the world conditions are more stable. That is engaging the services of approximately 40,000 officers and men and is costing us a good deal of money.

Curiously enough, if the Congress reduces the funds to a point where we have to furhter reduce our active fleets, it will cost us a great deal of money to dispose of those ships. It cost approximately a quarter of a million dollars to lay up a large ship like an aircraft carrier or a battleship, to lay it up in the manner that we think it should be laid up for possible future use.

We have to provide berthing facilities for that ship, where she can be securely kept during this period that we want to keep her. That

costs money.

From the end of hostilities until the 1st of September 1946, the Navy demobilized from 31⁄2 million to 4 million men. Today we are approximately 430,000 men.

The demobilization of materials and ships has not moved as rapidly, and that is what is costing us a good deal of men and money at the present time.

We hope that that program will be completed by the end of this year, the end of this calendar year. By the 1st of January 1948, we hope that all of the ships involved will be laid up, and our bases will be rolled up. That is uppermost in our minds, Mr. Chairman, and I assure you that we are reducing to a very minimum the shore establishment needs to maintain our active fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. In your answers to questions from Senator Bridges, you told about the plan for the national security, and how there was agreement between the Army and the Navy at the moment and that plans were ready.

Undoubtedly, this complete national effort on economy causes you some concern, for undoubtedly, you will have to dig into your plans and squeeze them together somewhat below even the estimate presented in the budget. Undoubtedly-and I should like to put this as a question-the Navy is presenting to the Appropriations Committee the places in the national planning where you feel security is being jeopardized?

Admiral NIMITZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You will do that in both the House and Senate before June 30, undoubtedly.

Admiral NIMITZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Thank you very much, Admiral, for coming down this morning. I feel quite sure we may not have to have you back again, although some of the committee are not present this morning and they may want to ask some questions later.

However, we will notify you in plenty of time.

I certainly appreciate the frankness with which you have answered the questions. I think you have done a great deal of good in properly presenting the bill, and what we are up against on national security. The committee will stand in recess now until Friday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, March 28, 1947.)

NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT-UNIFICATION OF

THE ARMED FORCES

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1947

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Bridges, Robertson of Wyoming, Saltonstall, Tydings, Russell, Byrd, and Maybank.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are still taking testimony on S. 758.

Before the start of the testimony this morning, that of Admiral Sherman and General Norstad, I would like to have entered in the record, a copy of the resolution adopted by the American Legion at its twenty-seventh annual convention at San Francisco last fall, in favor of the bill for unification of the armed forces. (The resolution referred to is as follows:)

RESOLUTION No. 816

San Francisco National Convention, September 30-October 1-4, 1946

SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Whereas the American Legion at its twenty-seventh annual convention established its policy on unification as follows:

"We endorse the principle of a unified command of our armed forces with the Army, Navy, and Air Force on an equal level."

Whereas Congress recognizing the need for unification of the armed forces, has voted to reorganize its Committees on Military and Nayal Affairs to accomplish unity of action; and

Whereas closer coordination between branches of the armed services is essential to adequate preparedness and economy of supply; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Congress is requested to enact appropriate legislation to establish a single department for national security with provision for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces on an equal level therein.

The CHAIRMAN. The two officers assigned by the Army and Navy to work out the bill that is presently before us are here with us this morning. They are Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad.

Admiral Sherman, do you have a prepared statement this morning?

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. FORREST SHERMAN, U. S. N., NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. After that, the committee will undoubtedly want to ask you some questions.

You may proceed.

Admiral SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be helpful if, before proceeding with a detailed discussion of the proposed National Security Act of 1947, I review briefly the background of its drafting.

On May 31, 1946, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy submitted to the President a letter in which agreement was reached on various matters including a Council of Common Defense, a National Security Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Central Intelligence Agency. It was agreed that there should be no, single military Chief of Staff.

At that time full agreement was not reached on the coordination of procurement, production, and distribution; with respect to a research agency, or to an agency for the review of military education and training. At that time no agreement was reached on the number of military departments, or on the status of the Army Air Forces and naval aviation and the functions of the United States Marine Corps. The President in his letter of June 15, 1946, to the chairmen of the military committees in Congress and the Secretaries of the military departments reviewed the above points and outlined his position regarding those on which full agreement had not been reached.

Senator BYRD. May I interrupt you there?

Do you have the President's letter of June 15, 1946?
Admiral SHERMAN. Yes; I think we have one here.

Senator BYRD. At the conclusion of the Admiral's testimony, I would like to have that put in the record.

Admiral SHERMAN. There is a complete file here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the conclusion of your testimony this morning, we will follow with the President's letter of June 15, 1946.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to delay things, but if you put in the President's letter, will it not be necessary to put in the May 31 letter to which the President replied?

The CHAIRMAN. We will put them both in.

All right, Admiral; you may proceed.

Admiral SHERMAN. On November 7, 1946, Mr. Forrestal invited Mr. Symington, General Norstad, Admiral Radford, and me to a meeting at his home at which it was agreed to draft a plan for unification acceptable to both the War and Navy Departments, and within the scope and spirit of the President's letter of June 15, 1946. It was apparent that the issues which would have to be resolved in order for the Army and Navy to work better together were as follows:

First. The form of administrative organization of the departments in Washington;

Second. The military command arrangements in Washington; Third. The military command arrangements in the field;

Fourth. The status and future of naval aviation;

Fifth. The status and future of the Marine Corps.