venting overlapping functions-that is, eliminating duplicate roles and missions, and eliminating duplicate services in carrying out these functions.

In order to perform his prescribed functions, the Director of Central Intelligence must keep in close and intimate contact with the departmental intelligence agencies of the Government. To provide formal machinery for this purpose, the President's directive established an Intelligence Advisory Board to advise the Director. The permanent members of this Board are the Directors of Intelligence of the State, War, and Navy Departments and the Air Force. Provision is made, moreover, to invite the heads of other intelligence agencies to sit as members of the Advisory Board on all matters which would affect their agencies. In this manner, the Board serves to furnish the Director with the benefits of the knowledge, advice, experience, viewpoints, and over-all requirements of the departments and their intelligence agencies.

One final thought in connection with the President's directive: It includes an express provision that no police, law enforcement, or internal security functions shall be exercised. These provisions are important, for they draw the lines very sharply between the CIG and the FBI. In addition, the prohibition against police powers or internal security functions will assure that the Central Intelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police.

Among the components of any successful intelligence organization are three which I wish to discuss: collection, production, and dissemination. Collection in the field of foreign intelligence consists of securing all possible data pertaining to foreign governments or the national defense and security of the United States.

I feel it is safe to say that in peacetime approximately 80 percent of the foreign intelligence information necessary to successful operation can and should be collected by overt means. By overt means I mean those obvious, open methods which require, basically, a thorough sifting and analysis of the masses of readily available material of all types and descriptions. Into the United States there is funneled so vast an amount of information from so many varied sources that it is virtually staggering. It encompasses every field of endeavor-military, political, economic, commercial, financial, agricultural, mineral, labor, scentific, technical, among others-an endless and inexhaustible supply.

There exists a misconception in the minds of some people regarding the task intelligence is to perform in time of peace, as contrasted with its task in time of war. This misconception is that in wartime intelligence is more important and more difficult than in time of peace. This is a fallacy. In the midst of a war, our armed forces, with their intelligence services, gather vast amounts of strategic and tactical information. This may be secured through the underground or resistance movements, reconnaisance, prisoner-of-war interrogation, and aerial photographs taken in spite of enemy resistance-to mention a few. But these sources are drastically reduced as our forces return home. Such information, which can be collected during actual combat, is largely denied us in peacetime. In times of peace, we must rely on the painstaking study of that available overt material I mentioned a minute ago, in order to replace the material readily available during combat.

If we fail to take advantage of these vast masses of material, we are deliberately exposing the American people to the consequences of a policy dictated by a lack of information. We must realize also that we are competing with other nations who have been building up their intelligence systems for centuries to keep their leaders informed of international intentions-to inform them long before intentions have materialized into action.

Among the primary collecting agencies in the field of foreign intelligence are the military, air, and naval attachés of the defense establishment and the Foreign Service officers of the State Department. The central Intelligence Group cannot and will not supplant these people. They do most valuable work in the field of collection. As national aims and needs in this field are established, their value will be increasingly apparent. This will be particularly true as the boundaries of departmental collection become firmly defined and wasteful duplication and overlap are eliminated or reduced.

As I stated, it is not the province of the Central Intelligence Group to take over departmental collection activities. This is the type of collection which can best be done by the experts of the departments in their various fields.

The role of the Central Intelligence Group is to coordinate this collection of foreign intelligence information and to avoid wasteful duplication. The State Department should collect political and sociological intelligence in its basic field. The Navy Department should devote its efforts primarily to the collection of naval intelligence. There should be no reason, for example, for the military attaché to furnish the War Department with detailed political and politicaleconomic analyses. This material should be collected by the State Department. If a military attaché should receive political information, he should hand it right across the desk in the embassy to the appropriate member of the Foreign Service, and vice versa.

We are engaged in making continual surveys of all Government agencies to ascertain their requirements in foreign intelligence. When two or more agencies have similar or identical requirements, the collection effort for one can be made to satisfy all others. The only additional action necessary is the additional dissemination.

