direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and esprit de corps of each service can be retained. It was gratifying to have both of you and General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz assure me that you would all give your wholehearted support to a plan of unification no matter what the decision would be on those points upon which you did not fully agree. I know that I can count upon all of you for full assistance in obtaining passage in the Congress of a bill containing the 12 basic elements set forth above. Very sincerely yours, The Honorable CHAN GURNEY, (Signed) HARRY S. TRUMAN. THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. MY DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: You have requested me to comment on the advisability of having an Under Secretary of National Defense. As you pointed out, S. 758 provides a Secretary of National Defense, but not an Under Secretary or any Assistant Secretaries. Furthermore, S. 758 does not make any provision for succession to the office of the Secretary of National Defense in the event of separation from office of the incumbent. In the course of our exhaustive studies of the problem involved in the reorganization of the armed services, it has been established that a Secretary of National Defense, to best fulfill his purpose, must be free to concentrate his efforts on the establishment of broad policy. He should rely upon capable secretaries at the head of the individual military departments for efficient administration in support of the established policy. In other words, he must look to the secretaries of the military departments for the information and data upon which his policy is to be based and then look again to them for the execution of those policies. In the resolution of the problem of reorganization of the armed forces to which the War and Navy Departments have agreed, a determined effort was made to achive the benefits of a Secretary of National Defense while minimizing the detriment of lowering the stature of the Secretaries of the military departments. It was thought that this could best be accomplished by closing as much as possible the gap between the Secretary of National Defense and the three departmental Secretaries, and by providing the same rate of pay for the Secretaries of the military departments as was provided for the Secretary of National Defense. It is obvious that the position of an Under Secretary above them in the line of succession would be anomalous, and would directly serve to reduce their stature and authority. This matter was considered in the drafting of S. 758, but for the reasons I have given provision for an Under Secretary was not included in the bill. If the bill is left in its present form it would be my understanding that the Secretary of the individual military department having first official precedence would serve as acting Secretary of National Defense in the absence or indisposition of the Secretary of National Defense. I would have no objection to an amendment to S. 758 to provide expressly for succession to the office of Secretary of National Defense. If the succession which I have mentioned is not satisfactory to your committee, provision might be made for the President to appoint any civilian official in the National Defense Establishment to serve as Acting Secretary of National Defense in the absence or indisposition of that Secretary. This, for example, would permit the appointment of the Chairman of the National Resources Board, or some other civilian in the National Defense Establishment as Acting Secretary if the President so desired. Sincerely yours, JAMES FORRESTAL. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess, then, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., an adjournment was taken to reconvene Wednesday, April 2, 1947, at 10 a. m.) NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT-UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1947 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Bridges, Robertson of Wyoming, Saltonstall, Tydings, Hill, and Maybank. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Sherman, I believe we shall continue with your statement at this time. You might have to pick up some threads of what happened yesterday, and then you may proceed in your own way. STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. FORREST SHERMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.-Resumed Admiral SHERMAN. The agreement of January 16 took an incomparably better form than the German authoritarian organization, and it is on the basis of their functions, their roles and missions that weapons and equipment are assigned to our Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is around these functions that their organizations are shaped. Furthermore, no service has a monopoly on any weapon or type of equipment. Each service has the tools to accomplish its strategic mission, by the use of its own forces if possible, or through its joint employment with other services if this is necessary. The Navy with its naval aviation, its Marine Corps and its own service forces and logistic support is a functionally well-balanced service. Its flexibility, range and striking power on and over the sea and over coastal regions, as well as its adaptability to joint employment during the last war, speak for themselves. Senator ROBERTSON. Admiral, in the German form of organization, did they have any such naval aviation, or marine corps, et cetera, as we have? Admiral SHERMAN. In the German organization they had no marine corps which was comparable to ours. They had another very curious arrangement, from our point of view, whereby what is the equivalent of our coast artillery was under the navy. They had no naval aviation, and the records of the conferences between the Commander in Chief of the Navy and the Fuehrer show that the Commander in Chief of the Navy made repeated representations to the effect that he needed naval aviation and he needed greater support from the German Air Force. And although on one or two occasions he got some