Chiefs of Staff; which, of course, is not the intention of it at all, in my opinion.

Admiral SHERMAN. We tried, in this particular chart, to show only the primary line of control, with the exception of the one dotted line from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is there for constitutional reasons.

Senator TYDINGS. Well, I hope that my comments will cause us to find some way that we can make sure that someone will offer an amendment from the War Department or the Navy Department that the Intelligence Agency is to have direct tie-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Otherwise, we may have another Pearl Harbor controversy, with the question arising, "Who got the information?" And the reply, "It was not transmitted."

That is one thing that should not happen again.

And as this is set up, it would lend the layman the opinion that it was more or less detached, rather than an integral part of the three services. Admiral SHERMAN. I can assure you, sir, that the Central Intelligence-Navy is now serving us very effectively.

Senator BYRD. I see, Admiral, that in the section relating to the Central Intelligence Agency on page 20, you provide that—

any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force may be appointed to the office of Director.

Is it the intent that he shall be a military man?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is not the intent of that language, sir, and I do not think this bill does require that. Section 202 (b) is permissive. Section 202 (a) provides that there be a director; 202 (b), although it is very lengthy, provides that a commissioned officer may be appointed to that office. And then there is considerable language which safeguards his position in the military service in that event. Senator BYRD. Do you construe from that that a civilian could be appointed?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Would it not be better to make that clear? The way it is worded is certainly persuasive, if not definitely controlling.

Admiral SHERMAN. Since this is not the first time it has come up, I think that the language of the bill would be improved if, in 202 (a), where it says, with reference to the director, "to be appointed by the President," there were added such a phrase as "from military or civilian life," or vice versa. I think that would clarify it.

Senator TYDINGS. Admiral, that is an awfully short bit of explanation, under the caption "Central Intelligence Agency," the way it is set up here, separately, to be appointed by the President, and superseding the services now run by the Army and the Navy, I respectfully submit to you and to General Norstad that it might be wise to put an amendment in there, in order to make certain that the thing is understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency shall service the three Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have some tie-in with the three Departments, rather than to leave it hanging up there on a limb all off to itself. I do not think that would change anything materially, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are setting up something for the purposes for which we conceive it to be set up.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I would like to make a comment on the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency.

At one time in the drafting we considered completely covering the Central Intelligence Agency in the manner that it should be covered by law.

Senator TYDINGS. Admiral, my point in simply this: That under the wording as to the Central Intelligence Agency which begins on page 20 and ends at the top of page 22, it deals more or less with consolidation and not with the duties that devolve upon that office.

It seems to me there is a void in the bill there that ought to be eliminated.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, we considered the matter of trying to cover the Central Intelligence Agency adequately, and we found that that matter, in itself, was going to be a matter of legislation of considerable scope and importance.

Senator TYDINGS. A separate bill?

Admiral SHERMAN. A separate bill. And after consultation with General Vandenberg, we felt it was better in this legislation only to show the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council, and then leave to separate legislation the task of a full and thorough development of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator TYDINGS. Well, now, for the record, is it safe for this committee to assume that during this session it is likely that a bill will come along dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency in the particulars that we have had under discussion?

Admiral SHERMAN. It is my understanding that that will take place. The CHAIRMAN. How about that, General Vandenberg?

General VANDENBERG (Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief, Central Intelligence Agency). The enabling act is prepared, but we do not want to submit that until we have reason for it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To carry out that point, look at subparagraph (c), sections (1) and (2). The bill does talk about functions there. It does take up certain functions that are now in existence and transfers them to this agency.

If you are going to take up any functions, let me ask you, to follow up your question, should you not take up all the functions, or leave out that subsection (c) in some way?

Senator TYDINGS. What happens under the bill, it seems to me, is that the consolidation itself takes place, but the services which are to be performed, and by whom they are to be performed, and for whom they are to be performed, are not very clearly set out. And I imagine it would be better in a separate bill. But I did not know the separate bill was coming, and in looking over the bill, it seemed to me to deal very shortly with a very important operation.

So your question and mine probably both would be answered in the new bill that is coming along.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The only point, to try to carry out what you said: It does mention some functions here, but does not mention all the functions.

Senator TYDINGS. And it deals with consolidation of functions. Senator SALTONSTALL. It takes over certain functions not now in existence, if you will read subparagraph (c) there.

Senator TYDINGS. That is what I mean.

Admiral SHERMAN. The intent of this language was merely to transfer the duties of the existing intelligence agency to the Se

curity Council, and, next, to move the functions of the intelligence group as it is now constituted, by a letter directive of the President, over to the authority.

I would suggest that it might be beneficial to take the existing letter directive under which the Central Intelligence Agency is functioning now, and insert it in the record. Because that letter will clarify this whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time the committee hears General Vandenberg, I am sure the General will bring with him that letter and we will have that in at the start of those hearings.

Senator ROBERTSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. In connection with making this more definite and certain, I feel that this should be done in this bill:

I think the question of Naval Aviation should be set forth much more clearly and should be a congressional decision, making it a matter for the Congress to decide, or to determine in this bill, what are the functions of the various three arms, if you wish to call them that, of the service.

There is a very great difference of opinion among the Navy men and among the Air Force men, particularly, and among the Army also, as to the aviation points of this bill; as to how much aviation will actually go to Navy; and as to the status of the Marine Corps. But I think the Congress should set that up very clearly in this bill.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we are under a very great handicap here.

Practically every witness that we have had before us and that, as far as I can see, we will have, is in favor of this bill.

The very fact that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and the President have more or less agreed to this bill, agreed to sponsor this bill, really is a notification to every man in the armed services that that is the department of the various armed services, and there must be no statements or words issued against it; and I feel that the Navy has carried that out to the letter.

