III. Common Section 8. Powers of Congress CLAUSE 1. TAXES; DUTIES; COMMON DEFENSE Notes of Decisions defense. The national defense is not an exclusively Federal function or responsibility precluding cooperation from the States. (U. S. C. A., Const. art 1, sec. 8.) State ex rel. Gibbs, Atty. Gen. v. Gordon et al. (Fla., 1939), 189 So. 437. The statute creating the Duval County Air Base Authority in aid of the Federal national defense program, and declaring that the national defense is a joint responsibility of the Federal and State Governments, does not violate the Federal Constitution as an encroachment upon an exclusive function of the Federal Government. Acts 1939, H. B. 1145, par. 1; U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. Id. The power granted Congress by the Constitution to provide for the common defense and to raise and support armies is not to be interpreted in a way that will make the power ineffective against an enemy, actual or potential. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. U. S. v. Lambert (C. C. A. 8, 1941), 123 F. (2d) 395. IV. General welfare.-Change citation to read: Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1938), 21 F. Supp. 947 affirmed (1938), 306 U. S. 118. Under authority of Congress to spend money in aid of the "general welfare," the discretion to determine between particular and general welfare belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong or a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment, and courts will respect the judgment of Congress unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation or is shown to involve an impossibility. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1. In re United States (two cases), (D. C., 1939), 28 F. Supp. 758. There is a middle ground between particular welfare and "general welfare" for which Congress is authorized to spend money, in which discretion is at large and belongs to Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1. Id. V. Constitutionality of Federal statutes.— A court in considering the validity of an act must give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law, but amendment may not be substituted for construction, and the court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation. Pflueger v. U. S. et al. (App. D. C., 1941), 121 F. (2d) 732; certiorari denied (1942), 314 U. S. 617. CLAUSE 3. REGULATION OF COMMERCE I. In general.-A State cannot tax interstate commerce either by levying a tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or by taxing the privilege of engaging in it. State ex rel. v. Southern Oil Service, Inc. (Tenn., 1939), 124 S. W. (2d) 704. Where interstate shipment of goods is not contemplated or required by party, a contract of sale within State between persons residing in State for delivery of goods therein is not "interstate commerce" merely because the seller fulfills the contract by shipments to the purchaser of goods from a point without the State. Id. II. Authority over navigable waters.-The Federal Government's jurisdiction over navigable waterways is based on section of Constitution authorizing Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce and make all laws necessary and proper to carry such U. S. C. A. Const. powers into execution. art. 1, sec. 8. Grand River Dam Authority v. Going et al. (D. C., 1989), 29 F. Supp. 316. The fact that portions of a navigable stream are no longer used for commerce does not dilute the power of Congress over them. Congress may control nonnavigable parts of a river in order to preserve and promote commerce on the navigable parts. The power of Congress, under the Commerce Clause, to protect a navigable river from floods extends to the control of waters of its tributaries. The exercise of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce may be aided by appropriate and needful control of activities and agencies which, though intrastate, affect that commerce. It is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project, by itself or as part of a more comprehensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the arteries of interstate commerce as to warrant it. Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co. (1941), 313 U. S. 508, affirming (D. C., E. D. Okla., 1941), 37 F. Supp. 93. The Federal Government derives its authority of navigable rivers the United States from the commerce clause of the Constitution. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3. Goodman et al. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8, 1940), 113 F. (2d) 914. over the The power of the United States Government over waters is not limited to control of navigation. State of Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. (D. C., E. D. Okla., 1941), 37 F. Supp. 93. The power of the United States over a (App. D. C., 1941), 123 F. (2d) 155; certinavigable waterway under its constitutional orari denied (1942), 315 U. S. 806. right to regulate "commerce" is no longer limited to control and improvement of the waterway for the operation of vessels in interstate and foreign commerce, but it exists equally in the case of flood protection, watershed development, and the recovery of In its control over navigable waters, the the cost of improvements through the utili- United States Government is not limited to zation of power structures for the purpose portion of stream which is in fact navigable, of generating electricity. Pennsylvania Water if the stream in general is 8 navigable & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission stream. Id. CLAUSES 11 AND 12. WAR POWERS Notes of Decisions U. S. v. Herling (C. C. A. 2, 1941), 120 F. (2d) 236; U. S. v. Lambert (C. C. A. 3, 1941), 123 F. (2d) 895; affirming (D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1941), 36 F. Supp. 915. I. In general. Under the Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12. Congress has power to compel military service of a citizen, in case of need, when Congress so declares, whether in peace time or war time, and to make preparations for national defense, if Congress declares that The power of Congress to raise and supit is imperative or necessary, or that an port armies conferred by the Constitution emergency exists requiring raising and sup- may be implemented by legislation providing port of an army, and Congress need not wait for compulsory military service. Const. art. to prepare for defense until nation is in-1, sec. 8. U. S. v. Lambert (C. C. A. 3, vaded. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cls. 11, 12, 14. 1941), 123 F. (2d) 395. U. S. v. Cornell (D. C., D. Idaho, S. D., 1940), 36 F. Supp. 81. Congress has power to raise and support an army before a formal declaration of war has been made, and such power is not prohibited by constitutional provision granting Congress power to declare war since the powers of Congress to raise and support armies and to declare war are separate, and it was not intended that the powers should be so linked together as to prohibit Congress from raising an army when and under such circumstances as in its judgment it is imperative or needed, or an emergency exists, before Congress has declared war. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, els. 11, 12. Id. II. Conscription.-The Selective Training and Service Act and regulations thereunder are valid, notwithstanding that there has been no formal declaration of war. Const. The power of Congress to compel citizens to register for military training is not limited to actions taken after formal declaration of war. Const. art. 1, sec. 8. Id. Congress has the power to raise and support armies by conscription in time of peace as well as in time of war. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12. U. S. v. Garst. (D. C., E. D. Pa., 1941), 39 F. Supp. 367. Under the Constitution, Congress has plenary and exclusive power to raise and support armies, and such power is not limited to accepting voluntary enlistments but includes power to exact and enforce military duty, and Congress can determine how the army shall be raised, the period of service, the age at which a soldier shall be inducted, the compensation he may receive, and the service to which he shall be assigned. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12. U. S. v. Newman (D. C., E. D. Ill., 1942), 44 F. Supp. 817. CLAUSE 17. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER PLACES PURCHASED WITH Notes of Decisions and other 1. Jurisdiction in general. The constitutional provision giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction over places purchased "for the erection of forts needful buildings" is applicable to lands over which the Federal Government seeks exclusive jurisdiction, and does not limit the right of acquisition of land by eminent domain. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. In re United States (two cases) (D. C., W. D., N. Y., 1939), 28 F. Supp. 758. Mere ownership and use of land by United States does not withdraw land from State's jurisdiction, but constitutional provision authorizing exercise by Congress of exclusive legislation over places purchased for erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings becomes applicable when United States acquires land with State's consent for those purposes. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. State v. Blair (Ala., 1939), 191 So. 237. The Where realty on which the United States delegation of Congressional authority. constructed housing project for defense Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Law of workers was merely leased to the United 1915 applied to the whole state and was States, the land was not "purchased" within merely in abeyance on the Fort Sill reservathe meaning of constitutional provision giv- tion until enactment of the act of Congress ing Congress power to exercise exclusive of June 25, 1936, when it became effective legislation over all places purchased by con- on the Fort Sill reservation without the sent of State legislature for erection of necessity of acceptance by the Oklahoma legforts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and islature. Ottinger Bros. v. Clark (Okla., other needful buildings, nor within meaning 1942), 131 P. (2d) 94. of State statute consenting to the purchcase or condemnation by the United States of such places, and the United States did not have "exclusive jurisdiction" of the realty, and hence defense worker who resided in housing project was entitled to register as an elector of the State in county where project was located. Act Cong. March 1, 1941, 42 U. S. C. 1523 note: U. S. C. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17; Pol. Code, sec. 34. Johnson v. Morrill (Calif., 1942), 126 P. (2d) 873. Land acquired by the United States, but which is not subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the United States under the Federal Constitution, remains subject to the jurisdiction of the State in matters not inconsistent with the free and effective use of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired. U. S. C. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. Id. A municipal income tax ordinance is applicable to income earned by a resident of another State as an employee of the United States at a navy yard located within the territorial limits of the city imposing the tax by virtue of the act of October 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 1060); 4 U. S. C. 14, authorizing State taxation of income received in Federal areas, notwithstanding the fact that the State had granted to the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the navy yard, without qualification or restrictions, save as to service of criminal and civil process. Kiker v. City of Philadelphia (Pa., 1943), 31 A. (2d) 289; certiorari denied (1943), 320 U. S. 741. II. Acceptance of cession.-Acceptance of cession of land within State to Federal Government is evidenced by Federal Government's purchase of the land and may be presumed therefrom. Pound v. Gaulding (Ala., 1939), 187 So. 468. The acceptance by United States of exclusive jurisdiction over lands ceded by State to United States without reservation except for service of process was to be presumed in absence of any contrary intent. Code 1907, secs. 898, 899. State v. Blair (Ala., 1939), 191 So. 237. The filing of the metes and bounds description and of the map or plat of land purchased by United States with consent of the State is a condition precedent to transfer of jurisdiction under the general ceding statute. