In March 1965, the President requested that the Director of the U.S. Information Agency visit Vietnam and report back to him on the progress of the psychological war in that country and what added steps the Agency could take to help. The Director's report concluded that the psychological effort, despite the fact that there was almost unanimous agreement as to its importance, was being given too little attention and direction. The report concluded with specific recommendations of things to be done, and the President instructed that these recom mendations be implemented immediately. The Agency has been following through since March. The nature of the effort and the uses to which additional resources are being put are as follows:

1. Expansion of USIS field operations

The need was to create an organization which reached down to the village level. USIS was given the role of coordinating psychological operations which, at the village level, are conducted by U.S. Army psychological warfare personnel, their Vietnamese Army counterparts, and the Vietnamese Information Service and other Government of Vietnam civil officials. To improve this effort, it was neces sary to establish a more effective, unified chain of command, make sure that there was a nationwide, planned effort; make sure that personnel were doing the best professional job possible; and make sure that necessary support materials were available.

It was decided that the most effective overall U.S. Government participation would result from a joint operation of USIS and military personnel. Accord

ingly, a central Field Services Division was established. This in turn operated through a network of USIS field representatives who were charged with organizing efforts at the local level. A senior USIS field representative is in charge of each of the four corps areas of Vietnam. Junior representatives under him are in charge of an average of two provinces each. They are each assisted by an average of three USIS Vietnamese employees who work right in the provincial operations of the Vietnamese Information Service and other local groups.

The job of these American field representatives is to help organize the local effort. By now, nearly every province has an operating psychological coordinating committee, most of which have developed action plans for the province. These plans assure that the psychological factor is included in all military operations, in rural development projects, in programs to win over the Vietcong, and in all other programs designed to influence the local Vietnamese people to support their government.

This new structure requires increased programing and considerably increased support. Each field representative must have the equipment and materials at his command to be responsive to local needs. These include motion picture equipment, some for daylight shadowbox showings in areas where nighttime projection is too dangerous; added motion picture production; tactical leaflets and longer range pamphlets stressing rural development and building the will to resist; administrative supplies and materials and vehicles to provide flexibility of movement and operations.

2. Expansion of field program direction and advisory support to the Government of Vietnam

The buildup in field operations requires increases in the complement of officers in Saigon directly associated with psychological operations: (a) senior level officers for the overall direction of the program; (b) special-project officers to carry out training and other activities in the provinces, although stationed in Saigon; (c) advisers to the Government of Vietnam in psychological activities to assist the Government of Vietnam more and more to take on these responsibilities itself; (d) a planning and evaluation staff to determine Vietcong vulnerabilities and our best method of operations.

Added support personnel are also required actually to produce medial materials needed by our field programs and to provide administrative backstopping for the program as a whole.

In Thailand, Communist Chinese boasts that a sizable insurgency situation would deevlop before the end of 1965 are backed up by a marked increase in Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese-backed subversive activities in recent months. These follow the classic pattern-stepped up attacks on provincial policemen and officials, creation of a "national liberation movement" under external Communist auspices, and the smuggling of arms and men into northeast Thailand. For example, recently a policeman was killed and the colonel commanding the police forec of the critical Province of Nakorn Phanom was seriously wounded in a skirmish with a large band of insurgents.

Backstopping these activities has been a well-coordinated propaganda effort based primarily on radio broadcasts by the clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" but also including printed matter and heavy Communist press agency dissemination of anti-RTG statements made by members of the "Thai Patriotic Front," set up early in 1965.

The situation offers a serious threat to Thailand's continued ability to maintain its independence. It is the judgment of the Ambassador and of the Department of State that if the United States acts swiftly and makes use of the experience painfully gained in Vietnam, we can assist the RTG in preventing a full-grown war of "national liberation," using dollars for psychological operations now to keep from using bullets later.

The program proposed in Thailand would be primarily in the 15 provinces of the northeast. USIS efforts would supply the psychological underpinning for the already extensive and growing development efforts of the Thai Government with the assistance of USAID and the JUSMAG.

The proposed plan will provide for locating an American officer, assisted by three Thai employees, in an additional five of the northeast provinces now covered by USIS branch posts in Udon, Ubon, and Korat, and in three other critical border provinces. Each officer would be supported by program materials and equipment.

Additional media support for the activity of these field officers, and to backstop the psychological aspects of the Thai Government's mobile development units and joint mobile information teams, are also required.

A. American employee compensation and benefits (prior 1966 estimate, $4,574,803; current 1966 estimate, $5,016,094; supplemental request, $441,291)

The supplemental request of $441,291 will provide for the costs of 19 additional American positions for Vietnam to support expanded psychological operations and 13 additional American positions required for operation, planning, and logistical support of programs in northeast Thailand (details of new positions on p. 186).

The addition of 19 American positions in Vietnam will provide a total increase of 55 American positions over the original 1966 estimate. The cost of 36 American positions was offset by the closing down or curtailment of operations in Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma; including the dropping of 25 American positions.

B. Local employee compensation and benefits (prior 1966 estimate, $2,935,795; current 1966 estimate, $2,989,131; supplemental request, $53,336)

The supplemental request of $53,336 will provide for the costs of 40 additional local employee positions, required for operation, planning, and logistical support of programs in northeast Thailand (details of new positions on p. —). The costs of the 60 additional local employee positions required to support the expanded psychological operations in Vietnam were more than offset by the reduction of 186 local positions in Indonesia and Cambodia programs. American and local employee compensation and benefits provide for American and local employee positions in the Far East as follows:

The 1966 supplemental request includes 19 additional American positions for Vietnam (over and above the reallocation of staff accommodated under the House allowance for 1966) and 13 American and 40 local employee positions for Thailand. The following position changes are proposed:

(a) For Vietnam.-Staff shifts accommodated under the 1966 House allowance and the additions proposed in this supplemental provide a total increase of 55 American and 60 local employee positions above the original 1966 estimate. These positions are required to provide support of expanded psychological operations in Vietnam by the addition of 36 American and 35 local employee positions for field operations and 19 American and 25 local employee positions to be stationed in Saigon to provide planning and logistical support and development of materials in the field of press, motion pictures, exhibits, and radio activities.

(b) For Thailand.-This supplemental request provides 5 American and 15 local employee positions to staff 4 new branch posts (Khon Kaen, Nakorn Phanom, Nakorn Sawan, and Phitsanuloke) in the provinces of northeast Thailand; 4 American and 13 local employee positions to strengthen 5 existing branch posts (Chiengmai, Korat, Songkhla, Ubon, and Udon); and 4 American and 12 local employee positions to be stationed in Bangkok to provide planning and logistical support and development of materials in the field of press, information,. and cultural activities.

54-434-65-pt. 3--12

The following table recapitulates the position changes planned for the Far East area since the original 1966 estimate was prepared:

C. Overseas program activity costs (prior 1966 estimate, $3,571,441; current 1966 estimate, $4,616,614 supplemental request, $1,045,173)

Overseas program activity costs derive from the following activities: Radio, television, press and publications, motion pictures, information center and related activities, binational center assistance, research, program direction, and direct administrative expenses. The estimates for each of these activities are shown below in detail.

1. Radio activities (prior 1966 estimate, $154,313; current 1966 estimate. $208,813; supplemental request, $54,500).—Radio activities consist of the following:

The supplemental request of $54,500 will provide (a) $32,000 for Vietnam to cover special and feature events for inclusion in all locally produced radio programs, planned production of pilot radio programs for use by Radio Vietnam and various Government of Vietnam ministries, program production assistance to Radio Vietnam regional and provincial stations, development of program materials and provincial stations: and (b) $22,500 for Thailand to cover increased costs related to local production of a dramatic series on communism for broadcast to northeast and central Thailand, and the planned local production of two new radio programs for use in the northeast area of Thailand.

2. Television activities (prior 1966 estimate, $41,914; current 1966 estimate, $41,914; no change).-Television activities consist of the following:

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