In determining, apportioning, and allocating the primary field of responsibility among the various agencies of the Government, it is useful to note one additional factor. After this mass of material has been studied and evaluated, certain gaps in the over-all picture will be readily apparent. A centralized intelligence agency, intent on completing the national intelligence picture, must have the power to send out collection directives and request further material to fill these gaps. Once the initial field of collection is delineated, the responsibility for securing the additional information can be properly channeled and apportioned. Central Intelligence, however, needs the authority granted originally by the President's directive, and now by this proposed legislation, to coordinate all this foreign intelligence collection.

The second major component of a successful central intelligence agency is that coming under the broad general heading of production. This involves the evaluation, correlation, and interpretation of the foreign intelligence information gathered for the production of intel

ligence. It involves the process of systematic and critical examination of intelligence information for the purpose of determining its usefulness, credibility, and accuracy. It involves the process of synthesis of the particular intelligence information with all available related material. It involves the process of determining the probable insignificance of evaluated intelligence.

Information gathered in the field is sent to the department responsible for its collection. This material is necessary to that department in the course of its day-to-day operations. Each department must have personnel available to digest this information and put it to such use as is necessary within that department. The heads of Government departments and agencies must be constantly informed of the situation within their own fields to discharge their obligations to this country. With this departmental necessity, Central Intelligence will not interfere. Each department must evaluate and correlate and interpret that intelligence information which is within its own exclusive competence and which is needed for its own departmental use.

The importance of research to the Central Intelligence Agency becomes evident when we start to deal with intelligence on a national as distinguished from a departmental level. The research provided by the central agency must be turned to the production of estimates in the field of national intelligence. National intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officials and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. National intelligence is in that broad political-economic-military area, of concern to more than one agency. It must be objective, and it must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department.

One of the greatest contributions which a central intelligence agency makes is the preparation of national intelligence estimates. Previously, if the President desired an over-all estimate of a given situation, he had to call, for example, upon the War Department, which would furnish him with the military and air picture; the Navy Department, which would present an estimate of the naval potentialities and capabilities; and on the State Department, which would cover the political and sociological picture. But nowhere would there be an over-all estimate. Nowhere was there such an estimate before Pearl Harbor. Each department would, of necessity, present an estimate slanted to its own particular field. Now it falls to the Central Intelligence Agency to present this over-all picture in a balanced, national intelligence estimate, including all pertinent data. From this the President and appropriate officials can draw a well-rounded picture on which to base their policies. And it should be clearly borne in mind that the Central Intelligence Agency does not make policy.

The estimates furnished in the form of strategic and national policy intelligence by the Central Intelligence Group fill a most serious gap in our present intelligence structure. These estimates should represent the most comprehensive, complete, and precise national intelligence available to the Government. Without a central reseach staff producing this material, an intelligence system would merely resemble. a costly group of factories, each manufacturing component parts, without a central assembly line for the finished product.

The third component of the successful Central Intelligence Agency is that dealing with dissemination. Just as there is no purpose in collecting intelligence information unless it is subsequently analyzed and worked into a final product, so there is no sense in developing a final product if it is not disseminated to those who have need of it. The dissemination of intelligence is mandatory to those officials of the Government who need it to make their decisions.

A central intelligence agency, properly cognizant of the intelligence requirements of the various departments and agencies, is best equipped to handle the dissemination to all departments of the material to meet these requirements.

The complexities of intelligence, the immensities of information available virtually for the asking, are so great that this information must reach a central spot for orderly and efficient dissemination to all possible users within the Government.

In addition to the functions mentioned, it is necessary for a central intelligence agency to perform others of common concern to two or more agencies. These are projects which it is believed can be most efficiently or economically performed centrally. An example of such a service is the monitoring of foreign voice broadcasts. There are many departments of the Government vitally interested in this matter. No one department should shoulder the burden of its operation and expense. Nor should two or more agencies be duplicating the operation. It should rest with a central agency to operate such a service for all. Similarly, we have centralized the activities of the various foreign document branches which were operated by some of the services individually or jointly during the war.

