Stations will be designed with a view to congregating passengers together rather than isolating them on separate platforms. The Agency's plans emphasize center-platform loading. In other words, all passengers will utilize the same waiting area regardless of their direction of travel. The likelihood that an offense against one passenger would go unnoticed by others will be greatly reduced. To guard against incidents during off-peak, late-evening, and weekend periods, the stations will be equipped with facilities for closing off unnecessary mezzanine and platform areas so as to keep patrons together and thus facilitate their protection. All stations and other public areas of the system will be finished in bright revealing colors, and will be fully illuminated by modern fluorescent lighting. In contrast to the poor lighting associated with older subways, under the Agency's plans, daylight conditions will obtain throughout the public areas of the Washington system. Thus, supervision of such space will be facilitated and loitering discouraged.

There has been, in some quarters, a tendency to equate the public safety problems that exist on older subway systems and those that may be confronted in Washington. There is no basis for this. In design and operation the Washington subway will be vastly different from all of the existing systems in the United States. The Washington system will take advantage of every new design concept, device, or procedure possible to enhance public safety. Some of the major differences between the NCTA system and those in other cities are listed below.

(7) Station lighting.

Because of system layout or of traffic demand, cities such as New
York must operate long trains even in late evening hours, thus
few passengers are spread over many cars, out of sight of oper-
ating personnel.

Train operators and in some cases conductors (guards) are in en-
closed cabs.

Most systems must depend on wayside telephones alone, though
Chicago is completing a 2-way radio system for trains and New
York is considering it.

Because of the inability of some systems to reduce train lengths in
the evening hours they must stretch out the interval between
trains, often as long as 15 minutes.

New York runs trains all night, providing a hangout for vagrants
and other undesirables.

Often there is little attempt made to coordinate schedules of rapid
transit and surface lines resulting in long waits for connecting
buses at transfer points.

Stations and approaches to stations often have a poor standard of
lighting.
(8) Station entrance and mezzanine design. Many stations in New York and Philadelphia have mezzanines
as long as the platform, often with hidden pockets which are
difficult to supervise. Passengers are spread too thinly over a
large area in off-peak periods.

Side platforms are common in many stations. Often they require
awkward connecting passageways and have more stairways to
supervise than island platform stations. Platforms with a
forest of supporting columns have too many places to hide.

Communication with the "outside world" if often limited to a telephone connection with the change booth clerk who has visual control over a restricted area.

NCTA proposed system

The system is designed to permit reduction of trains to single car
units in the evenings so that all passengers are within control of
the operator.

Simplification of controls and operation due to advances in tech-
nology permits cabs to be open, similar to the driver's position
in a modern bus.
All trains would have radio contact at all times with the central
dispatcher who would have a direct line to the police.

1-car trains would operate on frequent intervals leaving little
opportunity to commit offenses at stations.

The NCTA system would close down during the early morning
hours (with substitute bus service where necessary) which would
discourage use of the system by vagrants.

Schedules would be coordinated, as is done in Cleveland, so a pas-
senger can take a train which meets a particular bus, reducing
waiting time at the transfer point. Most stations outside of
downtown would be the terminal point for feeder bus routes.
There would almost always be a bus with driver in the station
area.

Modern lighting, in and outside of stations, would deter crime, as
has been the experience with street lighting improvement.
Mezzanines with straight through circulation as are found in
Stockholm and Hamburg are more compact and easier to control.
These would be the model for NCTA stations. Many mezza-
nines would contain commercial activities, or would be tied in
with local commercial centers so that there would be people and
activity around the stations at all hours.

The NCTA stations would have island platforms which concen-
trate the waiting passengers giving them mutual protection.
Modern construction methods would allow stations to have
much more feeling of openness than older stations, discouraging
their use by vagrants and making them easier to police. Portions
of stations would be closed off during periods of lighter traffic to
reduce the area needing supervision.

Closed circuit TV would permit supervision of stations from the
central dispatching office. A talk-back information service with
facilities on the platforms and mezzanines, connected with a cen-
tral office, could also serve in emergencies. The existence of such
facilities will be a deterrent to crime.

Another aspect of this problem that is receiving, and will continue to receive the Agency's close attention, is that of providing for the actual surveillance and policing of the system. In connection with surveillance, under the Agency's plans the stations and other public areas of the system will be equipped with modern electronic communication systems designed to permit a quick response to trouble whenever it might occur. Where necessary, stations can be equipped with closed-circuit televisions monitored at a convenient police control point, which will do much to discourage would-be offenders.

