The CHAIRMAN. May I ask a question right there, Mr. Bracken? Three weeks ago, were the delegates fully advised at that time of the signed agreement between the Army and Navy Secretaries?

Mr. BRACKEN. Are you referring to the so-called Executive order, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right; the mutual agreement between the services. That was the basis of the President's message to Congress. Mr. BRACKEN. I believe they were aware of it, sir. They were aware that the top flight heads had agreed on this particular merger bill, that the Secretaries of War and Navy had agreed upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. BRACKEN. These, gentlemen, are but a few of the questions which are bothering us and which are unanswered by this bill. Perhaps you feel that these are details which can best be handled by Executive decree. If this act is passed, gentlemen, they will be handled by Executive decree and there will be no compunction upon the Executive to follow the wishes of the Congress unless the Congress has made those wishes law. I feel that I sense correctly the spirit of this Congress when I say that it will refuse, and the Nation will applaud its refusal, to permit the return to the days of rule by presidential decree, by so-called Executive order.

We in RONS are bothered by the emphasis which this bill places upon the authority of one man, the Secretary of National Defense; "he shall establish policies and programs"; "he shall exercise direction, authority and control"; he shall have power of decision in the War Council; the performance of duties by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be subject to his authority and direction; he shall direct the activities of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board. Is this man to be just an over-all supervisor, a mediator reconciling the differences of the three branches of the service-which is one interpretation that can be placed upon the functions that have been delegated to him-or is he to be an all-powerful, compelling and coercive force applying his limited, general experience, or the singleminded experience of his dominant adviser of the moment to problems of national defense?

No one would question the reposing of such powers on a military leader in the field in wartime; there is serious doubt however whether it is necessary, or whether it is not in fact dangerous to repose such power, in wartime or peacetime, in one man whose functions are planning and not operations. The man who holds that position must have a comprehension of and a deep appreciation of the missions of each of the components of the armed forces. With the tenure of Cabinet offices averaging 2 years, the Military Establishment will be subject to the whims and vagaries of successive Secretaries of National Defense.

A Navy man might be tempted, under the guise of economy or expediency to jeopardize the over-all security of the Nation by emphasis on the Navy as the chief arm of our defense and, in like manner, an exponent of air power or tank warfare, to a like degree. The man must have sound judgment, he must know when to act and when not to act. We in RONS most emphatically do not subscribe to the theory expressed by some military men that a wrong decision is better than no decision. Yet, this committee can certainly conceive of the possi

bility that one with that philosophy of command might well be chosen to head this establishment.

It is perhaps unfortunate that this whole unification movement had its inception, received its impetus, from isolated examples of noncooperation between branches of the services. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the war was the greatest cooperative venture ever undertaken by man. Not only did we cooperate with each other to win it, but we cooperated with allies of considerably greater differences of opinion than that of our brother officers. The examples of cooperation are legion; of noncooperation few. Already the Army and Navy have consolidated their medical activities; already there is in existence a joint Army-Navy aeronautical board; an Army-Navy munitions board; a joint board of the ranking officers of both War and Navy Departments; a joint economy board; a joint research and development board; a joint staff college; a joint industrial college, a joint war college. This is the organization which won the war. Is it to be scrapped in favor of a noble experiment?

I realize that it is very easy to point out the defects in legislation; to tear down; to criticize. I would be unmindful, however, of the high privilege which you have accorded me and the organization which I represent, if my efforts were wholly destructive, if we made no effort to offer anything constructive in an endeavor to help the committee in its deliberations on this legislation.

We therefore propose, first, that where legislation is necessary to bring about the benefits of unification, that problems should be approached step by step with the Congress enacting specific legislative bills to unify or merge specific functions of the services and not by enacting a general bill leaving, as does this one, all major questions to the Executive. Only should the national security demand immediate action on unification would legislation giving such a general delegation of power to the Executive, as proposed by this bill, be justified. This committee has given much valuable time to this legislation. Undoubtedly, these hearings have clarified many points connected with merger. I repeat, however, that this committee has not as yet tapped the great reservoir of unbiased, experienced opinion which should be made available to it before it passes the bill on to the Senate with its recommendations. I speak of the Reserve officers of the Army and the Navy; the investment broker of today who was the Army quartermaster of yesterday: the certified public accountant back in Philadelphia who was the Navy supply officer in Trinidad; the banker in Baltimore who was the finance officer in Paris; the engineer from New Mexico who erected steel hangars in the swamps of British Guiana, the physician from Mercy Hospital who under great odds organized one of the largest blood banks in the jungles of New Guinea. The experiences of these men should be before the the committee just as are those of the Regular officers of the Army and Navy who have appeared before you. Of equal importance to the committee are the experiences of the retired officers of military services, only one of whom has as yet been heard by this committee, and he is a former member of the Senate, under whom I had the pleasure of serving at the outbreak of the war. These men, Reserve and retired, have no compulsion to testify one way or another. Their opinions are based on their own experiences, not on the policies of their superiors.

I cannot help but feel that RONS is not only the voice of the Reserve but the voice of the conscience of the Navy; that it not only reflects the opinion of the Reserve officers but likewise the opinions of a large proportion of their brother officers in the regular service. I respectfully submit that the announced official policy of the Navy Department is not a true representation of the feeling of the officers within the Naval Establishment.

I urge this committee to delay immediate positive action on this bill and further I propose and urge the appointment of a commission of Reserve officers of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and the Air Corps to study the unification of the armed services, drawing upon the wartime experiences of their Reserve brother officers to assist them in this study and giving to this committee its recommendation based on that study. I offer the fullest cooperation of RONS in conducting this survey.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bracken, the committee thanks you very much for your testimony. There are a lot of good thoughts in it.

I want you to know that the committee is not concluding the hearings as of today. There are quite a few more witnesses to be heard yet.

The committee has not closed the hearing of anyone whom they may decide to invite here to give further testimony.

Are there any questions? Senator Wilson!

Senator WILSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy?

Senator MCCARTHY. I have just one question.

Mr. Bracken, did your organization give any amount of study to the question of how much power this over-all head will have under the wording of this bill as it is presently worded?

Mr. BRACKEN. They have not given intensive study on that point; no. They feel intensive study should be given to that point.

Senator MCCARTHY. I gather from your statement, however, that you feel the language is so indefinite, it is rather impossible for any two fair-minded men presently to agree as to the power he does have. Mr. BRACKEN. I do so feel; yes, sir. I think that the hearings before this committee have indicated the various witnesses differ in their opinion as to the authority of this man.

Senator MCCARTHY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bracken.

I offer for the record a letter received by me as chairman of the committee from A. W. Dulles, of New York City, dated April 25, together with a memorandum from Mr. Dulles, referring particularly to section 202 of Senate bill 758, having to do with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL,
New York 5, April 25, 1947.

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR GURNEY. With reefrence to previous correspondence relating to the Central Intelligence provisions of the services unification bill, I enclose a memorandum outlining my views on the subject in view of the fact that I am leaving tomorrow for Europe, to be gone about 4 weeks. In the event that I return prior to the termination of your hearings and you then wish me to appear in person, I shall be very glad to do so.

However, in the enclosed memorandum I have set forth as succinctly and as clearly as I can the quite definite views I have with regard to the requirements for an adequate Central Intelligence Agency.

As I have also been invited to appear before the House Committee on Expenditures in the executive departments, I am also sending Representative Clare Hoffman a copy of this memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. DULLES.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING SECTION 202 (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) OF THE BILL TO PROVIDE FOR A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, SUBMITTED BY ALLEN W. DULLES, APRIL 25, 1947

I

To create an effective Central Intelligence Agency we must have in the key positions men who are prepared to make this a life work, not a mere casual occupation. Service in the Agency should not be viewed merely as a stepping stone to promotion in one of the armed services or other branches of the Government. The Agency should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job. They must find their reward primarily in the work itself, and in the service they render their Government, rather than in public acclaim.

Intelligence work in time of peace differs fundamentally from that in time of war. In time of war military channels and military facilities, and consequently military personnel, can effectively be employed in far greater measure than in peacetime. In time of peace intelligence with respect to foreign countries must come largely through civilian channels.

Because of its glamour and mystery overemphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war this form of intelligence takes on added importance but in time of peace the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through overt channels, through our diplomatic and consular missions, and our military, naval, and air attachés in the normal and proper course of their work. It can also be obtained through the world press, the radio, and through the many thousands of Americans, business and professional men and American residents of foreign countries, who are naturally and normally brought in touch with what is going on in those countries. A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy. An important balance must be supplied by secret intelligence which includes what we now often refer to as "Magic."

II

I believe that the agency which is to be entrusted with assembling and analyzing intelligence should be predominantly civilian rather than military, and under civilian leadership.

Whoever takes the post of Director of Central Intelligence should make that his life work. If previously a military man, he should not look forward to resuming a position in one of the armed services. The same should be true of his top staff. Whatever may have been their previous professions, whether military or civilian, once they take high position in the central intelligence organization they should, if military, divest themselves of their rank as soldiers, sailors, or airmen and, as it were, "take the cloth" of the intelligence service. The success of the FBI has been due not only to the ability of the director and the high qualities of his chief assistants, but to the fact that that director has been on that particular job for a sufficient period of years to build up public confidence, an esprit de corps in his organization, and a high prestige. We should

seek the same results for our intelligence service, which will operate in the foreign field, and on items of foreign information.

I do not suggest that the legislation should lay down a hard and fast rule that the chief of the Intelligence Agency must come from civilian life. Certainly there are many men of military training who are competent to hold that job. But if a military man takes the job, he should operate from that time on as a civilian. Further, he must be assured, subject to good performance, a specified term of duty, which should be subject to extension as long as he carried out his task efficiently. Appointment as Chief of Central Intelligence should be somewhat comparable to appointment to high judicial office, and should be equally free from interference due to political changes. In fact, the duties the Chief will have to perform will call for the judicial temperament in high degree. An appointee must gain that critical faculty which can only come of long experience and profound knowledge to enable him to separate the wheat from the chaff in the volume of information which will pass through his office.

Of course, the Central Intelligence Agency should also have attached to it a substantial number of men from the armed forces as well as from civilian life, many of whom will not make it a life career but who can perform useful functions for a term of years.

Much of our thinking relating to an intelligence agency is colored by our recent dramatic war experiences. Intelligence work in time of peace will require other techniques, other personnel, and will have rather different objectives. The prime objectives today are not solely strategic or military, important as these may be. They are scientific-in the field of atomic energy, guided missiles, supersonic aircraft, and the like. They are political and social. We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces communism, not only in the relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the west, but in the internal political conflicts within the countries of Europe, Asia, and South America. For example, it may well be more important to know the trend of Russian communism and the views of individual members of the Polit Bureau than it would be to have information as to the locations of particular Russian divisions.

. Having this conception of the task of a central intelligence agency, I am skeptical as to the wisdom or adequacy of the provisions in the bill to provide for a national defense establishment with respect to central intelligence. These provisions seem to me to set up what, in effect, is likely to become merely a coordinating agency for the military intelligence services, G-2, A-2, ONI. This is useful, and this function should be performed by the agency, but it is not enough.

The constant changes in the chiefs of the military intelligence services has crippled their efficiency and lessened their prestige. As these services are a part of a professional career, of which intelligence is only one segment (and too often it has been a stepchild), such changes are somewhat inevitable. But this precedent should not be carried over to the new Central Intelligence Agency. There provision must be made for permanence and continuity. And yet the Central Intelligence Authority, heretofore based on Presidential order, will have had three heads in the space of 1 short year. The two men who up to now have been the heads of that agency were both extremely able, devoted, and competent men, but no man can do much in this most difficult field in a few months. Constant change destroys the morale and prevents the long-range planning which must be the task of a properly functioning intelligence agency.

Hence I would recommend that any legislation provide long-term tenure for the Chief of the Agency, with the establishment of a precedent that his chief subordinates should also have that degree of permanence which is necessary to insure team play between the Chief and his immediate assistants. The Chief should not have men imposed upon him for political or other like reasons. He should have the right to pass upon his assistants. The legislation should provide that the Chief and his immediate assistants, so long as they are attached to the Central Intelligence Agency, should act in a civilian and not in a military capacity. III

Under the legislation as proposed, the Central Intelligence Agency is to operate under the National Security Council, the stated purpose of which is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military policies, and to enable the military services and other agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security." This Council will have at least six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential appointment. From its composition it will be largely military, although the Secretary