I would call your attention to the fact that the kind of men who are able to execute the intelligence mission successfully are not too frequently found. They must be given an opportunity to become part of a secure and permanent agency which will grow in ability with the constant exercise of its functions in the fields of operations and research. We must have the best available men, working in the best possible atmosphere and with the finest tools this Government can afford.

During the war, intelligence agencies were able to attract a great number of extremely intelligent, widely experienced, able men. Some are still available and might become members of the central intelligence agency should it become possible to insure them that career which was recommended by the congressional committee report I cited previously. It is very difficult to recruit such men before the will of Congress is made known. I do not wish to belabor this point, but it is most important.

In conclusion, I respectfully urge the passage of section 202 of the bill under discussion, together with such additional legislation as is needed to make for operational efficiency. I urge your increased and continued interest in an intelligence system which can do much toward safeguarding our national security.

Such a system indicates the necessity for a central intelligence agency to augment and cordinate these intelligence missions and functions of the armed services and the Department of State. Such an agency should be given the authority to provide research and analysis in the interest of national intelligence. We know that the passage

of such legislation will enable us to establish a field attractive to men of outstanding background and experience in intelligence. These individuals will meet the challenge of the task before them-the most stimulating in which men can serve their country-by the production of a positive safeguard to the national security.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to offer for the record this morning a letter received from Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, in compliance with the request made by the committee some few days ago. Also for the record I have a statement of costs as submitted by Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad. Both of these letters will appear in the record at this time.

These letters are as follows:

1. Statement submitted by Major General Kirk, Surgeon General, United States Army, on April 28, 1947, in response to a committee request as to the present strength of the Army Medical Corps.

2. The present strength of the Medical Corps of the Army, including the Air Force, is 6,900. This figure includes 1,100 medical officers of the Regular Army and 550 volunteers. The remainder (5,250) are doctors who were commissioned in the Army after finishing their training under the Army specialized training program.

3. To give medical service to an Army of 1,070,000 will require 5,885 medical officers. The War Department has fixed as the strength of the Medical Corps, Regular Army, 3,000 of a total of 50,000 Regular Army officers corps authorized by Congress. There is, then, at present a deficit of 1,900 officers of the Regular Army Medical Corps and a 'requirement for an additional 2,885 who would have to be procured from civil life on extended active duty or under contract to meet the needs of an Army of 1,070,000. This figure includes the requirements of the Air Forces as well as the Ground Forces.

4. By April 1948, 4,550 medical officers will be available in the categories enumerated under (2) above, which makes an over-all shortage of 1,550 medical officers as of that date.

NORMAN T. KIRK,

Major General,
The Surgeon General.

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: In compliance with your request of April 3, 1947, during the testimony of Major General Norstad on S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, a joint statement by the undersigned on the comparative costs of the existing and the proposed national security organization is hereby submitted.

In general, S. 758 provides for a continuation of boards and agencies established during the last war which are considered essential to our future national security and proposes grouping certain of these agencies under a Secretary of National Defense in order to assure maximum integration consistent with efficiency and economy, not only within the military services but over the entire field of national security. The bill further recognizes the importance of air power in the future and provides for a separate department of the Air Force and a United States Air Force.

For the purpose of this letter the total cost of a department, board, or agency will not be estimated, and only an increase or a decrease in cost will be considered. In arriving at a logical over-all cost estimate the following has been taken into consideration:

1. In general, the agencies, boards, and committees provided for in the bill (S. 758) are already in existence or are to be composed of members who are already in the service of the Government.

2. The Secretary of National Defense will make full use of existing agencies within the military departments, and transfer of detailed supervisory functions to the new office of the Secretary of National Defense is not anticipated.

3. In general, the United States Air Force will continue to use services and facilities now furnished it by the Army, and the Army will continue to use services and facilities now furnished it by the Army Air Force.