Concerning the matter of policing, it is the Agency's view that this will be a matter primarily within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. The Agency understands that the Board of Commissioners concurs.

It is not possible, however, at this juncture to present any specific plan of protection for the entire system. Arrangements must be made with Maryland and Virginia authorities concerning the facilities located in their jurisdictions and in any event, it is difficult at this time to know with any degree of certainty the size, character, and composition of the security force that may be needed to patrol the system.

The Agency's review of other rail rapid transit cities shows a variety of approaches ranging from total dependence on the regular local law enforcement agencies, as in Chicago and Philadelphia, to maintenance of a special transit police force, as in New York City. The formulation of a plan of protection for the Washington system will require cooperative planning by the Agency and the law enforcement authorities of the region. To accomplish this, under section 203 of the National Capital Transportation Act of 1960, the Agency will invite these authorities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, representatives of existing subway rapid transit systems, and the public to serve on a special technical advisory committee on transit safety to assist in the preparation of an appropriate plan prior to the commencement of operations.

The prospect of criminal activity on board transit trains, as well as at stations, has also been considered land will receive the Agency's continued attention. Among the measures available to combat this problem are the provision of train attendants, the control of train size to obviate the operation of excess passenger capacity during off-peak hours, and utilization of modern communications systems. Under the Agency's plans, the transit system will incorporate the latest developments in automatic train control and communications equipment. While an operator will be aboard and have charge of each train, operations will not require his full time and attention. Instead of working in an enclosed compartment at the head of the train isolated from the passengers, the control system will permit surveillance of the car by the operator and an on-train communications system can be provided to maintain operator contact with each car, and with one or more control points on the system. Such equipment would facilitate quick reactions by security personnel in emergency situations, and will be considered for use on the system.

Concerning train size, it is recognized that on-train offenses occur most often in sparsely occupied units of multicar trains. To combat this danger, the Agency plans to reduce train size during off-peak periods, and at very late hours to operate single or double car units depending on traffic demand. To the extent that excess train space is eliminated the capacity of the operator to provide passenger protection is enhanced. Consequently, the Agency plans contemplate careful regulation of train size.

This is

The foregoing illustrates some of the matters under consideration. not, however, exhaustive. Crime, passenger security, and system policing is a subject of continuing concern, and will be the subject of study throughout the period during which the proposed rapid rail system is being constructed. The Agency's planning contemplates that in design, equipment, and operation, Washington's rail rapid transit system will provide the maximum possible security for its users.

CONTRACT FOR PRIVATE OPERATION OF SYSTEM

Mr. DENTON. It is my understanding that the system will be operated by a private operator. Please describe for the committee just what the details of this arrangement will be.

(The information follows:)

PRIVATE OPERATION

Section 3(b)(3) of Public Law 89-173 provides that the rail rapid transit system shall be operated under contract by private transit companies, private railroads, or other private persons, and requires that such contracts be entered into only after formal advertisement and negotiations with all interested and qualified parties, including the private mass transportation companies in the National Capital region.

This approach to the operation of the system recognizes that under the transit development program the transit system will be a publicly financed, publicly owned facility, and secondly, that section 102(5) of the National Capital Trans-portation Act of 1960 declares it to be the continuing policy of the Federal Government to make full use of private enterprise whenever appropriate in the implementation of a transit improvement program for the region. The task has been to provide for private enterprise participation and, at the same time, to assure that the means selected will be adequate for protection of the public interest. The authorized rail rapid transit system will involve a public investment of an estimated $431 million. It will be public property, and any plan for operation of the system must recognize the overriding public interest in the facilities.

The primary objectives of any arrangement must be: (1) Protection of the public investment in the system. This will require continuing public control over the fares and revenues of the system to assure that debt service requirementswill be met. (2) Efficient, economical operation of the facilities. Here, experienced private management can make a major contribution to the success of the operation, but protection of the public investment will require public supervision of expenditures, and public control over standards of maintenance and service. (3) Fast, safe, reliable, and attractive service to the public at reasonable fares. Here again, the benefits of experienced private management would be invaluable, but public control over schedules and standards of safety will be necessary.

Necessarily, the terms of any arrangements for operation of a publicly financed, publicly owned transit system must differ considerably from those that are appropriate for privately financed, privately owned systems. The latter involve substantial private investments in privately owned property devoted to the public service. There, private investors put their capital to work and assume the risks of the business. Subject to appropriate regulation as to fares and service, such investors are entitled to a reasonable return on their investment, and, consistent with their obligation of public service, may apply their resources as they see fit to achieve this.

A publicly financed, publicly owned transit system presents an entirely different situation. It involves no private investment and no private risk. The risks of the business are assumed by the public. No basis exists for operations designed to produce dividend income for private investors.

In providing for contract operation of the proposed system. section 3(b) (3) provides the means for achieving the two major objectives. Private operation of the facilities is assured. At the same time, in contracting out the operation, the public agency involved will be in a position to require the inclusion in any such contract of the provisions necessary for protection of the public investment and interest. In addition, under this approach the operating contractor rather than the Government would employ all operating and maintenance personnel required for the transit system. It will not be necessary, therefore, to disturb the established pattern of labor-management relations in the local transit industry, or the existing rights and benefits of transit workers. Also, by contracting out operations, the Federal Government's involvement in the details of day-to-day transit management can be held to a minimum.

Public Law 89–173 does not undertake to specify the form or the terms of any arrangement for operation of the system. In the Agency's judgment, it should not. It will take approximately 7 years to construct and equip the proposed facilities. Assuming no delays, first operations on a portion of the system will not occur until some time in 1971. It would be premature at this time to commit the Agency, or any successor, to a particular contractual approach. The Agency responsible for operations should be afforded the discretionary authority it will need to fashion an appropriate arrangement which will take account of conditions as they exist at the time the negotiation of a contract becomes necessary. The authorizing legislation wisely provides this necessary flexibility.

OPERATIONS CONTRACTS GENERALLY

Under section 3(b)(3), a variety of contractual devices would be available for obtaining private enterprise operation of the transit system. These include management services contracts, lease arrangements, or arrangements such as the so-called facilities contracts under which the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force provide for contractor operation of Government-owned production facilities in connection with defense procurements. The Air Force contracts out the operation of the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Kennedy, and the Atomic Energy Commission contracts out the operation of its Los Alamos, N. Mex., installation, as well as its production facilities at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and at other locations. In addition to providing ample precedent for private enterprise operation of publicly owned facilities, these activities constitute a reservoir of experience which will be useful in developing an appropriate arrangement for the transit system. Regardless, however, of the form of the arrangement-be it a management contract, lease, a combination of these, or some other contractual device, the basic requirements of any such undertaking are clear. It will be essential that jurisdiction and control be retained over fares, revenues, operating schedules, and standards of maintenance and service. Such control will be necessary for the protection of the public investment in the system and should be exercised by an agency that will be responsible to both the Congress and the public on a continuing basis.

Aside from establishing the foregoing as the basic requirements of any arrangement for private operation of the transit system, the Agency has made no final judgments as to the form such arrangements should take. In this connection, however, a survey has been conducted of the experience in a number of cities where publicly owned transit facilities are, or have been, operated by private corporations under leases or management services contracts.

LEASES

The city of Philadelphia has a long history of leasing municipally owned transit facilities to a private company for operation. There, most of the subway rail rapid transit system was constructed and equipped by the city, and is publicly owned. Some portions were constructed on a cost-sharing basis with the private company. All of the facilities have for many years been operated by the Philadelphia Transportation Co. under leases from the city. The lease periods have ranged from 15 to 35 years. Rents have been established on a number of bases including a fixed amount, an annual payment based on a percentage of the original cost of the leased property, and at a sum equivalent to the interest and principal payments on the city's construction bonds.

The Agency's survey indicates that Philadelphia's leasing experience is unsatisfactory. The rental for the Broad Street subway has not been sufficient to repay the interest and amortization requirements on the city's construction debt, and deficits have had to be made up out of property taxes. Also, under the present arrangements maintenance appears to be a continuous problem, with the city demanding higher standards and getting what it regards as an inadequate response from the company. The Agency's survey indicates a growing disenchantment with the existing public-private arrangements. The city's problems are summarized in a report prepared for the mayor of Philadelphia entitled "The Public Transit Authority-A Study of Five Cities." In addition to the usual problems of increasing traffic congestion and declining transit patronage the report notes (1) the reluctance of the lessee-company to adopt an agressive policy of service extensions and improvements, (2) a loss of public confidence due to the company's failure to provide improved service, and its repeated demands for fare increases, (3) that the company has instituted service improvements only under the prodding of the city government, (4) that in view of the city's heavy investment in the system, the public does not look kindly on the use of tax funds for transit improvement while stockholder dividends continue, and (5) an apparent unwillingness on the part of the company to continue operations except on its own terms.

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently created a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, and present indications are that that agency will acquire and operate all of Philadelphia's mass transportation system. Such a move has been advocated by the city.

Philadelphia's difficulties are not attributable solely to its leases, although it does appear that the city has had problems obtaining what it regards as proper