nomic burden of a nondiscriminatory State income tax on the salary of an employee of the National Government or of a governmental agency is passed on so as to impose a burden on the National Government tantamount to an unconstitutional interference by the one government with the other in the performance of its functions. Graves v. N. Y. ex rel. O'Keefe (1939), 306 U. S. 466, reversing (N. Y., 1938), 16 N. E. (2d) 404; State Tax Comm. et al. v. Van Cott (1939), 306 U. S. 511. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, are overruled in so far as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from nondiscriminating income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or State governments or their instrumentalities. Id. 349c. States sales and income taxes; applicability to Federal areas.—That (a) no person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part within a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area. (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to sales or purchases made, receipts from sales received, or storage or use occurring, after December 31, 1940. Sec. 1, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1059); 4 U. S. C. 13. (a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occuring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area. (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to income or receipts received after December 31, 1940. Sec. 2, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 14. (a) The provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this Act shall not be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from the United States or any instrumentality thereof, or the levy or collection of any tax with respect to sale, purchase, storage, or use of tangible personal property sold by the United States or any instrumentality thereof to any authorized purchaser. (b) A person shall be deemed to be an authorized purchaser under this section only with respect to purchases which he is permitted to make from commissaries, ship's stores, or voluntary unincorporated organizations of Army or Navy personnel, under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. Sec. 3, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 15. The provisions of this Act shall not for the purposes of any other provision of law be deemed to deprive the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over any Federal area over which it would otherwise have exclusive jurisdiction or to limit the jurisdiction of the United States over any Federal area. Sec. 4, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 16. Nothing in sections 1 and 2 of this Act shall be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed. Sec. 5, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 17. 646631°-456 As used in this Act (a) The term "person" shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 3797 of the Internal Revenue Code. (b) The term "sales or use tax" means any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, sales, receipts from sales, purchases, storage, or use of tangible personal property, except a tax with respect to which the provisions of section 10 of the Federal Highway Act, approved June 16, 1936, are applicable. (c) The term "income tax" means any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts. (d) The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the United States. (e) The term "Federal area” means any lands or premises held or acquired by or for the use of the United States or any department, establishment, or agency of the United States; and any Federal area, or any part thereof, which is located within the exterior boundaries of any State shall be deemed to be a Federal area located within such State. Sec. 6, act of Oct. 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 18. Notes of Decisions Municipal income tax.-A municipal income tax ordinance is applicable to income earned by a resident of another State as an employee of the United States at a navy yard located within the territorial limits of the city imposing the tax by virtue of the Federal statute authorizing State taxation of income received in Federal areas, notwithstanding the fact the State had granted to the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the navy yard, without qualification or restrictions, save as to service of criminal and civil process. Kiker v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 1943), 31 A. (2d) 289; certiorari denied (1943), 320 U. S. 741. tempt of the South Carolina Tax Commission to enforce against United States Army Post Exchange the State statute imposing a license tax on privilege of selling beer, tobacco products, etc., is a violation of immunity from State taxation enjoyed by “federal instrumentalities" under the Federal Constitution, notwithstanding provision in Federal statute that no person shall be relieved from liability for payment of any State sales or use tax on the ground that the tax is levied within a Federal area. 4 U. S. C. 13 (a), 15. U. S. v. Query (D. C., E. D. S. C., 1941), 37 F. Supp. 972; reversed (1942) State taxation of post exchange. The at- 316 U. S. 486. 353. Witnesses before committees of Congress. The act of January 13, 1940 (54 Stat. 13), provides a penalty for endeavoring to influence or intimidate witnesses in proceedings before departments or Congressional investigations. CHAPTER 3 ARTICLES OF WAR A. W. 2. Persons subject to military law, 359. A. W. 59. Advising or aiding another to deA. W. 3. Courts-martial classified, 360. A. W. 12. General courts-martial, 369. A. W. 17. Trial judge advocate to prosecute; A. W. 38. President may prescribe rules, 395. A. W. 42. Places of confinement; when law- A. W. 43. Death sentence; when lawful, 400. A. W. 46. Action by convening authority, 403. sert, 417. A. W. 61. Absence without leave, 419. A. W. 74. Delivery of offenders to civil au- A. W. 82. Spies, 440. A. W. 83. Willful or negligent loss, damage, or wrongful disposition of military property, 441. A. W. 86. Misbehavior of sentinel, 444. A. W. 108. Soldiers; separation from the ser- A. W. 114. Authority to administer oaths, 472. A. W. 52. Suspension of sentences in general, A. W. 118. Officers; separation from service, 410. A. W. 58. Desertion, 416. 476. A. W. 121. Complaints of wrongs, 479. military law. 359. (A. W. 2). Persons subject to The act of March 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 41) extends the jurisdiction of naval courts-martial in time of war to persons other than Army personnel, accompanying or serving with the naval forces outside the continental limits of the United States. Notes of Decisions Employees of Government contractors.-Ap- | faring man, had signed shipping articles at plication for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner had been employed by an aircraft company in connection with the operation of an overseas aircraft depot, which was a wholly military installation in former enemy territory occupied by American and British forces and was under the supervision of U. S. Army officers. Both American and British planes were repaired at the depot, but petitioner worked on British planes only. Petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial at the depot of theft of a diamond ring in violation of Article of War 93. At the time of the alleged offense, he had been relieved of active duty and was in a city a number of miles from the depot, but his employment had not been terminated. Writ dismissed. Held, Petitioner was a person "accompanying or serving with the Armies of the United States in the field" within the meaning of Article of War 2. The circumstances of the enactment of Article of War 2 as well as its plain language show that it was intended to include petitioner. It is immaterial that his work was upon British planes only. In re Di Bartolo (D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1943), 50 F. Supp. 929. Merchant seamen.-Application for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner, a civilian sea Norfolk, Virginia, as chief cook on a merchant vessel owned by the United States but operated by a shipping corporation under a contract making the corporation general agent of the United States for the purposes of such operation. He worked about a week on board the vessel while she was lying at the army base at Norfolk. As she was pulling away from the wharf, bound for a theater of operations with none but military passengers and cargo aboard, petitioner jumped to the dock. He was apprehended by a military policeman and held in military custody for trial by general court-martial for desertion. Writ denied and petitioner remanded to military custody. Held: A voyage carrying troops and military cargo to a theater of operations is "in the field," and petitioner was "accompanying or serving with the armies." He was therefore subject to military law under Article of War 2 (d). It is immaterial that he was in the employ of a private corporation. There is no merit to the contention that petitioner is excluded from the scope of that Article by reason of being subject to "naval jurisdiction," because, though he was subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, in time of war a part of the Navy, as to certain mat ters in connection with his signing up, his | In re Berue (D. C., S. D. Ohio, 1944), 54 certificate, etc., he was not subject to the F. Supp. 252. criminal or court-martial jurisdiction of the Navy. Nor is there any merit to his contention that he did not know that he was to be subject to military law, because the test of jurisdiction is an objective one and a person's ignorance thereof is immaterial. McCune v. Kilpatrick (U. S. D. C., E. D. Va., 1943), 53 F. Supp. 80. a Sentences including forfeitures instead of fines have been imposed by military and naval courts-martial on merchant seamen employed on vessels owned by or bareboat chartered to the United States. Such seamen are paid by the United States through General Agents operating the vessels under the General Agency Service Agreement. Held, Although the question has not been passed upon by the courts, it is believed that, where the sentence is regular on its face, it is the duty of all officers, employees and agents of the executive branch to comply with the sentence and withhold the pay. In such case there would seem to be "sufficient cause" for withholding wages, within the meaning of that term as used in R. S. 4529, as amended (act of March 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, 46 U. S. C. 596). (July 1, 1944), 40 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 80. Persons accompanying the Army.-Petition for habeas corpus to obtain release from penitentiary confinement under sentence of an Army court-martial. Petitioner had been hired in the United States by a corporation engaged under Army contract in salvage operations in the harbor at Massawa, Eritrea. His own contract provided that his employment should be terminated if the Army officer in charge should so direct; and that, if he should be discharged, the company was to pay his transportation and subsistence back to the United States. The petitioner was discharged by the company 21 Scptember 1942 at the direction of the Army officer in charge. While awaiting transportation home, he visited a civilian on a ship in the harbor. The next day he sailed for the United States on another ship. When his ship arrived at Port Tewfik, Egypt, he was taken off, and later brought before a general court-martial of the U. S. Army at Heliopolis, Egypt, on 23 December 1942 on charges of larceny of jewelry from the civilian whom he had visited on the ship at Massawa, of forgery of a receipt for purchase money for the articles stolen, Application for writ of habeas corpus to obtain release from imprisonment under a sentence of court-martial. Petitioner was merchant seaman on vessel owned by the United States but operated by a private corporation under an agency agreement with the War Shipping Administration. Prior to the time in question, and without knowledge of petitioner, the vessel was assigned by the War Shipping Administration to the Army by letter of allocation. Petitioner boarded the vessel at an Army Port of Embarkation and served as a messman. The vessel then took on and carried an exclusively Army cargo. During her voyage, the vessel carried an Army officer whose duty it was to prevent larceny of, or damage to, the cargo. Pursuant to Army orders the vessel left the port and joined a convoy en route to a foreign country. While the convoy was on the high seas, a fight occurred between the petitioner and another member of the crew. The master of the vessel intervened and the accused struck him. When the convoy arrived in the foreign country, the petitioner was brought to trial before a general court-martial for this offense as a violation of Article of War 96, and convicted. Under the sentence, petitioner was confined in the Federal Reformatory, Chillicothe, Ohio, and this action was brought to obtain his release therefrom. Writ denied. Held, The petitioner was a person subject to military law. There can be no doubt that the vessel, sailing as a part of a convoy through submarine-infested waters, was "in the field" within the meaning of Article of War 2. The convoy was simply a means of conveyance used by the Army in bringing up supplies and munitions through territory and of. uttering the forged receipt at Port constantly subject to enemy attack. Whether the road lay over land or water and whether short or long could make no difference; the course traversed constituted a supply line to our armed forces abroad, menaced throughout its length by armed forces of the enemy. The conclusion is inescapable that petitioner was "accompanying or serving with the Armies of the United States," within the intent and meaning of Article of War 2. The circumstances show that the Army was itself engaged in transporting, by its own conveyance, its own supplies to the front. The existence of jurisdiction over petitioner was not defeated by his ignorance that he was subjecting himself to that jurisdiction. Tewfik. He was found guilty and sentenced, as modified by the reviewing authority, to ten years' confinement. Petition dismissed. Held, Petitioner aligned himself with a military enterprise and was accompanying the Army of the United States in the field in time of war. It is immaterial that the record fails to show the kind or number of U. S. Army units stationed at the places in question. It is unnecessary that, in order to be accompanying the Army, a person be in sight of or within certain distance of a definite number or group of the armed forces. a Petitioner's contention that, even if he had previously been within A. W. 2(d), his discharge from the service prior to the commission of the crimes withdrew him from military jurisdiction, is without merit. Military jurisdiction expires when "accompaniment" ceases, but it does not follow that accompaniment ceased when employment ceased. Administratively and legally, he had not been merged in the population of Eritrea; but, as is shown by the papers in reference, he continued a citizen of the United States brought to Eritrea for a limited time by a contractor with the United States Army, to work on a project of the United States Army, upon an express agreement with him that he would be returned by the contractor to the United States upon completion of such employment; and he was at the time awaiting return. From these facts, the conclusion is inescapable that petitioner's accompaniment continued while he was still in Africa, independently of his discharge from his job. Once military jurisdiction attaches to a person, the location of the court-martial is immaterial. Perlstein v. U. S. and William H. Hiatt (D. C., M. D., Pa., 1944), 57 F. Supp. 123. Persons under sentence adjudged by courtsmartial.―Military prisoners held for punishment under previous sentences are subject to military law and trial by court-martial for offenses committed during such imprisonment, and the second sentence will be executed upon expiration of the first. Mosher v. Hudspeth, Warden (C. C. A. 10, 1941), 123 F. (2d) 401; certiorari denied (1942), 62 Sup. Ct. 1039. and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for the purpose of determining the question of when a selectee is "actually inducted" into the Army. Petitioner had reported for induction as ordered, and had submitted to a mental and physical examination. He was advised that he had passed and would be accepted. At the induction ceremony in the presence of several officers he was asked to stand and take the oath; he refused. The oath of induction was then read to him but he stated that he would not subscribe to it. The officer in charge informed him that he was in the Army. The District Court (46 F. Supp. 663; 1 Bull. JAG 344) held that induction was completed upon acceptance of the selectee by the Government, and the Circuit Court of Appeals (135 F. (2d) 505; 2 Bull. JAG 287) affirmed on the ground that "induction was completed when the oath was read to petitioner and he was told he was inducted into the Army." Reversed. Held, The acceptance of a selectee, and the ceremony of induction, are two separate parts of the whole induction procedure. He is "actually inducted" and subject to military jurisdiction after he has been found acceptable and undergoes the prescribed induction ceremony. Until actually inducted, he is a civilian and subject only to the jurisdiction of civil courts. In the present case, the petitioner's refusal to submit to the induction was a violation of sec. 11, Selective Training and Service Act, and is punishable Selectees not actually inducted.-Petitioner only by the civil authorities. Billings v. was denied release on writ of habeas corpus, Truesdell (1944), 321 U. S. 542. 360. (A. W. 3). Courts-martial classified. Notes of Decisions Review of decisions.-Civil courts cannot Hudspeth, Warden C. C. A. 10, 1941), 123 review merits of cases tried in military F. (2d) 401; certiorari denied (1942), 62 Sup. tribunals. Sanford, Warden v. Robbins (C. Ct. 1039. C. A., 5, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 435; Mosher v. 369 (A. W. 12). General courts-martial. For jurisdiction of military commissions, see Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, cited under Constitution, Amendment 6, ante. That the defense of entrapment does not go to the jurisdiction of a court-martial, see Romero v. Squier, 133 F. (2d) 528, cited under Constitution, Amendment 6, ante. 372 (A. W. 15). Jurisdiction not exclusive. For jurisdiction of military commissions, see Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, cited under Constitution, Amendment 6, ante. 374 (A. W. 17). Trial judge advocate to prosecute; counsel to defend. That an accused is entitled as of right to military or civilian counsel, but not to both, see Romero v. Squier, 133 F. (2d) 528, cited under Constitution, Amendment 6, ante. 395 (A. W. 38). President may prescribe rules. Paragraphs 30c, 35a and 94, M. C. M., 1928, were amended by War Department Circular No. 79 of 1938. Executive Order No. 9216, August 7, 1942, amended paragraph 117a, Manual for CourtsMartial, U. S. Army, 1928, by adding thereto the following paragraph: |