I am sorry that I cannot say the same for the Air Force.

I would like to read into the record at this time, from the Washington Post of Thursday, March 20, 1947, a statement by a columnist, headed "End of the Marines." [Reading:]

Interesting light on the future of the Marine Corps was given by Brig. Gen. Frank Armstrong in an off-the-record talk before a group of naval officers at a dinner tendered by Norfolk, Va., businessmen.

General Armstrong, who is part Indian, and who had a fine record in training B-29 crews, really let his hair down regarding the future role of the Army Air Forces and the Marines, as follows:

"You gentlemen had better understand that the Army Air Force is tired of being a subordinate outfit, and is no longer going to be a subordinate outfit. It was a predominant force during the war. It is going to be a predominant force during the peace, and you might as well make up your minds, whether you like it or not that we do not care whether you like it or not: The Army Air Force is going to run the show. You, the Navy, are not going to have anything but a couple of carriers which are ineffective anyway, and they will probably be sunk in the first battle.

"Now, as for the Marines, you know what the Marines are. They are a small, fouled-up army talking navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the Regular Army and make efficient soldiers out of them. The Navy is going to send up by only supplying the requirements of the Army, Air, and Ground Forces too. The Army is going to take over Norfolk. We are here

now, and we are going to stay. We know this is a Navy town and a Navy hang-out, but the Army Air is still going to stay, and we are going to take over."

Senator TYDINGS. There is a man who has no pride in his own branch of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that the chairman of the committee remembers that article, an article by Drew Pearson, and I would like to ask General Norstad for the Army to ascertain if there was any record taken of that talk made by Brigadier General Armstrong, and if there was a record made of that talk which he gave, the committee would like to have it.

Senator ROBERTSON. I would like to ask the same question of Admiral Sherman-if the Navy has any report on that meeting.

Senator BRIDGES. I would like to ask that General Armstrong be brought here as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman will be glad to sit when any of the other members of the committee would like to sit to hear General Armstrong.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as that happened in Norfolk, I would like to second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your statement, Admiral. Admiral SHERMAN: On January 20 work was started on drafting legislation in accord with the above agreement. Our task was to achieve a draft satisfactory to the War and Navy Departments and subsequently to assist in adjusting it satisfactorily to the other interested executive agencies of the Government.

The bill now before you is the product of that collaboration. It is in many respects a compromise of views initially divergent. I believe that it is an equitable compromise, one which will work, one which is in the interests of our national security, and one which will increase the effectiveness of our national defense. It is my belief that economies would eventually result from the proposed organization, although actual dollar savings may not be great except during a period of large procurement or large expansion.

To my mind, the greatest immediate benefits to be derived from the proposed legislation would be the unity of military concepts, the unity of purpose, and the unity of effort, which should result from the organization as proposed, and from putting an end to contention and controversy over the unification question.

I want to repeat that the bill represents part-the agreement on functions is the other part-of an over-all accord achieved from divergent points of view. Although the areas of divergencies have been narrowed during recent months, any one section of the bill may still represent a concession by one service to another. It is not to be expected that the services will give unanimous support to each section of the bill by itself.

It has been long apparent that any national security organization should be so constituted and empowered as to fit harmoniously into the existing framework of our Government. Study of the principles under which our American institutions have been successful shows that there are two things which these institutions all have in common, whether they are institutions in the Government, in business, in industry, or in the professions.

First, the structure of our various institutions is normally built around the special purpose, or the function, they are intended to fulfill instead of following certain foreign practices of building the structure first and then throwing the purpose in afterward.

Second, each functional institution normally is essentially autonomous in its mode of working and doing business. Such controls as exist over successful institutions pertain in most cases to policy matters and are at the same time positive and firm.

In keeping with the American system, these controls serve to guide and direct from above in such manner as to insure common action but without destroying the enterprise and flexibility of the autonomous units by projecting lines of authority and control into the inner structure of the units themselves.

An outstanding example of the antithesis of the American system was the German armed forces organization under Hitler's armed forces high command, which he created in 1939 in anticipation of World War II.

The German organization was designed for authoritarian control in which rigid lines of authority would proceed direct from a supreme commander to and within operating units.

It swept functions aside as though they were of no consequence and built its whole military structure in terms of the static media-the three elements of land, sea, and air-in which wars are fought; that is, instead of assigning functions, or missions, to its army, navy, and air force, and then providing them with the weapons and men to fulfill those functions, they gave them men, weapons, and material without the functions.

To the army, for instance, they gave a virtual monopoly of all ground weapons and equipment; to the navy they gave a monopoly over all seacraft and sea weapons; and to the air force they gave a monopoly over all aircraft and air weapons.

The German Army, Navy, and Air Forces under this doctrine, which in the naval service would be called a type doctrine, became essentially huge organizations for the maintenance of equipment and the training of their personnel in its mechanical use. The services were not recognized as having individual strategic missions. In the strict sense, they had practically no operational autonomy. Every operation was a joint operation, with the navy providing U-boats, for instance, and the air force reconnaissance planes. Every operation called for a joint staff, which, in turn, functioned under a heirarchy of joint staffs, largely dominated by the German Army and extending to a supreme general staff. This system was very costly of men but was designed for the authoritarian control which the German High Command sought, regardless of its cost in flexibility.

Regarding this system, Field Marshal Keitel, the first supreme chief of staff, stated at the time of its inauguration:

This solution (of unification) has found a warm response in the nation and in the ranks of the officers' corps. In my opinion, the present organization of the armed forces command represents the most logical and most efficient solution for an authoritarian state. All that is needed is to recognize these facts and to adopt them in a harmonious manner.

It is needless for me to point out that an "organization of the armed forces representing the most logical and efficient solution for an authoritarian state" would not be the most efficient solution for the