appointed to issue such regulations and such directives as he may see fit."

General EDSON. You should meet that possibility by writing into the bill that the secretariat should be limited to secretarial duties only. Senator TYDINGS. Why not write it into the Joint Staff and let it stay here? You would get the same result.

General EDSON. If that is the result, you would get the same result. Senator TYDINGS. I do not see how the Joint Staff can do anything that the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not empower it to do, because it says here that they shall operate under the Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall perform. such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They cannot do anything the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not tell them to do.

They had a had a Joint They had a They did not have the

Did the German high command have a joint staff? secretariat; did they not? The German high command Chiefs of Staff under one single head for a long while. secretariat under that Joint Chiefs of Staff. joint staff as a separate agency; did they?

Senator MCCARTHY. As I read this bill, Senator, while the language is indefinite and vague, I think this bill as written lays the groundwork for the identical set-up that you had in Germany, except I believe we go a step further. It does not use the same provisions, but that is what I speak about-its vagueness. It lays the

groundwork for it.

Senator TYDINGS. That is a criticism of the whole bill. I am dealing with this one little phase of it.

Senator MCCARTHY. It is most vicious in this one little phase. Senator TYDINGS. One man had control over the German military forces before the war and after the war. He was Hitler. He was the president, more or less, but he operated through his title, and other men who were on his staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the German set-up operated primarily through a secretariat. There would be no virtue in eliminating the joint staff here and setting up a secretariat if you are trying to stay away from the very system Germany already had.

As I understand it, the general would prefer the Joint Staff. Senator MCCARTHY. Let me ask you something, Senator: Do you and I agree that we are here in effect providing a situation in which we can have a repetition of the German set-up?

Senator TYDINGS. No. My thought is, Senator-and I am going to be frank with you-the next war is beyond the imagination of any person in this room. I assume it will take place 10 or 15 or 20 years from now. I do not care how many laws you write. When the atomic bomb is pretty well scattered in other nations, your one hope of survival will be the strong authority at the top. It will have to regulate largely, whether we like it or whether we do not like it, the civilian as well as the military population.

Do not use that against me in the next election.

Senator MCCARTHY. I am glad, Senator, that we agree as to what we are doing. I believe you and I agree that we are laying the groundwork for a military dictatorship in time of emergency.

Senator TYDINGS. No. I do not think it is right, nor do I think war is right. I am concerned about surviving, and I am concerned

about how our country can survive under the impact of things already in existence.

I

I do not think you should have a model T to fight the next war. think you have to have a high-powered, streamlined organization that can go into action and get you where you want to go. If we lose that war, there will not be a vestige of democracy left. I want it retained, and I would rather gamble on the good faith of the men that gravitate to the top to win that war, more so than I would gamble on the ability of Congress to write a law to apply 15 or 20 years from now to a circumstance they do not even quite visualize. Senator MCCARTHY. That is one theory, Mr. Senator, which certainly has a lot of merit-that is, we should place the destiny of the country in the hands of the military. There is a lot more to be said for the theory now, with the type of future wars we may have, than was true in the past.

However, I think we can best fight the next war not by placing all the power in the military, which we would do here, but by keeping a well-balanced control over the military and civilian economy.

Senator TYDINGS. To show you what happened during World War II, General Marshall came before the Appropriations Committee one day and said in effect this:

Gentlemen, I want you to give me a billion dollars. I do not want you to ask me what it is going to be used for. It is a military secret, but I hope you will give me the money.

Well, General, will a billion dollars be enough for what you have in mind? It may cost $2,000,000,000, or even more, but a billion is all we need now. I cannot tell you what we are using the money for.

There was a direct subjection of the power of Congress to our military leader. We gave him the billion dollars and walked out of the room, appearing to be dumbbells, not knowing what it was for. It turned out to be the atomic bomb 3 years later.

I am sure that this last war had its old-fashioned stages, and it certainly had many renovations and new things, but in its old-fashioned stages it required a degree of secrecy and confidence in our military leaders which we did not need in the Civil War, in the War of 1898, or in World War I. I think that was a pretty good war-World War I. I hope you fellows will not write it down too much because I thought we did some rather good jobs in that war.

My point is: If we are going to proceed on the theory that wars can be fought in the future on the same plane that they were fought in the last war-World War II or World War I-we are going to wake up some morning about 10 or 15 years from now, if we have another one, and find out we have not put the decimal point in the right place. The CHAIRMAN. The committee realizes it is approaching 1 o'clock. I would suggest that we recess now, and in order to comply with the decision made by the committée a week ago that we conclude hearings this week, I would suggest that we reconvene again this afternoon and ask the general to come back at that time.

If that agrees with the thinking of the members of the committee here now, and we would like to meet again, the Chair would entertain a motion to reconvene at a set time this afternoon.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would be glad to make that motion, that we reconvene at 2: 30 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the committee will stand in recess until 2:30.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I read into the record, in justice to Mr. Kenney, who needs no justification from my memory of him, certain parts of his testimony. I would like to refer to pages 678 to 684 of the record. I will not try to read all that at the present time, but Mr. Kenney says, on page 684:

In further amplification of my explanation of the difference between the functions of the Munitions Board and the Resources Board, I want to emphasize that the Munitions Board is an operating organization and in time of peace should do a large part of the work for the Resources Board. It carries out the program for stockpiling of strategic materials. The plan for industrial mobilization must commence with its military aspects. Thus, the Munitions Board at an operating level formulates the plans and conducts the studies which become the basis for operation in time of emergency.