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. Valley County v. Thomas (Mont., 1939), 97 P. (2d) 345. III. Reservations by State.-Whenever a State reserves any power at all, even that Proceeding to review an award of workman's compensation made for an injury sustained on the Fort Sill military reservation on May 15, 1941. Fort Sill was set aside as a military reservation prior to 1907. Oklahoma was admitted to the union in 1907. The Oklahoma legislature ceded exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Sill (subject to certain reservations not material in this case) to the United States in 1913. The Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Law, under which the award was made, was enacted in 1915. By the act of June 25, 1936, Congress authorized the enforcement of state workmen's compensation laws within areas subject otherwise to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. By an act of June 4, 1941 the Oklahoma legislature accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of June 25, 1936. The of serving civil or criminal process, over employer contended that the act of Congress lands purchased by United States for purof June 25, 1936 was a delegation of Con- poses designated in provision of Federal gressional jurisdiction in conflict with Art. Constitution respecting exclusive authority I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 of the Federal Constitution of Congress over places acquired by purchase and that, in any event, it was ineffective with State's consent, the jurisdiction 18 prior to acceptance by the Oklahoma legis- concurrent and not exclusive, since the only lature. Award sustained. Held: Art. I, exclusive jurisdiction is that of the Federal Sec. 8, Cl. 17, applies only to lands pur- Government. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. chased by the United States with the consent Valley County v. Thomas (Mont., 1939), 97 P. of state legislatures; it has no application (2d) 345. to lands acquired by the United States without the consent of the state legislature, exclusive jurisdiction over which has been ceded subsequently by the state legislature. The act of Congress of June 25, 1936 was a valid partial recession of jurisdiction, not a A State, in ceding jurisdiction to United States over land purchased with State's consent, even for purposes mentioned in provision of Federal Constitution respecting exclusive authority of Congress over places acquired by purchase with State's consent, may make such reservations of jurisdiction | Maryland was not territory belonging to and such conditions as it sees fit, and the State of Maryland, but was territory which Federal Government can accept the jurisdiction subject to such conditions as are not inconsistent with proposed governmental use. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, clause 17. Id. The fact that State of Maryland in ceding to Federal Government the ground upon which Fort Hoyle was established reserved the right to go upon the reservation for the purpose of serving process in no way prevented Federal Government from having full and complete jurisdiction over the military reservation. United Services Automobile Ass'n. v. Harman (Tex., 1941), 151 S. W. (2d) 609. had been ceded to United States Government. United Services Automobile Ass'n. v. Harman (Tex., 1941), 151 S. W. (2d) 609. If housing projects constructed by the United States for defense workers were forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other needful buildings, within meaning of the provision of the Federal Constitution giving Congress power to exercise "exclusive legislation" over such places, and State statute consenting to the purchase or condemnation of such places by the United States, then the projects were acquired by the United States with the consent of the legislature, and the United States had "ex IV. Effect of cession. (8th paragraph.)—clusive jurisdiction" over the land Change citation to read: Ryan v. State (Wash., 1936), 61 P. (2d) 1276; affirmed (1937), 302 U. S. 186. Where State has ceded land within its territory to Federal Government, Government acquiring exclusive jurisdiction thereover, municipal laws of the State which are in effect at time of cession generally remain in full force until abrogated by Federal Government, except insofar as they are inconsistent with Federal laws, but State's subsequent legislative enactments do not take effect in ceded area. Pound Gaulding (Ala., 1939), 187 So. 468. v. Where United States had purchased territory from State for military reservation subsequent to enactment of statute ceding to United States jurisdiction over land which might thereafter be purchased, with reservation only for service of process, United States had exclusive jurisdiction over territory, and gasoline stored and used there by defendant in carrying out contract with United States was not subject to gasoline excise tax. Code 1907, secs. 898, 899; Gen. Act 1923, p. 86; Gen. Acts 1927, pp. 16, 826; Gen. Acts 1931, p. 859; Gen. Acts 1932, Ex. Sess., p. 314; U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. State v. Blair (Ala., 1939), 191 So. 237. Upon the transfer from a State to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction of a site for a post office, the State laws in effect at the time continue in force as Federal laws, save as they may be inappropriate to the changed situation or inconsistent with the national purpose, and save as Congress may have provided otherwise. James Stew art & Co. v. Sadrakula, Adm. (1940), 309 U. S. 94; affirming (N. Y., 1940), 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 260. While the Government building contract is in a sense the means by which the United States secures the construction of its post office, the contractor in carrying out the contract has not the immunity of a Government instrumentality. Id. The military reservation of Fort Hoyle, although within territorial boundaries of 80 ac quired; the quoted terms being synonymous. Pol. Code sec. 34; U. S. C. