Senator BYRD. A good statement too, Admiral.

Senator RUSSELL. I would like to complete the record with respect to people coming up before the Congress. I happen to have served for many years on the Appropriations Committee, and any member of that committee has a right to have any representative of the Government come before the committee that they desire, any member of the committee may ask any question that he desires, and there is no restriction whatever, by Executive order or otherwise, as to that individual's answering the question if it is directly propounded by a member of the Appropriations Committee.

Now, there is an Executive order, and there was a custom before there was an order. It was understood generally, before the President issued this order that employees of the Government, whatever their rank or grade, should not volunteer any information contrary to the administration's policy. But there are always ways of knowing what the witness will testify, and if you ask questions you can get just what that man thinks. And I have never heard of that procedure injuring anyone, and I have heard witness after witness in all the departments of government testify, when the question was put, that they did not agree with the administration's policy. And they gave the reasons and suggested the course that they had recommended in the first instance, and that was done in response to questions of the committee. Now, General Eisenhower may be a very popular man. But, of course, he could not be Secretary of National Defense. In our concept of government, that is a civilian job. And I think it is well, even though, as Senator Robertson says, it involves political appointments, to have such a civilian over the armed services, through whom their budget estimates must pass.

And I think that if anyone, even General Eisenhower, came to this Congress and suggested the abolition of the Marine Corps as a matter of legislation, a great deal of his glamor would be dimmed; and I know that Senator Byrd and myself and Senator Robertson, and I imagine Senator Saltonstall, and I know Senator Maybank, who has Paris Island at his back door, would be doing everything within our power to make General Eisenhower's recommendation look very illadvised. And so would the Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator be kind enough to include me too?

Senator HILL. I will be glad to join the group also.

Senator RUSSELL. The marines may not be very numerous, but you will find that they will prove to be powerful beyond their number. Senator HILL. General Eisenhower is a brave man, but I do not think he would tackle that job.

The Senator has spoken with great authority, which he has, because he has been on the Appropriations Committee now for a good many years. He has spoken of the freedom with which witnesses are allowed to testify, and do testify, and have testified.

Is this not also true: That any department of government that has views which are contrary to those of the administration, if they really have some feeling about the matter, never had any difficulty in getting before the committee and before the Congress? They always have the means to get the questions asked and to get the witnesses before the committee.

Senator ROBERTSON. Admiral, just one question: During your discussions in working on this bill, or the letters of the two Secretaries, was the question of the Cabinet rank of the Secretaries of Navy and of War considered?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. We had no discussion of the question of membership in the Cabinet at all. It was not mentioned in any joint discussion that I took part in prior to the President's decision that he would only have the Secretary of National Defense in his Cabinet.

I had thought a good deal about the question of the Cabinet status of these Secretaries, but I thought it was completely hopeless to try to put anything in the agreement, and certainly even more hopeless to try to put anything in legislation, about membership in an organization which does not have any statutory background for its existence. It is pretty hard to legislate a man into an organization that does not exist in conformance to status.

I do feel that the National Security Council which, under the terms of this legislation, has statutory responsibility for advising the President on questions of foreign policy, military policy, and national security, is in many ways because of that statutory responsibility, because of the nature of this work, equal to the Cabinet as an agency of dignity and importance.

Senator ROBERTSON. That is the National Security Council?

Admiral SHERMAN. I am talking about the National Security Council. That organization would have statutory responsibility for advising the President on these very important matters. To my mind, it would therefore become an agency of dignity and importance certainly equal to that of the Cabinet.

Senator ROBERTSON. Well, as I see it, according to this chart, their suggestions would have to go through the Secretary of National Defense.

Admiral SHERMAN. Only in order to get their views down into the business of preparing detailed budget estimates. Under the law, as proposed, they have statutory responsibility for advising the President on these very important matters, and the Cabinet, as I understand it, has no statutory responsibility whatsoever. In fact, there is no statute establishing it.

Senator HILL. Not only is there no statute establishing it, but as I recall, in the statutes creating the different heads of the different departments, there is no reference to the cabinet.

You suggested the Cabinet as being just the President's advisors, selected by him.

During the war, you will recall, he called many into his Cabinet who had never even sat in the Cabinet before.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Secretary Forrestal, the other day, Mr. Robertson, when you were not feeling well, answered that question. Senator BRIDGES asked him—

Well, are these men going to be in the Cabinet: The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy?

Secretary Forrestal answered that in this way:

My own view is that that is a determination which he is entitled to make, as to whom he shall have in his Cabinet.

I think as far as President Truman was concerned the suggestion was made that he would not have them, but, if I may inject a personal observation, my

experience with the present incumbent of the White House is that he would want those views to be fully developed before all of his advisors, which would include the Cabinet; so I would assume that any strong difference of view of the Secretary of the Navy would be heard by the President.

Then the next question was:

If this bill goes through, there is nothing to guarantee that the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the component parts of this, will get consideration on a Cabinet basis. There is nothing to provide for their being in the Cabinet is there? To that, Secretary Forrestal replied

There is no guaranty, Senator Bridges, that a man who would determine, for example to extinguish the Navy or the Air Forces, who did not believe in either one or the other, might not be able to hamper them. But I think that we have enough safeguards here, again making due allowance for the form of our Government, and the access to the President, which in my mind carries a connotation of wider appeal, if you will.

Senator ROBERTSON. Yes; I read that, Senator. But still I do feel that as advisers to the President, as members of his Cabinet, it is very essential that he should have there the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, as advisers purely to him.

Now, all the advice has to go through the Secretary of National Defense, according to this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that the National Security Council is composed of the Secretaries of the three services, and they report directly to the President.

Senator ROBERTSON. Yes, I am aware of that.

