The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 169
... party to share some of the benefits of his favoured position with the other party . That is , voluntarily to narrow the gap between them , or , if you will , to ' bribe the other party off ' - to buy peace and stability by occasional ...
... party to share some of the benefits of his favoured position with the other party . That is , voluntarily to narrow the gap between them , or , if you will , to ' bribe the other party off ' - to buy peace and stability by occasional ...
Page 195
... party to the extent that it is ' good ' to the other . It is , to be sure , a status quo of ( relative ) inequality , but not a state in which one party gets absolutely all the benefits and the other party is correspondingly absolutely ...
... party to the extent that it is ' good ' to the other . It is , to be sure , a status quo of ( relative ) inequality , but not a state in which one party gets absolutely all the benefits and the other party is correspondingly absolutely ...
Page 196
... parties is not zero- sum . Precisely this happens in the situation at hand . The favoured party is not taken to be particularly interested in keeping the other low , as an end in itself ; it is not the case that he thrives on the ...
... parties is not zero- sum . Precisely this happens in the situation at hand . The favoured party is not taken to be particularly interested in keeping the other low , as an end in itself ; it is not the case that he thrives on the ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum