations and information and education staff sections.

The curriculum and doctrine of the school are under the supervision of the Director of Information. Although the quotas of students were to be announced by the War Department, Circular No. 28 prescribed staff officers' courses which were to begin on February 27, 1946, to run concurrently for 100 information and education personnel and 100 public-relations personnel; and set the length of courses as 8 weeks

each.

Enlisted courses were prescribed to begin about October 1, 1946, to run concurrently for 150 information and education personnel and 150 public-relations personnel. The length of the enlisted courses was set at 4 weeks. From time to time the Director of Information was to arrange appropriate courses for groups such as commanders, senior staff officers, and instructors in service schools.

Assuming that the implied quotas of 200 officers per staff officer's course and of 300 enlisted men per enlisted course have been maintained, 1,400 officers and 2,100 enlisted men-to say nothing of the numbers of commanders, senior staff officers, and instructors in service schools who have attended the special courses-have been indoctrinated with the militaristic tenets contained in these lectures of General Palmer, and have been assigned the duty of spreading the gospel to an unsuspecting public and to the more than a million men in active service, every one of whom is a prospective disciple once he returns to civilian life.

It was this fact to which General Edson alluded when he said in his testimony that he did not overlook the powers of propaganda, even in such a democracy as ours. Nor, I would add, can we overlook the power which rest in the expenditure of $11,000,000,000 a year-over a third of our annual appropriations-under control of the military coalition which this bill would establish.

Finally, in fairness to General Edson, I wish to point out that he stated emphatically that he is not opposed to unification; and that he

earnestly urges the establishment of the proper agencies under positive civilian control which are needed to correlate and unify our national foreign, military, and economy policies in the interest of national security.

He sincerely believes, however, that if Congress should combine all of our armed forces within a single department, under a single super Secretary, and dominated by a supermilitary high command-as this bill in its present form will do we are endangering the continued existence of our democracy and that, under such an organization, the military will eventually become the master of our Government rather than remain as its obedient servant. I am in full accord with him. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Eberstadt, we will be glad to have you tell the committee your thoughts on the bill.

STATEMENT OF F. EBERSTADT, OF NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator, you referred to my war service. I might say specifically that I was chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and subsequently vice chairman of the War Production Board in charge of program determination.

With you permission, I will read this statement. Any question that members of the committee may want to ask I will be happy to answer either during the reading of this statement or after it is over, if you prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year you spent a lot of time on this problem and were the author, I believe, of a plan known as the "Eberstadt plan."

Mr. EBERSTADT. It has been referred to as that. You refer to a study which I made at the request of Secretary Forrestal, something well over a year ago, in fact almost 2 years ago, on the subject of unification.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you are not just coming into this subject new this morning. I think you have had a few years work on the problem. Mr. EBERSTADT. I think I have a little background. The subject is so vast, anyone claiming to know it would certainly be transcending the bounds of modesty.

I do not claim to know the subject, but I admit I have had a little contact with it.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Having already expressed my views at considerable length on the general subject presently being dealt with by this committee in a report to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, dated September 25, 1945, and in testimony before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on May 9, 1946, I will limit my statement to observations on the bill which is before you.

I would like to state at the outset, that the general purposes, principles, and structure of this bill appear to me sound. It has, however, some serious deficiencies which are not impossible to cure. It needs clarification and a few additions. If these deficiencies are cured, I recommend that the bill be passed.

With certain important exceptions, which I shall discuss later, the bill comes to grips directly and specifically with the major weaknesses in our national security organization dieclosed in the late war and ing the period leading up to it.

Experience preceding and during the late war highlighted the serious gaps between our foreign and military policies-between the State Department and the Military Establishments. The National Security Council, provided for in this bill, affords the means of curing this weakness.

It is the most important single organizational advance contemplated by the bill. Its essential usefulness is twofold. It primary purpose is constantly to exert our diplomatic, military, and economic strength and influence for the maintenance of peace.

In case of hostilities, however, it would serve ready-made as the nucleus of a war cabinet. If all other elements of the bill fell by the wayside, the creation of the National Security Council would in itself mark this legislation as one of the most significant congressional enactments in our history.

There were serious gaps in the compilation, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency envisaged in the bill should cure this.

There were also wide gaps between strategic planning and its logistic implementation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial and civilian mobilization.

This bill sets up organizational mechanisms aimed at curing these. Into this category fall, among others, the National Security Resources Board and the War Council. Both of these are great steps forward. The importance of the National Security Resources Board is almost on a par with that of the National Security Council.

This Board offers an opportunity to have ready at all times adequate plans and preparations for immediate industrial and civilian mobilization. The last war proved that, politically and traditionally, our people are loath to accept the military's plan for civilian mobili

zation.

In the National Security Resources Board, headed by a civilian directly under the President, such plans can be prepared in sound partnership between military people and civilians, and, if necessary, put into effect without the public disturbance, delay and confusion involved in creating a new civilian industrial mobilization organization for this purpose. Through the War Council the civilian Secretaries can be kept closely in touch with strategic plans and military operations.

Our war effort also suffered from the fact that many important interservice problems could be finally decided only by the President. Into this category fall matters of military strategy and the military budget, unity of command, interservice policies and practices in procurement and logistics, in research and development, in intelligence, in education and training, and in personnel policies.

Where resort to such final decision seemed necessary, it involved the undesirable alternatives of adding to the tremendous burdens of a wartime President, or deferring or dispensing with an important decision.

The latter alternative was sometimes adopted. The bill purports to supply these deficiencies.

In giving the Joint Chiefs of Staff legal recognition and status and assigning to it definite fields of authority and responsibility, the bill enhances a great and proven national asset.