The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 45
... rest of society . In other words , such laws function to preserve the PD problem of the producers and to prevent them from solving it at the expense of others . This point will be taken up again later ( Chapter III , Section 5.5 ) . 8 ...
... rest of society . In other words , such laws function to preserve the PD problem of the producers and to prevent them from solving it at the expense of others . This point will be taken up again later ( Chapter III , Section 5.5 ) . 8 ...
Page 52
... rest of the citizens , it appears that it rewards me to evade payment , whereas the effect of my evasion is negligible as far as the others are concerned ; more- over , it appears that my E - choice and their P - choice are dominant ...
... rest of the citizens , it appears that it rewards me to evade payment , whereas the effect of my evasion is negligible as far as the others are concerned ; more- over , it appears that my E - choice and their P - choice are dominant ...
Page 53
... rest ' , are just my con- siderations as presented above , with the E - choice dominating the P - choice . This is true of any given citizen , hence of all of them . So that all might opt for the E - choice with the result that the ...
... rest ' , are just my con- siderations as presented above , with the E - choice dominating the P - choice . This is true of any given citizen , hence of all of them . So that all might opt for the E - choice with the result that the ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum