The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 33
Page 69
... reason . For the mani- festation whereof , we are to consider ; first , that when a man doth a thing , which ... reason to deceive those that help him , can in reason expect no other means of safety , than what can be had from his own ...
... reason . For the mani- festation whereof , we are to consider ; first , that when a man doth a thing , which ... reason to deceive those that help him , can in reason expect no other means of safety , than what can be had from his own ...
Page 88
... reason fails to conform , therefore , is likely to be taken by the others to be acting in the first place contrary ... reason - the only good reason - for my taking the decision to do A rather than to do B in a co - ordination problem is ...
... reason fails to conform , therefore , is likely to be taken by the others to be acting in the first place contrary ... reason - the only good reason - for my taking the decision to do A rather than to do B in a co - ordination problem is ...
Page 149
... reason for picking out the state represented by R1 - C1 as the social choice . R1 - C1 should be the social choice since it is Pareto - optimal in the sense explained above ( p . 142 ) : while Column - Chooser is indifferent between it ...
... reason for picking out the state represented by R1 - C1 as the social choice . R1 - C1 should be the social choice since it is Pareto - optimal in the sense explained above ( p . 142 ) : while Column - Chooser is indifferent between it ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum