United States, whose military services, like its civil institutions, are founded on dynamic functions and administrative autonomy. However, the German solution came to grief and resulted in fatal weakening of the German naval and air forces.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave at 12, and I would like to know whether Admiral Sherman and General Norstad will return tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the other members of the committee wish to take a recess?

In view of the fact that a number of the Senators have to leave, I think it best that we discontinue your testimony this morning and take it up at our next meeting. Will you come back again at 10 tomorrow morning?

(The letter of Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, and Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, dated May 21, 1946, to the President; the letter of the President, dated June 15, 1946, to Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson; and letter of Secretary Forrestal, dated March 29, 1947, to Senator Chan Gurney, are made a part of the record, as follows:)

The PRESIDENT,

The White House.

MAY 31, 1946.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to your instructions, we have reviewed the major elements involved in establishing a greater measure of unification among our national-security organizations, with a view to defining those matters upon which we agree and those upon which we differ. While we regret our inability to bridge completely the gap between us, we are pleased to be able to report a considerable area of agreement. Sincere efforts to expand it were made by both of us.

For your convenience, we outline below those matters upon which agreement exists and those upon which we are unable to agree. The order of presentation is not intended to indicate the relative importance of the various items. I. Agreement exists on the following matters:

1. Council of Common Defense

To integrate our foreign and military policies and to enable the militry services and other agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security. The membership of this Council should consist of the Secretary of State, the civilian head of the Military Establishment (if there be a single military department), the civilian heads of the military services, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, referred to below.

2. National Security Resources Board

To establish, and keep up to date, policies and programs for the maximum use of the Nation's resources in support of our national security. It should operate under the Council and be composed of representatives of the military services and of other appropriate agencies.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

To formulate strategic plans, to assign logistic responsibilities to the services in support thereof, to integrate the military programs to make recommendations for integration of the military budget, and to provide for the strategic direction of the United States military forces.

4. No single military Chief of Staff

In the opinion of the War Department, the Military Establishment should contain a single military Chief of Staff, who would serve as principal military adviser, available to offer advice when differences of opinion arise among the military heads of the several services. The Navy feels that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be the highest source of military advice. The War Department is willing to omit the feature of a single Chief of Staff.

5. Central Intelligence Agency

To compile, analyze, and evaluate information gathered by various Government agencies, including the military, and to furnish such information to the National Security Council and to other Government agencies entitled thereto. It should operate under the Council. An organization along these lines, established by Executive order, already exists.

6. Procurement and supply

There should be an agency to prevent wasteful competition in the field of military supply and procurement through joint planning and coordination of procurement, production, and distribution. If there should be a single military department, this agency should be within the department.

7. Research agencies

There should be an agency to coordinate the scientific research and development of the military services. If there should be a single military department, this agency should be within the department. The existence of such an agency would not remove the need for an over-all central research agency.

8. Military education and training

There should be an agency to review periodically the several systems of education and training of personnel of the military services and to adjust them into an integrated program. If there should be a single military department, this agency should be within the department.

As to the agencies mentioned in 6, 7, and 8 above, the War Department believes that these agencies will not be fully effective except as agencies within a single department. The Navy, on the other hand, believes that they will be more fully effective under a coordinated organization than under a single military department.

II. We are unable to agree on the following matters:

1. Single military department

War Department view:

The Military Establishment should be set up as a single entity, headed by a civilian of Cabinet rank with authority and responsibility for the several services. The administration and supervision of the services should, however, so far as possible be delegated to their respective heads, in order that each service may have as much freedom of development as possible and in order that the traditions and prestige of each be not impaired.

(Only if there is this unity of structure, headed by an individual with power of decision, can we achieve action where there is now inaction, concerted policy where there is now disjointed policy, and economy of manpower, resources, and money where there is now waste of them all. Any organization which does not facilitate prompt decision and prompt action thereon, totally ignores scientific development and the nature of modern war. The military security of the United States is a single objective. Accomplishment of this single objective with the greatest economy and efficiency demands unity of direction.)

Navy Department view:

The Navy favors unification but in a less drastic and extreme form. It believes that serious disadvantages will result from combining the military services into one department. It would involve sacrifices of sound administrative autonomy and essential service morale.

The Navy recognizes the need for a greater measure of integration than now exists, not only between the military departments but among all agencies of Government responsible for our national security. A single military department falls short of meeting these objectives.

While the Navy feels that the measures upon which agreement exists, as set forth above, would fully meet the neesd of present conditions, it sees certain advantages in placing a Presidential deputy with clearly defined powers of decision over specified matters at the head of the Council of Common Defense. From this as a starting point, it should be possible to move forward such further measures of unification as become advisable, based on further experience.

The Secretary of the Navy recommends to the President, in view of the wide area of agreement which presently exists, that legislation be enacted at once giving statutory effect to those matters on which there is agreement. These steps will of themselves constitute a very substantial advance over our prewar, and even our present, organization for national security. If they are put into effect it will

be possible, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, to meet the nine specific objectives set forth in the President's message to the Congress on December 19, 1945. Further consideration and study can then be given to the remaining questions on which there is wide and general divergence of view between, and outside of, the military departments.

2. Three coordinate branches

War Department view:

The Military Establishment should contain three coordinate branches-Naval, Ground, and Air. Each should have a civilian head and a military commander. These officials should have access to the President, but not Cabinet rank since this would be in derogation of the position of the civilian head of the Military Establishment. As was stated above, the three branches should be given as much autonomy as possible. Our experience in the last war clearly indicates that parity for the Air Force and the operation of all three services as a team are essential to our national security. Everything that we know of the future points to an increase rather than a decrease in the decisive role of air power. Navy Department view:

The Navy feels that our national security requires maintenance of the integrity of the Navy Department, headed by a civilian Secretary of Cabinet rank. Naval aviation, together with surface and subsurface components, have been soundly integrated within the Navy. The Navy feels that similar integration by the Army of its Air and Ground Forces would be in the best interest of our national security.

However, if the alternatives were three military departments or one, the Navy would prefer three departments.

3. Aviation

War Department view:

Responsibility for the development, procurement, maintenance, and operations of the military air resources of the United States should be a function of the Air Forces with the following exceptions, in which cases these responsibilities should be vested in the United States Navy: (a) Ship, carrier and waterbases aircraft essential to naval operations including those of the United States Marine Corps; (b) land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces, and where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities; (c) land-type aircraft necessary for the training of personnel for (a) and (b) above.

(The Nation cannot afford the luxury of several completely self-sufficient services. The war demonstrated that they must be complementary-mutually supporting. With respect to land planes, there are no purely naval functions which justify uneconomical duplication of equipment and installations. For example, the Air Force already performs long-range reconnaissance for the Ground Forces and itself. The Navy's recognized requirement for the products of long-range reconnaissance can be effectively filled by the Air Force. As regards antisubmarine warfare, it is the view of the War Department that the experience of the Army Air Forces in the last war adequately justifies the belief that land-based planes operated by the Air Forces can meet this requirement.)

Navy Department view:

The Navy has no desire either to compete with, or to dictate to, the Army Air Forces. On the other hand, the Navy feels that its experience qualifies it to judge its own aviation needs.

One reason for the Navy's strong conviction against a single department is the continued efforts of the Army Air Forces to restrict and limit naval aviation. The Navy knows that these efforts, if successful, would seriously impair our sea power and jeopardize our national security.

To accomplish its fundamental purpose, the Navy needs a certain number of landplanes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Experience indicates that such landplanes, to be effective, must be manned by naval personnel trained in naval warfare. Lack of such aircraft under complete naval control as to design, procurement, operations, personnel, training, and administration might be disastrous to our national security. Similarly the Navy must have air transport essential to its needs.