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. Johnson v. Morrill (Calif., 1942), 126 P. (2d) 873. re Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of California refusing to prohibit the state Department of Agriculture from voking appellant's license as a milk dealer on the ground appellant had bottled milk in California for sale to the United States at Moffett Field, California, at a price less Moffett Field than that fixed by state law. is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The state law, which was deliberately designed to control indirectly the price of milk on military reservations, prohibited bottling, handling or transporting milk in California proper for sale in areas within the external geographical boundaries of prescribed marketing areas, whether or not the place of sale was part of such an area. Reversed. Held: The California statute is in conflict with Art. I, Sec. 8 of the Federal Constitution insofar as it purports, directly or indirectly, to regulate the price of milk sold on military reservations subject to exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Pacific Coast Dairy Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of California, (1943), 318 U. S. 285. VI. Scope of Clause.-The purpose of the Fort Peck Dam project, which was flood control and improvement of navigation, was not within intent of provision of Federal Constitution respecting exclusive authority of Congress over places acquired by purchase with State's consent, nor was the purpose of the project within intent of the general ceding statute of Montana granting consent to United States to purchase State lands for purposes described in Federal Constitution. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. Valley County v. Thomas (Mont., 1939), 97 P. (2d) 345. Lands purchased by the United States in connection with construction of the Fort Peck Dam project were not purchased for purposes of erecting "needful buildings" within meaning of the general ceding statute or the provision of Federal Constitution concerning exclusive authority of Congress within meaning of provision of Federal Conover places acquired by purchase, with stitution concerning exclusive authority of State's consent, for the erection of forts, Congress over places acquired by purchase, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, as respects whether the State of Montana had ceded jurisdiction to United States over such lands under the general ceding statute. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 17. Id. sec. with State's consent, for erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, notwithstanding that buildings were needed for warehouses, offices, and housing facilities in connection with construction of dam, and that Fort Peck townsite was used for such purpose. Const. The Fort Peck Dam is not a "building" | art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17. Id. Section 10. Power Denied to States CLAUSE I. IN GENERAL Notes of Decisions I. Constitutionality of State Laws. An "emergency" authorizing invocation of police power is an unforeseen occurrence or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action or remedy; a pressing necessity. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Noble et ux. (Miss., 1939), 188 So. 289. Though court should give respect to legislative declaration that emergency exists, authorizing invocation of police power, so far as such declaration relates to present facts, court may not shut its eyes to an obvious mistake when validity of the law depends upon the truth of the declaration. U. S. C. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Id. The court has the duty, if reasonably possible, consistent with protection of constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to validity of statute in favor of its constitutionality, sustaining it, if it can be done as a whole, or if it cannot be done, as to the part of it that is constitutional. Buck et al. v. Gibbs, Atty. Gen. of Florida, et al. (D. C., N. D., Fla., 1940), 32 F. Supp. 510; affirmed (1941), 313 U. S. 387. A statute itself constitutional is not affected by an unconstitutional amendment, since the amendment drops out as though never passed. Reitz v. Mealey (D. C., N. D. N. Y., 1940), 34 F. Supp. 532; affirmed (1942), 316 U. S. 33. A statute will survive the excision of unconstitutional parts unless it is apparent that the legislature would not have enacted it without the invalid parts. Id. II. Impairment of contract obligations.— There may be a valid impairment of obligations of contracts during a public emergency by proper exercise of police power of the State. U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Waterville Realty Corp. v. City of Eastport (Maine, 1939), 8 A. (2d) 898. In determining whether the enactment of a statute allegedly impairing obligation of contracts was justified by public emergency, the fact that act was entitled as one "Creating a Board of Emergency Municipal Finance," without expression of facts in a preamble constituting a public emergency, does not compel a conclusion that there was a "public emergency" rather than one solely private affecting only certain municipalities. Pub. Laws 1937, c. 233; U. S. C. A. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Id. ARTICLE II. THE PRESIDENT Section 2. Powers and Duties of the President CLAUSE 1. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; GRANTING OF PARDONS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF By Executive Order No. 8983, December 18, 1941, the President appointed a commission to investigate the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941, on Hawaii. The act of December 23, 1941 (55 Stat. 853), authorized this commission to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents. By Executive Order No. 8991, December 26, 1941, the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to meet the requirements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as to the issuance of weather reports and not to disclose information which may be considered of value to the enemy. By Military Order of June 18, 1942, the Office of Coordinator of Information, was thereafter to be known as the Office of Strategic Services, and was transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Executive Order No. 9312, March 9, 1943, modified the above order to the extent of defining the foreign information activities of the Office of War Information. |