The Resources Board appraises the impact of these plans and studies on the civilian economy, and has the responsibility of integrating into the civilian economy the military aspects of these plans.

Upon the occurrence of an emergency, the wartime organization of the Resources Board should come into active being to put the plans into effect. Then again, on page 678, he says:

The Resources Board has authority to lay down broad programs and policies for the stock-piling of strategic material and for industrial mobilization and should maintain a current balance sheet of our natural and production resources. The importance of both these to a military establishment should not be underestimated. The existence of a sound and practical plan for industrial mobilization assures the availability with a minimum of delay of productive capacity to supply the essential weapons of war.

I read that into the record, because, with the utmost respect to General Edson, I think the paragraph he gives misinterprets completely Secretary Kenney's testimony to this committee. In justification of Mr. Kenney, his whole testimony should be inserted. He certainly says, in no uncertain terms, that the Industrial Resources Board should operate in peacetime as well as wartime.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30 o'clock this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Whereupon, at 2:30 p. m., the committee reconvened upon completion of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We still have with us General Edson of the Marine Corps. Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. When we recessed at 10 o'clock, you had covered the suggestion relative to the Presidential Deputy for Armed Services in the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board and your Munitions Board..

You had pointed out how, in a set-up such as you suggested to the committee, that Secretary of National Defense was no longer

necessary.

I think at the actual moment that we recessed, the question of the Joint Staff was under consideration. I think you had been comparing the German General Staff.

Other nations have had work done with the general staff as head, have they not?

General EDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Would you like to say something about that?

General EDSON. I am sorry Senator Tydings is not here because I would like to make this comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tydings told me he had to go to another committee meeting this afternoon, I may say.

General EDSON. During the last war, a billion dollars was turned over to General Marshall indicating extreme confidence in all the military people at the head of our armed forces. As a result of that confidence, the atomic bomb and other things of that nature were created.

I would like to point out, however, that that was done under the exisiting structure of the Joint Chiefs without an over-all high command. The set-up of an over-all high command, a national general staff covering all of the armed forces, would be similar to that which has existed in such countries as France under Napoleon, Germany in the First World War, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and all of those countries with that type of an organization were defeated in war.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. You are pointing out that General Marshall when he made that request for $1,000,000,000, of the Appropriations Committee, that while Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he was Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, General: Do you know how the Joint Chiefs of Staff operated during the war; did they at each meeting come to an agreement on who should be chairman?

General EDSON. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether General Marshall was, during the war, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General EDSON. No, sir; I do not know. I am quite sure, however, from papers I have seen, that both during and since the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not had too much difficulty in getting together on issues of national strategy. Only in those cases in which there has been a conflict between the trielemental theory of organization-land, sea, and air-and the organization of the Ground Forces, the Naval Forces, and the Air Forces as balanced units has there been disagreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General EDSON. I would like to pursue this thought a little further. I am quoting again from the Evolution of Military Policy of the United States, by General Palmer:

The Chief of Staff, General Marshall, was now free to become the professional commander in chief. His labors with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, United States and British, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Army, Navy, and Air, and his consultations with the President and with foreign statesmen-in short, his share in the strategic decisions and in the allocation of means to support the entire war effort of many countries-these duties necessarily were the major tasks of the Chief of Staff as professional head of the Army.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, a No. 2 position which had exisited for many years, conducted the business of the Army and made all internal decisions, except a few of outstanding importance.

I should like to read into that, though, instead of "Chief of Staff, General Marshall," the "Joint Chiefs of Staff" and in place of "the. Deputy Chief of Staff," "the Director of the Joint Staff."

Furthermore, Congress has heretofore taken a very positive stand on the estabishment of a joint national staff or an over-all staff. In the National Defense Act of 1903, which set up the original Army General Staff, Congress was very specific in restricting the duties of that staff, and specifically stated that it did not authorize this staff to perform administrative duties.

It was set up in the nature of an advisory body.

That was reaffirmed in 1916, I believe, and again in 1919.

It was not until 1942 that the Army General Staff took over control of the Army and became the governing body of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that accomplished by legislative action or Presidential directive?

General EDSON. Presidential directive, sir. I quote again from General Palmer.

And so, under the war powers of the President, the War Department was reorganized and the three major commands which existed during World War II were established.

The positions of chief of Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery were just abolished, and so they could no longer quarrel with the decisions of General McNair; and General McNair became commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, instead of a mere chief of staff of GHQ.

And again he says:

The truth is that the need for an efficient high command of the over-all national defense could not be appreciated until we got an efficient high command within the War Department itself.

I think the implication in that is clear, and it follows the steps which have been taken in all military nations, that the general staff of one service has gotten control of that service, and then has assumed control of all the armed forces and eventually becomes not only military, but military and political in nature.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. That was very much so with the German staff; did they not mold public opinion and operate propaganda agencies and schools?

General EDSON. Very much so.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Do you think such a thing is possible if an over-all general staff got hold of this military set-up? General EDSON. I think it is definitely possible and that this joint staff set-up here provides for it. I would like to make this further comment that if it is the intention in this act to set up a national general staff, I believe the bill should definitely say so, and that further Congress should be very explicit in the delineating the functions of that staff.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. General, do you agree with me. that this bill as it is written, is somewhat putting the cart before the horse, in that the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Resources Board are really the foundation of any unification, and that in this bill they are relegated to title 2, giving the impression that the predominant feature of any unification is the establishment of various military divisions and services, and the Secretary of National Defense?

Do you feel that any bill of this kind for genuine unification should start with the National Security Council? The President and the