4. United States Marine Corps

The Navy and the Army differ on the functions of the United States Marine Corps as follows:

War Department view:

There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component for

(1) Service with the fleet in the seizure of enemy positions not involving sustained land fighting and

(2) To continue the development of tactics, techniques, and equipment relating to those phases of amphibious warfare which pertain to waterborne aspects of landing operations.

Navy Department views:

There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component for

(1) Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advance naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign and

(2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces.

There is agreement upon the other primary duties of the Marine Corps, viz: (1) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, and

(2) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

These matters have been explored by us with a sincere desire to comply with your wishes that the military services reach complete mutual agreement. Our failure to achieve complete unanimity is due to no reason other than that our respective views on the points of difference are as sincere as they are divergent. Faithfully yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Secretary of War. (Signed) JAMES FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy.

(The text of the letter from the President to Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal follows:)

The Honorable ROBERT P. PATTERSON,

The Secretary of War.

The Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,

The Secretary of the Navy.

JUNE 15, 1946.

GENTLEMEN: I have read with care your joint report of May 31, 1946. It was also helpful to me to have the full oral presentation of the points involved, which you and the members of your Departments made to me on June 4.

I am pleased and gratified at the progress you have made. I feel that we have come a long way in narrowing the zone of disagreement which had previously existed between the services. The full understanding reached on eight vital aspects of unification is a significant accomplishment. These eight elements are Council of Common Defense, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs of Staff, omission of single Military Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Procurement and Supply, Research Agencies and Military Education and Training.

In addition to these eight points of agreement, I am advised also by representatives of both services that they are in accord in their attitude toward the provision in the Thomas bill (S. 2044), which provides for four assistant secretaries in charge of research, intelligence, procurement, and training, respectively. They believe that such assistant secretaries are unnecessary. I agree with their position that the presence of these four assistant secretaries is undesirable because they would greatly complicate the internal administration of the services and that such a plan would deprive the secretaries of the respective services of functions which are properly theirs.

Your report of May 31 listed four items upon which you were unable to agree. An analysis of your comments contained in your report, and in the lengthy discussion which we had, discloses that the services are not nearly so far apart

in their attitude toward these points as had been reported. It is my firm conviction that the determination of these questions in the manner which I present herein will result in a plan which incorporates the best features offered by the respective services.

With reference to the points upon which full agreement was not reached my position is as follows:

1. Single military department

There should be one Department of National Defense. It would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the Cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the title of "Secretary." These Secretaries would be charged with the internal administration within their own services. They would not be members of the Cabinet. Each service would retain its autonomy, subject of course to the authority and over-all control by the Secretary of National Defense. It is recognized that the services have different functions and different organizations and for these reasons the integrity of each service should be retained. The civilian secretaries of the services would be members of the Council of Common Defense and in this capacity they would have the further opportunity to represent their respective services to the fullest extent.

2. Three coordinated services

There should be three coordinated services--the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The three services should be on a parity and should operate in a common purpose toward over-all efficiency of the national defense under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretaries of the three services should be known as Secretary for the Army, Secretary for the Navy, and Secretary for the Air Force.

3. Aviation

The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the development, procurement, maintenance, and operation of the military air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:

(1) Ship, carrier, and water-based aircraft essential to naval operations, and aircraft of the United States Marine Corps.

(2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces and where the requirements cannot be met by normal air-transport facilities.

(3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of personnel for the aforementioned purposes.

Land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work as a team there must be close cooperation, with interchange of personnel and special training for specific duties.

Within its proper sphere of operation, naval aviation must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity to develop its maximum usefulness.

4. United States Marine Corps

There shall be maintained as a constituent part of the naval service a balanced fleet marine force including its supporting air component to perform the following functions:

(1) Service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

(2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by the landing forces.

(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.

(4) To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases.

It is important that the basic elements of the plan of unification be stated clearly. The eight fundamental points agreed upon and the four points which are herewith decided, constitute a total of 12 basic principles that should form the framework of the program for integration.

There is no desire or intention to affect adversely the integrity of any of the services. They should perform their separate functions under the unifying