Admiral SHERMAN. But to answer your original question, sir, there was no discussion of the question of Cabinet membership of these officials in the preliminary discussions between General Norstad and

me.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, then, of Admiral Sherman, we will proceed with our next witness, Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad.

We do not have a great deal of time. Again I make the statement that we might expedite the hearings if we will let the witness go through with his prepared statement and save our questions until afterward.

You may proceed, General Norstad.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LAURIS NORSTAD, DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C.

General NORSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I might add that my statement is relatively brief. I think it will only take about 10 or 12 minutes to complete it.

Senator ROBERTSON. I would like to ask you: Has this been approved by the Secretary of War?

General NORSTAD. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. Has he a copy of it?

General NORSTAD. I do not know, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. Has the White House been supplied a copy? General NORSTAD. I understand that a copy has been supplied to the White House for information purposes.

Senator ROBERTSON. There have been no corrections made in it?

General NORSTAD. No corrections or additions. It is as I wrote it. Senator RUSSELL. Were any suggestions made to you as to what you should include in your statement, before you wrote it? General NORSTAD. None, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, General.

General NORSTAD. Since World War I, many studies have been made with a view to developing a workable plan for combining the armed forces into an efficient and economical machine for the preservation of peace, or as a last resort, for the successful prosecution of war. Since 1921 there have been at least 60 bills introduced in the Congress pertaining to this subject. During the same period there have been at least seven congressional committees who have investigated the problem and submitted reports. Most of the proposals considered have included a requirement for a single directing head.

During the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a committee to study the reorganization of national defense. This committee was composed of Army, Navy, and Air officers of long experience. It found that a great majority of the leaders in the field favored a unified system of organization of the Armed Forces.

In 1914, the Committee on Post War Military Policy, House of Representatives, considered the subject of unification and conducted open hearings on October 17 to December 17, 1944. This committee decided that the time was not then opportune to undertake to write the pattern of any proposed unification of the Armed Forces. The committee recommended that when the war was over the Armed Forces should follow the question of reorganization of the services, with a view to recommending to the Congress the results of their study.

Prior to World War II, the real necessity for the integration of our Armed Forces was not so readily apparent. I am convinced, however, that one lesson which has come most clearly from the costly experience of this war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea and air forces at the top as well as in all parts of the world where our Armed Forces are serving.

With your permission, I would like to read an extract from the Summary Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

This group was established by President Roosevelt in the latter part of 1944 to conduct an impartial study of the effects of the air attack on Germany. The findings of the survey were to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating air power as an instrument of military strategy, for planning for the future development of the United States Armed Forces, and for determining future policies with respect to the national defense.

The survey consisted of civilian leaders in the scientific, business, and educational fields of our Nation with Mr. Franklin D'Olier as chairman. It operated under charters from both the Secretaries of War and Navy. I quote from pertinent passages of the summary report (Pacific War) of the survey published July 1, 1946:

The survey has been impressed with the need for concerete and prompt action to encourage adequate research and development; to assure adequate intelligence during peacetime; to integrate our military establishments; and to increase the national appreciation of the necessity for continued strength of the United States as a force for peace.

Even though the United States did not achieve unity of command in the Pacific as a whole, each theater commander used the air, ground, and sea forces assigned to him as an integrated or coordinated team. Coordination and com

promise among theater commanders was largely achieved in all major respects. Such lack of complete integration as existed was in a large measure traceable back through the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the basic structure of our prewar military organization.

The lesson of the Pacific war strongly supported that form of organization which provides unity of command, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control and thus provides closer integration of miltary policy with foreign and domestic policy, and favors a high degree of coordination in planning, intelligence, and research and development. Such unity of command should, however, decentralize administrative burdens and permit specialized training and the free development of the component forces, even at the risk of some duplication.

Within a department of common defense which provides unity of command and is itself oriented toward air and new weapons, the survey believes that, in in addition to the Army and the Navy, there should be an equal and coordinate position for a third establishment. To this establishment should be given primary responsibility for passive and active defense against long-range attack on our cities, industries, and other sustaining resources; for strategic attack, whether by airplane or guided missile; and for all air units other than carrier air and such land-based air, units as can be more effective as component parts of the Army or Navy.

I have quoted from the conclusions reached by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey because substantially similar conclusions are the basis of the bill you are considering, S. 758.

It is my opinion that this bill, if enacted into law, will accomplish three fundamental objectives. It will (1) provide a means for the integration of military policies with foreign and domestic policy; (2) provide for a military establishment with a single civilian head and (3) recognize the fact that our fighting forces comprise a team of three coequal members-the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

With these fundamental objectives accomplished, I am convinced that the process of welding these great fighting arms into a smooth and efficient operating machine will continue rapidly and will present no difficulties that cannot be overcome by concerted action.

I know of no better way in which the Congress can insure the maximum security for each dollar appropriated for national defense. Admiral Sherman has discussed most of the provisions of the bill. I would like briefly to comment on some of the provisions not fully covered by him.

You are all familiar with the position the United States Army has held and the essential part it has played in our national defense. Under the provisions of this bill this position remains substantially unchanged. The name of the War Department is changed to the Department of the Army. The Air Force, which during the war enjoyed autonomy in many respects and, in fact, parity in some— is cut off. The Department of the Army, however, will continue to provide support to the Air Force as determined by the Secretary of National Defense.

Since the bill under consideration provides for a new Department of the Air Force, I will discuss this subject in greater detail. On March 9, 1942, the President, within the limits of the powers granted to him under title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, recognized the necessity of organizational parity for Air by Executive Order No. 9082. Under this order the functions, duties, and powers of the commanding general, General Headquarters, Air Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps were transferred to the commanding general, Army Air Forces.

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