measure of agreement from Hitler, yet, when Goering, who was the head of the air force, was brought into the consideration of that proposition, he always was able to defeat it. So the German Navy had no naval aviation; and for the reconnaissance from bases in France against the trans-Atlantic convoys which the German submarines were attacking, they were dependent upon the forces which Goering was willing to allocate for that purpose. We have always felt, both from our own observation of what happened, and from our subsequent examination of the records, that what Goering allocated left a great deal to be desired. Senator ROBERTSON. It was quite a weakness, was it not? Admiral SHERMAN. It was. Senator ROBERTSON. In your last statement on page 4 you state: It is on the basis of their functions, their roles and missions, that weapons and equipment are assigned to our Army, Navy, and Air Force. That would not be quite correct, would it, in following the German system? Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. That statement refers to our own organization as contrasted with the German organization, which I discussed yesterday. Senator ROBERTSON. Well, you say: It is on the basis of their functions, their roles and missions. Do you refer to the German functions, roles, and missions? Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. The word "their" refers to the Army, Navy, and Air Force of the United States. Senator HILL. You say: The agreement of January 16 took an incomparably better form than the German "authoritarian" organization. You are referring to that agreement, and it is under that agreement that weapons and equipment are furnished to our Army, Navy, and Air Force, on the basis of their functions, their roles and missions. Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. The basic principles upon which these attributes rest have not been changed by developments in the art of war. This functional balance in our naval forces should be preserved until actual developments necessitate changes. Similarly the Army and the Air Force should be developed as balanced autonomous forces with such of their own service elements as cannot be more effectively supplied by another service. Accordingly the first major feature of the bill is the organization of the National Defense Establishment into three departments instead of into a single department or the two now existing. The naval service has been consistent in desiring to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Navy Department and the Navy, including its Marine Corps and naval aviation as developed through experience in peace and war, and also such service and logistic elements as are essential to naval combat efficiency. The naval service has been consistent in its desire to insure also that the ability of the Navy to discharge its responsibility for the security of the Nation is not impaired, and to retain those imponderables of spirit and morale so essential to a military service. At the same time it recognizes the validity of the desire of the Army and the Air Force also to have a coequal autonomous status with such service elements as are essential to their combat efficiency. Senator ROBERTSON. You mean that, as far as the Army is concerned, it should retain its tactical air force? Admiral SHERMAN. I would mean, in developing that, sir, that the Army should retain such aviation elements as it feels it needs to do its job, and which it cannot properly get from an air force under a separate department. Senator ROBERTSON. That would include its tactical force? Admiral SHERMAN. It would include certain elements, sir, but it is my understanding-and General Norstad is better qualified to speak on that than I am-that it would not include all of what are popularly known as tactical air forces. There are certain elements that they feel they should have organically within the Army; there are certain other elements that they feel can be handled best by getting them from the Air Force. Senator ROBERTSON. Which of the elements that you mention are concerned in here? Will you give us more in detail the elements that you mention that the Army is now controlling as a tactical air force which would, in your opinion, be better handled by the new United States Air Force? Admiral SHERMAN. I think I can do it more clearly if I start at the other end, sir. It is my understanding that the Army desires to retain within the Army the light airplanes that are used for local reconnaissance, for regulation of artillery fire and that sort of thing; but that they have agreed to the transfer to the Air Force of the longer-range offensive elements, which would be used for support of Army troops in the same manner that carrier air forces manned by naval pilots support Army landing forces or marine landing forces, as the case may be. In other words, elements such as medium bombers and pursuit would be transferred to the Air Force, but the lighter aircraft which are organic within the Ground Force organization, would stay with the Army. That is my understanding. Senator ROBERTSON. Well, let us try to put it in a concrete form. When General Eisenhower was at the Rhine, he was very desirous as I understand it, of getting support or help from the strategic bomber force for his crossing of the Rhine. I think he finally got it, after some days. The request had first to go to London, and finally to Washington, and it had to be passed on by the controlling element of the strategic air force there, before it could be used. Apparently that would still be in existence today: he would have no bomber force of his own to prepare the way for his own troops. Admiral SHERMAN. I think, sir, the remedy for that condition lies in the agreements and plans that we have for unified command in the theaters of operation. For instance, to be specific: General Clay, who is now in command in Germany, has under him his own air force commander. He also has under him his own naval commander. The forces involved at the present time are, of course, on a much smaller scale than they were 60266-47-pt. 1- -13 |